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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis puts forth a theory of how interstate wars are fought and how certain 
outcomes and their determinants occur. It begins with an overview of military theory and 
military science, followed by an overview of the relevant literature in political science.  
 Next the Informal Theory of Interstate Warfare is put forth, along with its 
implications for how interstate wars are fought and won, lost, or fought to a draw. The 
theory and its several hypotheses are then tested qualitatively in two case studies, that of 
the Russo-Japanese War, and World War II. The theory and its hypotheses are further 
tested quantitatively using a data set that contains strategic level, operational level, 
doctrinal, economic, population, and political variables with an emphasis on ground, 
naval, and air warfare in order to determine how and why certain war outcomes occur, 
the determinants of those war outcomes, and the overall validity of the Informal Theory 
of Interstate Warfare.  
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Introduction 
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“It is well that war is so terrible- we should grow too fond of it” 
- Robert E. Lee, General, Confederate States of America  
 
“This war differs from other wars, in this particular. We are not fighting armies but a 
hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war” 
- William T. Sherman, General of the Army of the United States 
 
“The main thing in true strategy is simply this: first deal as hard blows at the enemy’s 
soldiers as possible, and then cause so much suffering to the inhabitants of a country that 
they will long for peace and press their Government to make it. Nothing should be left to 
the people but eyes to lament the war” 
- Philip H. Sheridan, General of the Army of the United States 
 
“The one great element in continuing the success of an offensive in maintaining the 
momentum.” 
- George C. Marshall, General of the Army, United States Army 
 
“The U.S.’s major strength factor and weapon is its economy. If you cripple it, 
you cripple the military.” 
- Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, United States Navy 
 
“In war there is no substitute for victory.” 
- Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army, United States Army 
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The Study of Warfare: Problems of Perspective 
 This thesis is a study of the state at war. This thesis will attempt to expand the 
study of warfare both within political science and military science by combining the best 
both fields have to offer into a new combined view of the state. This new view is of the 
state at war, specifically through the lens of the state at the organizational and structural 
level.  
 This thesis differs greatly from the current works within political science and 
military science. The study of warfare is study of different perspectives; however its 
study has been uneven in both its progress and its perspectives. Currently within political 
science, the study of warfare revolves around three main areas. The first area is that of the 
interaction of states within a larger international system. The second area is that of 
leaders in time of war. And the third are the factors and determinants to war onset, 
outcomes, termination, and duration. In each of these areas, the state is recognized as key 
actor in interstate war and has at its disposal the resources of the state to prosecute a war 
to achieve some stated political aim. However, while in each of these areas the state is the 
recognized actor, no theory really portrays the entirety of the state at war. Instead, the 
state is reduced to proxies, both in theory and in application and tests, with the hope that 
someday, all the various small proxies can be added up into some grand formula or view 
of the state, which in turn will produce the state in its entirety. Thus what is being 
forgotten in the study of warfare by political science is the state is at war, not just certain 
elements or proxies. This problem is further compounded by a general lack of 
understanding or exploration of military affairs below the strategic level of war. 
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 In the fields of military arts/science and military history, the approaches of the 
study of warfare has occurred from a multitude of perspectives. Historians study wars at 
both the microscopic and macroscopic levels of war. Some histories offer a broad sweep 
of an entire war, while others concentrate on certain events, weaponry, or person 
involved in a specific war. Further, the goal of the study of military art/science is mainly 
in teaching its students how to wage war. It focuses mostly on one state (most likely their 
own state’s concepts of warfare) attempt to defeat an enemy state. Research in this 
specific area is vast and interrelated, falling into such areas of military strategy, national 
security strategy, doctrine, training, weaponry, moral codes, operational analysis, etc. Its 
focus is not what occurs beyond that of the armed forces role in wartime. Thus both fields 
are lacking in detail. While describing in detail political science, political scientists gloss 
over the variables of military science, and the same is true with military science in its 
glossing over of political variables.  
 Because of this, I felt that there was something missing in both fields of study. 
What is missing is not that fact that they are inseparable, but that there were few efforts 
out there to combine both fields of study into one with levels of detail from both fields. 
Thus this thesis seeks to bridge the gap between both fields of study, while expanding 
upon the research already conducted in both fields.  
 As in physics, field of study, the search for greater understanding occurs only 
through changes in (and the development of) different perspectives. Political science is 
dominated by looking at the view of leaders and their decision making processes, and 
strategic level determinates of warfare. What is missing or glossed over are the 
component of the states in both theory and in applicable tests of how the state affects 
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decision making processes, how the state fights wars, and the determinates of warfare 
below the strategic level (i.e. the operational and tactical levels of war). Military science 
is dominated by how armed forces fight wars, with an emphasis on the operational and in 
particular, the tactical levels of war. The study of national and military strategy however 
is relegated only to a few political leaders, military commanders, war planners, and 
civilians in practice, and its study is left to historical treatments and mostly long dead 
theorists. Thus what is missing in both is how the state fights wars, how it utilizes its 
resources during wartime (through its population, economy, and government), how the 
state acts during wartime, how states win or lose in war, and the combined effect of 
strategic, operational, and tactical determinants.  
 The works of earlier authors in political science, such as Stam, Reiter, and 
Bennett have shown that domestic variables play a major role in deciding war outcomes. 
While their work has been a significant improvement over earlier works before them, 
their work is severely limited in both theory and in practice. That is not to say that finding 
quantitative variables for understanding how domestic politics affects wars is easy, 
because it isn’t. However, broad sweeps of domestic politics and strategy fails to pin 
point the actual variables that affect war outcomes. Further, the information gleaned is a 
mixture of the various levels of war, without clear definition or refinement, but primarily 
rely on the strategic level of warfare, while leaving out the operational and tactical level 
of warfare, and treating strategies as if they are onetime events, chosen and then followed 
without change through the war. This however is a major flaw in the current area of 
study, as strategy is useless without not just tactics, but the means of translating success 
in battle (tactics) to political aims (strategy). Because of the large gap between strategy 
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and tactics, only the operational level of warfare can truly show how wars are won, as it 
combines with strategy and tactics within a theater of war. Thus more research must be 
conducted in order to gain further refinement and further proof of these early efforts in 
war outcome determinants.  
 Fears of interdisciplinary studies (which is what the study of warfare is), 
knowledge of warfare and military affairs, and problems with information should not 
deter us from expanding the field. The study of warfare requires knowledge of weaponry, 
tactics, operational art, doctrine, technology, administration, logistics, psychology, 
strategy, and a whole lot more. Warfare is a complex and very human endeavor, and is 
right for study. To ignore the study of warfare because warfare is perceived as evil 
(which it is, but at times is a necessary evil in my opinion) it as they say, to cut off one’s 
nose in spite of one’s face. The fate of states and history of the world has revolved around 
the outcomes of wars as much as a state’s fate has revolved around domestic politics. Nor 
should the lack of detailed information from many wars stop one from studying it. The 
information found in the field of study of warfare is spread out and uneven, often 
contradictory, and very much incomplete (and for man pieces of information forever lost 
due to time and the destruction of war). Von Clausewitz’s “fog of war” not only holds 
true during wartime, but afterword when reconstructing the events that occurred during 
war.  
 In spite of the many problems with the study of warfare, both within military 
science and political science, these two fields should work together more frequently in 
order for us to truly understand the act of warfighting and wartime politics. This first 
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begins with the rejection of prior assumptions, and moving forward to a better and 
combined understanding of warfighting and wartime politics.  
Questioning the Presumptions 
Logic and common wisdom have held for the majority of history that in order for 
a state to be victorious in war it must simply defeat (or destroy) the enemy’s armed 
forces. This perception then follows through that with defeat on the battlefield, the enemy 
will no longer able to resist further attacks and therefore must give in to the political 
demands forced upon them or see their state annihilated if they choose not to give in. 
This perception is true, but only partially so. War is much more involved and more 
complicated than this perception. Simple dictums of “victory lies in defeating the 
enemy’s army” and or “only though the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces is 
victory achieved” are not only half-truths, but fail to portray the true scope of war. War is 
not just fighting between armed forces, but fighting between states (and state like actors) 
and all that encompasses the state beyond that of their armed forces. 
What should make one question the logic of the presumption above is that wars 
have been won without seeing the complete destruction of the enemy’s armed forces! 
This is not just a fluke either happening only once or twice in history but numerous times. 
In fact most wars have been won where the opponent’s armed forces were not destroyed. 
This poses a quandary. If traditional thinking does not hold up to analysis, is it wrong? Or 
perhaps is there something more to winning and losing wars than the battles fought 
between armed forces? 
If only a portion of the enemy’s armed forces must be destroyed, there is the 
temptation then to ask how much of an enemy’s armed forces are required to be 
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destroyed before they will give in to the political demands? This however misses its goal 
of understanding war outcomes; as if once some magical percentage of the enemy’s 
armed forces is destroyed then victory is achieved. What is missing is some other 
variable (or series of variables) that in conjunction with military victory on the battlefield 
will lead to one state to defeat the other state. What is missing is that “something else”. It 
is this combination of military victory/defeat on the battlefield plus that ‘something else’ 
that following theory attempts to explain, and does so through the perspective of the state 
as an interrelated structure.  
New Perspective: An Informal Theoretical Frame Work for the State at War 
In order to fulfill the gaps in theory and in practice of the state at war, I put for an 
“Informal Theory of Interstate Warfare.” This informal theory is a non-mathematical 
theory. The theory holds that wars are won or lost because of the actions of the state to 
defend its Core (the government, economy, and population) and Shield (its armed forces 
and other elements of national defense) from attack while being able to disproportionally 
damage the enemy state’s Core and Shield to the point where that enemy state will give 
in to the political demands placed upon them.  
This theory is not a view of how leaders make decisions, though that is an element 
of the theory, and specially elements of the Core and Shield, but of how the state 
structurally fights wars and withstands attacks against it. In order to test this theory, 
several hypotheses are put forth in Chapter 4 and are tested both qualitatively and 
quantitatively utilizing variables at the strategic and operational level of warfare.  
This thesis is not written solely for those well versed in political science or the 
military arts, but for a wider audience as well. In order to provide a firm basis of 
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knowledge before the theory, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the levels of warfare and 
the development of the theories and practices of warfare, strategy, and operational art. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the development of how political science views 
warfare, and the development of relevant theories.  
Chapter 4 formally puts forth the ‘Informal Theory of Interstate Warfare’ along 
with testable hypotheses. Chapter 5 will then test the theory as a whole and the various 
hypotheses through the lens of two case studies, that of the Russo-Japanese War (1905-
1905), and the United States at war with Nazi Germany in World War II (1941-1945). 
The qualitative analysis will be backed up by empirical testing in Chapter 6 by a data set 
compiled by myself. This quantitative analysis will utilize logistical (logit) and 
multinomial logistical (mlogit) forms of statistical analysis to test the hypotheses.  
The thesis will then conclude with some final observations found in the data, and 
put forth new ideas and areas of study that should be pursued. This thesis should not be 
seen as a final product, but as a first step in helping further the study of warfare with 
military science and political science, in no small part expansion of study beyond the 
strategic level of war to the operational level of war, and the expansion of the state 
beyond policy makers and domestic political leanings of democracy or autocracy. I hope 
that this thesis is not only enjoyable, but also thought provoking and that it stimulate 
thought on how wars are fought, won, or lost. I also hope that it inspires others to more 
rigorously pursue the study of warfare within political science.  
This thesis does serve one other purpose, not matter how selfish it may be. It is 
how I think of warfare and how it should be fought. To the academic, this may mean 
little, and while I view myself as an academic after my time here at the University of 
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Missouri, there is more to it than that. I am a serving naval officer, and thus I am also a 
practitioner of war as well, and may someday have to influence, design, and implement 
plans for action against an enemy state if and when the United States goes to war again. It 
also serves at my attempt to bind two very similar and different fields of study that I 
believe should come closer together and that I passionately study and read about all the 
time: that of political science and military science (and art) into one, and thus this thesis 
is written for audiences in both fields of study.  
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Chapter 2:  
 
The Military Arts and Science in  
Theory and Practice 
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The study of warfare has been one of mankind’s oldest enterprises. Its study has 
been spread over many different areas and perspectives, ranging from philosophy, 
history, administration, tactics, operational art, and strategy to songs, stories, and poems. 
Because of this wide range of not only sub-topics within the field, but different methods 
utilized to explain each of the sub-topics, the study of warfare has been anything but 
scientific and systemic.  In order to understand the art of warfare with its theories, 
philosophies, and practices (to include some level of tactics, weaponry, operational art, 
strategy, etc), this chapter will extensively cover the written literature of the art of 
warfare in order to develop an baseline understanding for warfare, how it developed, and 
where the field is today. This chapter will, however, primarily remain in the realm of 
strategy, operational art, and philosophy while keeping to a bare minimum that of tactics, 
weaponry, and technology.  
As this study is written for audiences in both the fields of political science and 
military art, this chapter, along with the next, may be skipped for those very familiar with 
the literature, and continued with the main theory in chapter 4.  
The Levels of Warfare  
Most elements of military literature is based upon three levels of perspective, that 
of tactics, operational art, and strategy. Each of these levels of perspective is known as 
levels of war, and they denote very different elements of warfare, but primarily relate to 
the armed forces and their use in warfare.  
  While not purely in line with the current paradigm of levels of war utilized by 
most nations today (that of Strategy (i.e. national policy, security strategy), Operational 
Art (i.e. theaters and fronts), Tactical (i.e. battles)), author and noted historian James M. 
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McPherson has perhaps one of the most concise and well written definitions of the level 
of war and how they build off of each other in order to serve as a baseline for this study. 
“Policy refers to war aims-the political goals for the nation in time of war. National 
strategy refers to mobilization of the political, economic, diplomatic, and psychological 
as well as military resources of the nation to achieve these war aims. Military strategy 
concerns plans for the employment of armed forces to win the war and fulfill the goals of 
policy. Operations concerns the management and movements of armies in particular 
campaigns to carry out the purposes of military strategy. Tactics refers to the formations 
and handling of an army in actual combat” (McPherson 2008, 5).  
From the earliest times, humans bonded in groups with leaders directing their 
clans, cities, etc. in battle. Over time warfare became a codified element of human 
activity. Because of this codification at some basic level, humans were forced to come up 
with systems of thought in order to handle and explain the use of violence for political 
objectives. As such, the development of strategy and tactics has their roots in both ancient 
Chinese and Greek cultures. The word strategy is derived from the Greek word 
‘strategia’, meaning “office of general, command, generalship”. Tactics also came into 
development from ancient Greece, where tactics came from the Greek word ‘takitos’, 
meaning “fit for arranging or ordering”. These two words, along with offense and 
defense, formed the very hard of military theory and training. Often field armies in 
ancient times were commanded by the leader (or a small select group of leaders) within 
the political unit or organization they represented (clans, tribes, cities, republics, 
autocracies, monocracies, etc.). It was easy in for most armies to translate battlefield 
tactical engagement into strategic goals, and for strategic goals to help shape the need for 
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the selection of tactical engagements. Before the French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, 
strategy and tactics were not only interrelated but often inseparable. However, the French 
Revolution and Napoleonic Era would change this structure.  
 With the rise of the French Republic, the old strategy-tactics paradigm was no 
longer enough as strategy and tactics could not handle warfare in the age of mass 
mobilized manpower. A new paradigm was created in response, and was first utilized by 
Napoleon as his forces spread throughout Europe. While wars in the past had at times 
multiple fronts, it was not that common. During the age of Napoleon and afterwards, 
wars would mostly see multiple fronts and if not multiple fronts, then armies so vast in 
the field that no longer could one commander command all of them from sight. Thus the 
level of warfare of the ‘operational level’ was born.  
 Warfare before Napoleon revolved around tactics, administration, weaponry, 
logistics, and strategy. Politicians and military commanders (many times one and the 
same) from ancient times up until Napoleon controlled how wars and battles were to be 
fought. Depending on the philosophy of warfare that the commander pursued, war 
generally revolved around armies and navies seeking to engage each other in battle, or 
maneuvering to a strong position and avoid battle (and force the enemy to capitulate 
without fighting). In the end, battle or not, low or high casualties, the forces fielded were 
relatively small or in a localized area.  
Even with the rise of empires such as the Romans, Mongols, Spanish, French, and 
British, wars were still (while now more global) localized affairs. Forces sent in theater 
were there to stay for long durations (even melding with locals). Forces still were small 
and the length of the front lines was short (or conversely very large and unable to be fully 
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manned). Campaigns fought in these broad wars (such as the Seven Years War) were 
rarely fought in coordination with other theaters of war except only in the most general of 
ways. Each theater thus became a micro-war into itself (such as the French and Indian 
War within the Seven Years War). Even as it became more difficult to control forces in 
the field as armies and distances grew, little intellectual or practical developments in 
fighting war came, and the Strategy-Tactics paradigm continued to hold sway. 
Over time the separation between tactics and strategy grew noticeably impractical 
by those practicing war and commanders began to experiment with changes, but saw little 
success in their attempts. The impetus for change would come dramatically due to the 
social upheaval in the late 1780s and 1790s that would lead to en masse levees carried out 
by the French Republic during the French Revolution (and continued under Napoleon) 
that created armies the size of which that only the Romans, Huns, Chinese, and Mongols 
had accomplished in the past. During the Napoleonic era wars, Napoleon and his enemies 
were forced to utilize massive armies in the field. Command and control of such vast 
armies was impossible to handle for one person in such a centralize role and thus 
Napoleon and his Marshals and generals came up with a new formation, that of the 
Corps. The corps was a unit that combined several divisions under one commander, 
which in turn saw several corps combine to create an army in the field. The Corps system 
utilized by Napoleon was a system of command and control that allowed flexibility and 
mobility for the ever growing field armies, which in turn saw some of the most massive 
armies that have been created (van Creveld 2011, 20-21).  
Under the corps system (later adopted by the rest of the world and still in use 
today), Napoleon was able to use his corps as interchangeable parts, allowing his armies 
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to coalesce when necessary to engage an enemy, and then spread apart in order to 
preform grand maneuvers of hundreds of thousands of troops all over the enemy 
countryside (and hopefully into the enemy’s rear areas). The introduction of the Corps, 
however, was only part of the dramatic changes to the strategy-tactics paradigm.  
While corps allowed armies to expand in numbers and territory covered, the new 
conscription laws and size of militaries allowed for greater and greater numbers of forces 
to be utilized at different fronts other than the main front. It came to the point where 
several armies with their many corps were operating in vastly different areas of the 
continent they were fighting in. The corps system allowed for the creation of the lower 
level of the “operational level of war”, but in wars that had several theaters or fronts, 
more was required. Hence the need for an upper level of the operational level of war 
began to take shape. Now several theaters of war were required to defeat the enemy, and 
forces coordinated between the several theaters. Thus, as the corps system took shape and 
became a defining element of the Napoleonic era, and quieter and less recognized 
development occurred, that of the upper level of operational warfare, which saw theater 
strategy and theater operations rapidly develop that had been stagnant since before the 
dark ages of Europe.  
National policy making began to take into account the various theaters of war 
more and more often. Napoleon stunned the world when his corps combined together to 
win stunning tactical and operational victory after stunning victory. However, these 
campaigns were short, and victory was won with only a few battles over a large (but not 
continental size) area. With improved mobility, transportation, and communication, 
national leaders and commanders could now attempt large scale maneuvers that were 
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only the dreams of those before them. They would attempt to unite their vast armies into 
a unified war plan on a scale unseen before. Where Napoleon would coalesce the 
separated corps his main field army for a battle, nations would now coalesce several field 
armies across multiple theaters. The goal was to attack the enemy simultaneously with 
these many armies in order to have maximum effect possible upon the enemy (i.e. 
overwhelm them at a single point or at every point and get into the enemy countryside). 
Napoleon had attempted this, and fought across several fronts simultaneously. However, 
he normally relied upon one front to conduct the main fighting, and saw the rest as 
diversions to his plans for short campaigns and decisive battles.  
It was not until Abraham Lincoln in the American Civil War that the higher levels 
of operational warfare would finally become reality from its earlier form under Napoleon.  
In Lincoln’s case he set forth a political aim (returning the Confederacy back into the 
Union) utilizing a military strategy of overwhelming force and attrition. Lincoln 
throughout the war constantly pressed the commanders of the Union’s several theaters to 
act in concert with each other. Lincoln realized that as long as the Southern Confederacy 
could shift troops from one threat to the next as Union armies launched offensives in a 
piecemeal and uncoordinated fashion, the Union could not use its manpower advantage to 
full effect (Handel 1992, 115). It would take the appointment of Generals Grant, 
Sherman, and Thomas to high command in 1864 before could Lincoln see his political 
policy and military strategy come into fruition across the multiple theaters of war.  
Later, the codification of the operational level of war would be difficult, as it fills 
a nebulous area. Tactics meant fighting battles, and strategy means national policy and 
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war aims. However, how does someone fill the gap of turning battle outcomes into 
successful war aims?  
The gap between tactics on the one hand and strategy and policy on the other 
cannot be overcome by physical combat alone. The tactical framework is too 
narrow and the strategic perspective too broad to ensure the most decisive 
employment of one’s sources of power. Therefore, another field of study and 
practice must exist to properly orchestrate all available sources of military 
and nonmilitary power in order to accomplish the ultimate strategic or 
operational objective. This third component of military art (alternately called 
here operational art and operational warfare) occupies an intermediate 
position between policy and strategy on the one hand and tactics on the other. 
Operational art serves both as a bridge and as an interface between these two 
areas of study and practice. (Vego 2007, I-3). 
“Broadly defined [operational warfare/art] as a grey area between strategy and tactics, 
operational art spans the theory and practice of planning and conducting campaigns and 
major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives a given 
theatre of operations” (Olsen and van Creveld 2011, 1). As wars expanded in size and 
scope, the need for the operational level of war and theaters of combat was required. 
Thus the old paradigm was replaced with a new one, that of strategy-operations-tactics 
(or strategy-operational art-tactics). 
Since Napoleon, writers such as Jomini, Clausewitz, Fuller, Vego, and many 
others have expanded upon the ‘Operational Level of War’. Even with the theoretical and 
practical development of the operational level of warfare and the conduct of campaigns in 
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a theater of war, it remains the least understood and least studied level of warfare. “It is, 
therefore, a paradox that operational art, though acknowledged as an important element in 
planning and execution of military operations at home and abroad, remains under-
researched and relatively poorly understood. Simply put, manuals, procedures, and 
checklists cannot substitute for in-depth studies” (Olsen and van Creveld 2011, 2).  
Figure 2.1: Levels of Warfare 
 
Source: (Vego 2007, pg II-17).  
Ancient China and the first military theorists 
 The first works of military theory (that have survived to present day) were written 
during the Warring States Period of China came about during the fall of the Zhou/Chou 
dynasty at the end of the Spring and Autumn Period of Chinese history (van Creveld 
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2000, 24; Sawyer 1994, 151-152).1 During this period, several different kingdoms fought 
for supremacy over China from 475 BC to 221 BC, until unified under the Qin/Ch’in 
Dynasty. The cultural philosophies of the era strongly influenced the writings of the era. 
War was seen as an immense evil, but sometimes necessary in a world that was full of 
imperfections (van Creveld 2000, 29). War broke the cosmic perfection created under the 
Tao, and the only the Tao could be brought back was by the winning side, which would 
always be the side that had the greatest virtues, honor, harmony, that combined to allow 
the winning side to “observe the Tao of Heaven” (van Creveld 2000, 24).  
 Sun-Tzu’s first words in the Art of War are “Warfare is the greatest affair of state, 
the basis of life and death, the Way (Tao) to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly 
pondered and analyzed.” (Sun-Tzu 1994, 167). From the first sentences of his work, he 
firmly places the importance of warfare in relation to the state. With the rise of large 
kingdoms during Warring States Period, China began to slowly unify into larger and 
larger kingdoms. Because so many kingdoms and states had fallen due to poor showing 
on the battlefield and in war, Sun-Tzu sought to teach wise rulers the lessons of military 
history and how to successfully wage war. 
In order to achieve victory, Sun-Tzu put forth the following strategic and 
operational concepts that a kingdom and its commanders were to follow.  
In general, the method for employing the military is this: Preserving the 
[enemy’s] state capital is best, destroying their state capital is second-best. 
Preserving their army is best, destroying their army is second-best. Preserving 
their battalions is best, destroying their battalions is second best… For this 
reason attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the 
                                                             
1 This occurred during the Iron Age of Humanity. 
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pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the 
true pinnacle of excellence (Sun-Tzu 1994, 177).  
“Thus the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy’s plans; next is to attack 
his alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities” 
(Sun-Tzu 1994, 177).  
In order to achieve these strategic outcomes, “in general, the strategy for 
employing the military is this: if your strength is ten times theirs, surround them; if five, 
then attack; if double then divide your forces. If you are equal in strength to the enemy, 
you can engage him. If fewer, you can circumvent him. If outmatched, you can avoid 
him. Thus a small enemy that acts inflexibly will become the captives of a large enemy” 
(Sun-Tzu 1994, 177-178). Sun-Tzu concludes the chapter that “thus it is said that one 
who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred 
engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be 
victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself 
will invariably be defeated in every engagement” (Sun-Tzu, 179).  
Sun-Tzu throughout his writings sought to use maneuver and the avoidance of 
battle in order to win wars. He believed in “manipulating the enemy, creating the 
opportunity for an easy victory, and then applying maximum power at the appropriate 
moment” (Sawyer 1994, 134). He stresses speed, surprise, the use of conventional and 
unconventional forces together, and good intelligence on the enemy’s abilities, 
dispositions, and supplies, along with knowledge of  weaponry, terrain, weather, to 
achieve victory (Sawyer 1994, 130).  
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Sun-Tzu’s work, while short, proffers basic advice over all the levels of warfare, 
from the strategic, to the operational (campaign), to the tactical. While his list of advice 
on campaigns relates to the use of terrain and supplies as much as anything else, his 
overall guidance for fighting campaigns comes to down to utilization of speed and 
maneuver to create the conditions for short wars. “Thus in military campaigns I have 
heard of awkward speed but have never seen any skill in lengthy campaigns. No country 
has ever profited from protracted warfare. Those who do not thoroughly comprehend the 
dangers inherent in employing the army are incapable of truly knowing the potential 
advantages of military actions” (Sun-Tzu 1994, 173). 
 Sun-Tzu also believed that when command was given by a sovereign to a general 
to command an army, that general was merely given starting directions (i.e. political aims 
and objectives), and was free to pursue them without the influence of the sovereign. This 
view is a very contentious view throughout history, and has been both abused and 
vilified, and proven correct depending on the political leader and commander 
combination.  
 In Sun-Tzu’s world, speed, maneuver, intelligence, discipline, and freedom of 
action by commanders were the keys to victory for an army in the field, at all levels of 
warfare. Protracted warfare, faulty intelligence, and fighting the enemy not on one’s own 
terms will lead to defeat. It will be the start of what Robert Clonts describes as the 
“Bloodless” Strategies line of lineage in military warfare, where wars were based not 
upon battles but maneuver and positioning, and where the targeting of civilians and 
complete destruction of the enemy was not required (Clonts 1999, 8-11). While Sun-Tzu 
was not opposed to fighting battles by any stretch of the imagination (for he did see their 
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utility, especially when maneuver and positioning alone would not achieve victory), it is 
the start of what is commonly referred to as the “Indirect Approach” to warfare, and is 
the earliest codified form of what is now termed “limited war”. 
While Sun-Tzu is certainly the most famous of the ancient Chinese military 
theorists today, there were other very important military texts, such as Jiang Ziay’s “Six 
Secret Teachings” for building and maintaining an army and the role of the state, “The 
Methods of the Ssu-ma” and its justifications for war and importance of discipline, Wu 
Qi’s “Wuzi” and his advice on tactics and strategy, Wei Laiozi texts on combined civil 
and military approach to state affairs, and the “Questions and Replies between tan 
Taizong and Li Weigong”. These texts combined are known today as the “Seven Military 
Classics” of Ancient China (Sawyer 1993). These writers followed a very similar view as 
Sun-Tzu. Their combined thoughts implied that both the combined efforts of the state 
(civil government) and military were required to wage wars and promote peace. They 
also echoed Sun-Tzu in the belief of the ‘Indirect Approach’ of warfare. These writings, 
influenced through strong cultural and religious values, would influence Eastern Asia for 
over 2,500 years to the modern day.   
Ancient Greek and Roman Military Thought  
 Across the globe around the same time as the Spring and Autumn Period and the 
Warring States Period in China were occurring, the Western military tradition was 
beginning to expand. In the West however, the development of military theory was less 
based on philosophy as in China, and more on history and the technical aspects of war. 
While this was not ignored in the East, in the West, the philosophy of war was strongly 
ignored, and instead was more based on practical knowledge and experience.  
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 While the early Egyptian, Persian, and Assyrian military experiences are notable 
historically, their campaigns were focused around large forces concentrating to fight large 
decisive battles. This can be seen as the birth of the ‘Decisive Battles’ (or “Direct 
Approach”) strategic paradigm, but it was not until ancient Greece and Rome did this 
paradigm truly become defined and codified.  
 The growth of Greek literature on warfare came from the traditions the Greeks, 
stories, and fables. Such stories as the Iliad and the Odyssey (in particular the Iliad), were 
stories of Greek valor in combat, along with lessons of strategy and politics that were 
played out on a grand scale in the War with Troy. Although Greek culture was impressive 
for its vast fields of study, the study of warfare was rarely codified, and instead was 
something that was passed down from generation to generation through training and 
practical knowledge instead of manuals, philosophies, and debates. Because of this, the 
famous Greek Phalanx and other tactical formations were refined at a very slow place, 
with emphasis on training alone. Greek tactics revolved around either sieges or phalanx 
battles on the open plains. Strategy revolved around defense of cities and alliances.  It 
was not until the great Peloponnesian War that elements in the study of warfare began to 
be codified beyond stories, fables, and traditions.  
Thucydides’ work, The Peloponnesian War, is a political and military history that 
is an example of where “Classical antiquity has never been surpassed” (van Creveld 
2000, 44). Its descriptions of “the goals of commanders, activities of armies, the 
motivations of troops, the possibilities and limitations of weapons and the sufferings of 
civilians” was the first of its kind in the Western world (van Creveld 2000, 44). For all of 
the great military histories written during this time period, “it is remarkable that ancient 
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military theory does not attain nearly the same level of excellence” (van Creveld 2000, 
44). It is also unknown how much influence the works of Xenophon on strategy and 
tactics, or Tacticus’ treatises of warfare this had upon commanders during the Greek era, 
but over time it reached nowhere near the popularity that (nor research into) Thucydides 
work has gained (Hanson 1995 29, van Creveld 2000, 48-49). 
 Strategy in both Greece and Rome revolved around national policy, such as 
influence over other states, the conquest of cities, and general expansion of power. 
Strategy as a concept or as a utility was not codified. Practicability and experience was all 
the ancient Greeks and Romans believed they need. What occurred in the West much 
different than what was seen in China. In China, strategy and military art was codified 
around what is now called the ‘indirect approach’ (though this was not always followed) 
which was seen as the supreme form of warfare. In the ancient Western world however, 
there was a fierce debate amongst politicians and commanders (many times one and the 
same) between the ‘indirect strategy’ and the ‘direct strategy’. This contrast was best seen 
in both the Peloponnesian War and the Second Punic War.  
 Before and during the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians were initially believers 
in the ‘indirect approach’, where their navy would keep the supply lines open and allow 
them to strike where the Spartans were weak. The Spartans on the other hand believed in 
the ‘direct approach’, where it’s well trained and feared army of hoplites would defeat 
their enemies on the field in the afternoon and win the war. Under the leadership of 
Pericles, the Athenians stayed behind their walls which the Spartans could not breech and 
await supplies from the Empire. The Spartans could not induce the Athenians to battle, 
and were forced to raze the land and leave Attia until such time as the Athenians would 
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come out behind their walls. The Athenians however were unable to effectively harm the 
Spartans with their raids and their alliances. Both sides suffered and drained their 
treasuries. It was not until the Athenians blundered with an offensive against Syracuse on 
Sicily and the Spartans built up a navy to defeat the Athenians and lay an effective siege 
on land and sea against Athens that the long and brutal conflict ended. The failure of 
Athens and its ‘indirect approach’ early on, and Sparta’s victory through the use of the 
‘direct approach’ placed decisive battle as the favored strategy by those in the ancient 
world. During the Second Punic War this view would undergo a transformation to an 
extent.   
At the start of the Second Punic War, Rome suffered two major defeats at the 
hands of the Carthaginian army under Hannibal at the battles of Trebia and Trasimene in 
218 and 217 BC respectively. Due to these losses, the Romans elected Quintus Fabius 
Maximus Verrucosus ‘Cunctator’ to the position of dictator in order to deal with the 
invasion by Hannibal.2 He utilized attritional and indirect warfare against the 
Carthaginians, avoiding pitched battles and attacking his supply lines in an attempt to 
outlast the enemy and whittle them down to nothing. Roman legions were rebuilt and 
retrained, but the Roman Senate and populace were unhappy with the slow pace of events 
and wanted direct action against the Carthaginian threat in order to end it once and for all. 
Many Romans believed that they merely had not had enough legions in the field to 
properly crush the Carthaginians, and turned away from Fabius’ strategy. Rome elected 
two now consuls in order to take the fight to the enemy though direct action and decisive 
battle. The consuls Varro and Paullus assembled a massive force of eight legions to 
                                                             
2 “Cunctator” means ‘delayer’ in Latin. 
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defeat Hannibal, and maneuvered their forces to a town in the eastern portion of Italy 
near Cannae.  
The battle that occurred on August 2, 216 BC was one of the most lopsided and 
decisive victories in the history of warfare, to the extent as it being proclaimed as the 
greatest tactical battle in all of the history and art of warfare. Hannibal utilized a double 
envelopment of both Roman flanks during the battle, and Hannibal utterly crushed 
Roman legions. Rome went into panic, its leadership in confusion, and it looked as if 
Rome and her republic would fall within a few days.  
Rome would bring back Fabius and his strategy, and never again seek to engage 
Hannibal in open decisive battle on the Italian peninsula. Instead Fabius would corral 
Hannibal through strong points, hit and run attacks, and surrounding his army with larger 
armies but avoiding battle all to wear down Hannibal and his supplies. This would 
become known as the ‘Fabian strategy’. While this strategy succeeded after many years 
in pushing Hannibal out of Italy due to a lack of manpower, not everyone was enthralled 
with the Fabian strategy. The Scipio family pushed for action and direct attacks by their 
legions against the enemy, in particular in Spain, Sicily, and North Africa. Eventually 
Publius Conelius Scipio Africanus would capture Spain and defeat Hannibal outside the 
walls of Carthage at the battle of Zama in 202 BC, through the use of direct action 
(O’Connell 2010). Thus Rome learned that it had either always be strong, or that it had to 
create the conditions for a Fabian strategy to be employed until strong reserves could 
brought up to decisively defeat the weakened invaders.  
 With Rome secure as the major power in the Mediterranean, she began a rapid 
expansion of her burgeoning empire, conquering Greece, Gaul, and the coastal regions 
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along the Mediterranean. Its grand strategy was to expand the empire, and eventually 
hold the empire together and stop outside invaders (which in the end it failed to achieve). 
Its military doctrine however is what stands the test of time. Roman methods for 
employment of troops, defensive organization, tactics, weaponry construction, camp 
fortification, administration, etc. are what have survived. Of its three most famous 
authors, Julius Caesar, Vegetius, and Frontinus, only one serves as a true manual. 
Frontinus’s work has been lost to history (though a companion piece survives), and Julius 
Caesar’s work is more self-serving for political reasons and posterity than true military 
value as a manual of philosophical work on warfare. Only Vegetius’ work has survived 
the test of time as a work of note. His work is more of an ideal of what the Roman 
legions had been in the past than any current form of the legions when his work, A 
Summary of Military Matters, was written. Its details of organization, training, tactics, 
administration, fortifications, and naval warfare are the best in the ancient world, and 
combined with knowledge of Roman imperial politics and foreign policy, serve to show 
Roman strategy. That strategy was one of “punitive war”, where Roman military 
campaigns were infamously destructive in the military phase, laying waste to rebellious 
or rival states in an attempt to impose fear and show off the might of Rome’s Legions. 
The eventual destruction of Carthage is one such example. Yet after it devastated its 
enemy, it utilized a brilliant system of “citizenship and manumission” that made “the 
promise of inclusion in the society and infrastructure of Rome too attractive for most 
people to refuse” (Carr 2002, 18, 22). 
 With the fall of Rome, and eventually Byzantium, Western military thought 
would stagnate (though certainly not in practice as the wars numerous fought from the 
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fall of the Roman Empire until the Renaissance will attest to) until the Renaissance in 
Europe in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries.  
Military Thought in the Medieval Era and Renaissance Era  
 Much of Western Europe was after the fall of the Western Roman Empire, in the 
control of barbarian tribes and local warlords. Because of this there was limited access to 
the old Roman documents, and anything from Byzantium or beyond was inaccessible for 
those practicing and studying war in Western Europe, and instead relied on songs, poems, 
and stories to pass down knowledge. There were few standing armies and professional 
soldiers beyond local lords (whom were busy running their territory), and military 
literature floundered during the medieval era.  
 With the rise of the state by consolidation of smaller territories into larger ones, 
interests in a professional force and military theory again arose. Ancient text that were 
long forgotten or ignored once again became important, and was widely debated. Such 
men as Nicolo Machiavelli and Raimondo Montecuccoli began to use their own 
knowledge of ancient warfare and current methods of war to create new works on war. 
Now the study of war based not only on experience, but observation and theory as well. 
Flemish philosopher Lipsisus put forth that the only legitimate war making body in the 
world was the state (van Creveld 2000, 76). However, all of these authors failed to take 
into account the various levels of warfare, as if they were not separated (or even inter-
connected), but indivisible. Their works are important, but only as a starting point for 
those who came after them. 
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The Early Age of Enlightenment 
 The early theories and concepts started in the Renaissance continued to develop 
during the Enlightenment. The authors of the period believed that theories should be 
based upon theories that in turn would became a system of rules that were to be applied 
in battle, based on logical reasoning and the experiences of battle. Many writers came 
after the great Seven Years War, in which France and its allies had failed to defeat the 
much smaller state of Prussia under Frederick the Great. One of the greater theorists of 
the period was Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, the Comte de Guibert. Guibert served during 
the Seven Years War, and used those experiences and his desire to see France perform 
better in the next war in his work, “A General Essay on Tactics”. In this, Guibert 
“detailed recommendations concerning the shape of military formations” along with 
“Four propositions… [that] justify the high reputation he enjoyed among his 
contemporaries” at the time (van Creveld 2000, 91). His work however “did not 
distinguish between tactics and strategy. At the same time his distinction between 
‘elementary tactics’ (the use of the various arms) and ‘great tactics’ (marching, combat, 
deployment and encamping) shows that he was groping his way towards the latter 
concept” (van Creveld 2000, 94). In the Western world, the levels of war and their 
differences were beginning to be understood.  
 Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban, a French Marshal who was the foremost expert on 
military engineering of his time, wrote several works on fortifications and conducting 
sieges. While he did not write a treatise of war as Sun-Tzu had done, his works were 
important for the development of warfare. He began to codify sieges into a play-by-play 
list of rules to be followed. He advocated the use of offensive forces (that were well 
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supplied) to cordon off and lay siege to a desired target, and through his methods, take 
the fortification as bloodlessly (for the French side) as possible. Vauban’s works have 
held the test of time, and are still referenced today as being perhaps the high water mark, 
“unsurpassed” in the field of sieges and fortifications (van Creveld 2000, 80-81).  
 Following in Vauban’s footsteps was Jacques Francois de Chastenet, the Marquis 
de Puysegur, whom wrote in a similar vein as Vauban, but on infantry and quartermaster 
topics. He sought to take warfare and create “the entire theory of war from the smallest 
part to the largest” (van Creveld 2000, 81) but both the use of theory and practice, going 
against the opinion of the time that only experience in war mattered. His book covered 
not only his own experiences, but campaigns of the past and came to the conclusion that 
the art of war was “knowing how to form good orders de battaille and how to make them 
move and operate according to the most perfect rules of movement; the principles of 
which are derived from geometry, which all officer must be familiar with” (van Creveld 
2000, 81-82). This is one of the first studies of warfare to include principles beyond 
experience and attempt to codify the movement of formations in tactical situations using 
geometry in his case. It was be a truly remarkable feat for the study of war, and in 
conjunction with others, the beginning of true study and codification of war in the 
Western world.  
 Most famous of the French Enlightenment military writers was the work of 
Reveries by Marshal de Saxe.3 It serves to refute elements of Puysegur while placing 
forth the common thoughts of the era. To De Saxe, the art of manoeuver was the supreme 
achievement in war, as it allowed a freedom of action because “battle was to be engaged 
in only as a last resort, and then only when prospect for victory were certain” (van 
                                                             
3 Reveries is “dreams” in French. 
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Creveld 2000, 83). But of even more importance is the realization that not only is 
maneuver key in war, but that the current system of organization and administration 
utilized by armies at the time had run its course, and something else was required. De 
Saxe promoted the idea of combined arms units (that of the ‘legion’) to help armies react 
and maneuver more quickly to bring fire upon the enemy, as he found the current system 
of regiments were too limiting. It was the seed for which would later bring about the 
corps system several decades later. However, de Saxe does fail to expand the opening 
made by Puysegur on levels of warfare, continuing to keep both strategy and tactics 
inseparable and indivisible.  
The Late Enlightenment Era to the Napoleonic Wars 
 With the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the rise of the absolute states and 
(proto) inter-state system, states began to realize that they could (and at times had to) 
utilize ever more resources to be victorious in war. The foundation for modern thoughts 
on war would come about due to the events from Seven Years War to the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars.  
 The first true theorist (and a practitioner as well) to come out of the Western 
world was the Frenchman Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, the Comte de Guibert. His 
experiences in the Seven Years would greatly shape his work, as France had performed 
poorly against Prussia and Austria. Guibert devised a ‘grand system’ of warfare that 
would cover all aspects, not just certain elements like Vauban and Puysegur had done 
(van Creveld 2000, 91).  
 Guibert believed that wars should not just be fought by a state’s standing army 
alone, but the combined forces of the entire state. In order to achieve this, general 
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conscription of the state would be utilized, allowing the state to utilize its vast manpower 
pool. Furthermore, vast logistical networks should be created, ready for use, and 
constantly maintained. And finally, utilizing a new system of tactical formations (which 
would be applied by the French during the Revolution and after by Napoleon), French 
field armies were to operate not as one massive unit, but as dispersed and independent 
formations, echoing the evolution started by de Saxe (van Creveld 2000, 91). Guibert also 
did not differentiate between strategy and tactics. He did however make the “distinction 
between ‘elementary tactics’ (the use of the various arms) and ‘great tactics’ (marching, 
combat, deployment, and encamping) shows that he was groping his way towards the 
latter concept [of the strategy-tactics paradigm)]” (van Creveld 2000, 94).  
 After Guibert came the Prussian officer Adam Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow. His 
first work was incredible, as it sought to combine military theory with politics and 
geography. In many ways von Bülow serves as the “father” of geopolitics (Palmer 1986, 
114).  
 Von Bülow’s later works failed to capture the events of his time, nor the changes 
that were occurring due to the French Revolution and Napoleon, and his theories became 
a jumbled and discredited mess (Palmer 1986).  He did however, begin to understand that 
strategy, and not tactics held the key to victory in war, and wrote much on supreme 
command. Unfortunately, von Bülow was unable to assemble all of the new concepts of 
warfare, and especially the command relations brought about at the national and corps 
level by Napoleon, into a unified theory (Palmer 1986, 118). Thus it would be left up to a 
Swiss born French general whom served under Napoleon for a time (and later Russia), 
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Antoine-Henri, baron Jomini, to expand upon the thoughts of Bülow and truly codify 
them into a theory. 
Jomini: “The Father of Modern Strategy” 
Antoine-Henri, baron Jomini was highly influenced by the campaigns of 
Napoleon in Italy, and as such wanted to follow in his footsteps in military glory and 
political power. Thus at a young age he began to devour books on warfare. Eventually he 
rose to the rank of general de brigade, and chief of staff to Marshal Ney through several 
campaigns, such as the Austerlitz campaign, battles of Ulm, Jena (Shy 1986, 152-153).4 
Jomini’s goal in all of his writings was not only fame, but an understanding of how the 
French had been so successful in under Napoleon while other states had failed utterly, 
and “answering this question, persuasively and influentially, would be Jomini’s great 
achievement” (Shy 1986, 145). In 1803 he set down the basis for all of his later works the 
following core concepts for victory in war: “That strategy is the key to warfare; That all 
strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles; and That these principles 
prescribe offensive action to mass forces against weaker enemy forces at some decisive 
point if strategy is to lead to victory” (Jomini 1811, 2:312). 
 Of Jomini’s many works such as Treatise of Grand Tactics, histories of the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, guides for tactical formations and weaponry usage, 
he is remembered today for his Summary of the Art of War. His writings were highly 
influenced by his role model, Napoleon, his own experiences in war, and by the British 
General Henry Lloyd’s writings on the Seven Years War (Shy 1986, 148-150). His 
Summary of the Art of War was “the most mature and influential expression of his ideas, 
                                                             
4 General de brigade would be considered a brigadier general today. 
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in the Summary, elaborates without altering the basic points made in his earliest 
published work” which made the work less popular during the period when it was 
published (Shy 1986, 153-154).  
 Jomini believed that there were a series of timeless principles that could be 
complied into both a theoretical and practicable system of war, valid for a commander 
during any period of warfare, which differs from von Clausewitz who doubted theories of 
war, and did not distinguish the difference “between a theory of systems and a theory of 
principles” (Shy 1986, 154). The way to victory in warfare in Jomini’s world was use 
massed force against a weak point in the enemy battleline when involved in a battle (i.e. 
tactical scenario), and using this same concept at the strategic level of war was the true 
secret to strategy and warfare. Out of this came the “principle of maneuvering the mass of 
an army as to threaten the “decisive points” in a theater of war and then hurl all available 
forces against a faction of the enemy force defending those points” (Shy 1986, 154). A 
decisive point was where attacking the enemy would cause serious harm and damage to 
the enemy (such as a major supply depot, fortification, city, etc). And while the principle 
may be applied differently due to the situation, the principle would never change in 
Jomini’s world.  
 Jomini was a proponent of offensive action, utilizing the attack even at the 
expense of weakening the defenses at other locations to strengthen the offensive, and that 
this counter-intuitive view of purposely weakening oneself to strengthen other sections of 
the front was what made commanders successful. Further, allowing the enemy to decide 
when, where battle would be fought, and allowing the enemy to have the initiative was a 
recipe for defeat (Shy 1986, 168). Therefore, offensive initiative with maximum force 
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applied at an enemy weak point was the key to Jomini’s understanding of victory. Jomini 
also believed like those in the past that commanders on the battlefield should, once given 
political goals and directives, be free to wage their strategies and campaigns without 
political interference.  
 What Jomini did was take the fused elements of tactics and strategy that earlier 
writers had written on, and begin to separate them into their own areas or levels more so 
than anyone else before him. He also brought back the ideas that battles were necessary, 
but could be won through maneuver and mass. His thoughts would dominate Western (in 
particular French, British, and American) thinking for the next two hundred years, where 
his ideas would be built upon by others (such as Liddell Hart), and contrasted by others 
(such as von Clausewitz). It would be the comparisons and contrasts of Jomini and von 
Clausewitz that would shape the next one hundred and fifty years of strategic and military 
debate.  
Carl von Clausewitz, the Philosopher of War 
 If Jomini was the father of modern strategy, then von Clausewitz was in many 
ways its mother or brother (even if belated in acceptance). Few military theorists have 
caused such rabid debate and conflict behind the meaning of their works than that of Carl 
von Clausewitz. Some view him as a revolutionary figure, his work the zenith of 
philosophical debate on the meanings of war and the philosophy of war. Others view his 
work as the nadir of military thought, one who provided the template for total war, and 
gave voice and reason to the destructive impulses that would culminate in the 20th 
century.  
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 Carl von Clausewitz was a Prussian military officer who fought against Napoleon, 
serving multiple roles within the Prussian and Russian militaries to include the chief of 
staff of the German II Corps during the Waterloo campaign. He was promoted to 
generalmajor (Major General) in 1818 and made the director of the Kriegsakademie until 
shortly before his death in 1831.5 It was at the Kreigsakademie that he began to seriously 
theorize on warfare.  
 His magnum opus was a work originally started in 1816, but slowly evolved over 
the next fifteen years. It was an unfinished work, as shortly before his death he began to 
edit the entire work, only completing editing the first book. It would be published 
posthumously by his wife in 1834, called On War, and over time, the unfinished work 
would forever change the way people thought about warfare.  
 Clausewitz was in search of several basic questions, such as what is war, what 
was the purpose of war, how does one properly study war, and how Napoleon and France 
were so successful during the wars of Revolution and Napoleon (Paret 1986, 186-187, 
van Creveld 2000, 106-107). Using the methods of such philosophers as Kant and 
Montesquieu, his earliest works reject Bülow’s methods and view of war, finding them 
unrealistic (Paret 1986, 190). In one of his first articles he published, he states that in 
contradiction to Bülow, that “tactics constitutes the theory of the use of armed force in 
battle; strategy forms the theory of using battle for the purposes of war” and that 
“strategy, however, is nothing without battle, for battle is the raw material with which it 
works, the means it employs” (von Clausewitz 1805, 271).  
 This view would be expanded in On War, where “war is not merely an act of 
policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on 
                                                             
5 Kriegsakademie is German for ‘War Academy’, similar to a war college in the US. 
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with other means… The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and 
means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose” (von Clausewitz 1976, 
99). Therefore, strategy is dependent on the political realm, and on political leadership for 
guidance and direction. The purposes and means of warfare for von Clausewitz require 
that “the objective of any particular war, which must guide military action if the political 
purpose is to be properly served, we find that the object of any war can vary just as much 
as its political purpose and its actual circumstances” (von Clausewitz 1976, 102). Von 
Clausewitz however does not delve more deeply into the nature of politics and war, and 
after making this declaration (which is famously quoted), moves on to the act of waging 
war, believing the relationship between politics and waging war to be an indisputable fact 
and beyond the scope of his work. 
 Von Clausewitz then takes an interesting turn and utilizes a method (the dialectic 
method) for the greater part of his work, where he places forth a theoretical idea, and then 
shows how that ideal cannot be achieved. “If for the moment we consider the pure 
concept of war [theoretic view without political direction]… war is an act of violence 
meant to force the enemy to do our will its aim would have always and solely to be the 
overcome the enemy and disarm him”(von Clausewitz 1976, 102). In order to disarm the 
enemy, the enemy’s military must be destroyed or “put in such a condition that they can 
no longer carry on the fight” (von Clausewitz 1976, 102). Only through war (through the 
medium of battle) can victory be achieved. This requires one side to defeat an enemy’s 
military and destroy their will to continue fighting (as von Clausewitz compares war to a 
duel between two parties), which in addition to the securing of their capital city and 
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center of administration, will create the environment where the enemy will give in to the 
political demands placed upon them.  
 Therefore, in von Clausewitz’s theoretical world, there is an event called ‘total’ or 
‘absolute’ war, war that is unrestrained, an ideal. The use of violence will be utilized until 
the enemy is completely destroyed, where wars are of mass violence, mass force, aimed 
at annihilation (Paret 1986, 198-201). Wars in von Clausewitz’s ideal world should 
utilize maximum force to disarm the enemy, and whomever it able to utilize their will 
power and resources best will win. However in the real world, this ideal cannot be 
achieved according to von Clausewitz. Such factors as politics, friction (a major element 
of theory, where “uncertainties, errors, accidents, technical difficulties”, morale, 
decisions, intelligence, past knowledge, technology, etc.) all play a role where the 
commander can never have perfect knowledge, or perfect movement of their forces (Paret 
1986, 202-203). Add in military genius of some commanders, intuition, along with 
morality, and the “fog of war” (composite for friction and all other uncertain variables) 
creates an environment that can never be made into mathematical principles according to 
von Clausewitz, as the commander will always be hampered by these variables and 
effects of uncertainty.  
 In von Clausewitz’s world, war is based upon two trinities, one of violence, 
chance, and politics (intangibles) and the people, military, and government (tangibles). 
Thus the nature of war is a competition between the people with their passions, 
government and their political aims, and the commander and his army, dealing with the 
“fog of war”. Only well trained troops, under a commander who realizes these variables, 
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with sound political policy backing him can truly be successful in causing damage upon 
the enemy by destroying their military and will power.  
 Von Clausewitz does an excellent job placing warfare solidly within the political 
realm, while covering the strategic and tactical levels of warfare (even if not by name 
directly). What is most important is his writings is that of campaigns, in which he 
dramatically expanded the theories and knowledge of the operational level of warfare far 
beyond anything before him. He strongly believed in the defense as stronger than the 
offense in tactical situations, but that of offensive action was ultimately required to win 
wars. Therefore victory is achieved in battles through the use of the ‘schwerpunkt’, or 
concentration of forces at one location on the enemy’s line, and with all the energies of 
the army directed at one point, will then be able to break the enemy line and pass through 
it, which will in turn force the enemy to retreat. This would then be followed up with 
further attacks, seeking to destroy parts of the retreating army during the retreat until a 
certain culmination of the offensive where offensive action was no longer profitable and 
the army resupplied and regrouped. This concept of the ‘schwerpunkt’ has seen its own 
mutation over the years through its translation as “center of gravity”, is in fact a 
mistranslation of the original word. Von Clausewitz meant a very limited meaning with 
schwerpunkt, whereas today the term ‘center of gravity” has taken on a meaning much 
more board than anything von Clausewitz described when discussing the schwerpunkt in 
his work. 
 Von Clausewitz would not see fame or acknowledgement for his ideas until many 
decades after his death. And then it was only accepted in Germany. It would more than a 
century after his death before the rest of the world embraced elements of his work. While 
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Jomini proved popular with the American military from the American Civil War to 
World War II, Jomini fell out of favor to a Clausewitzian view of the warfare by the 
1980s. However, von Clausewitz’s work remains a highly controversial today. While 
Jomini is known in military circles, von Clausewitz (like Sun-Tzu) is known outside of 
those circles and at least in name by portions of the general public. Jomini is seen today 
as a product of his era, while von Clausewitz’s work is seen as timeless.  
Von Clausewitz’s work is not without controversy. He has been demonized as a 
prophet of total war, and inspiration for bloodlust World Wars I and II, or as too abstract 
to understand properly. What should be remembered by those detractors, and everyone 
else for that matter, is that his dialectical method provided a way to compare war in a 
pure, unhampered format, and that his genius was to take elements that detract from this 
pure version of waging war, and making the understanding of waging war realistic and 
useful. Furthermore, he helped develop the understanding of not only the proper place of 
warfare, but the operational level of warfare as well In doing so he created a system of 
understanding that remains in use today. 
War in the Nineteenth Century 
 After the Napoleonic wars, theories of warfare fell back into the hands of the 
practitioners. Warfare was still thought of in terms of Jomini, von Clausewitz, and 
Napoleon. However major developments would change how warfare was viewed and 
fought. With the rise of the modern inter-state system, states continued to expand and 
consolidate their power, economics, and territory. With new technologies such as 
repeating rifles, the telegraph, railroads, and canned foods, such elements of warfare as 
logistics, transportation, communication, and tactics all saw dramatic changes. And while 
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all of these would have an effect on the operational art and strategy employed by states, 
the single largest change to strategy was brought about by the great population expansion 
that was occurring.  
 Armies in the past had numbered anywhere from a few hundred or thousand to at 
most a couple hundred thousand. But with the great population expansion, armed forces 
could now easily fill their ranks with hundreds of thousands if not millions of troops. 
Commanders were forced to move away from the tactics of Napoleon to disperse their 
troops. Command and control over the vast formations, along with their supply became 
both easier and harder. However, three commanders stand out during this timeframe for 
their waging of war: Grant, Sherman, and von Moltke.  
 During the American Civil War, the Union was despite its efforts, repeatedly 
beaten back by excellent tacticians such as Robert E. Lee, Albert Sidney Johnston, Joseph 
E. Johnston, and Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson were able to hold off Northern advances 
that failed to penetrate deep into the South during the first two years of the war. By 1863 
however, the combined efforts of the Southern Confederacy had not stopped the Federal 
Union forces from taking over large portions of Confederate territory. Foremost amongst 
the Union commanders in 1863 were two friends who with very different styles, would 
bring about the defeat of the Confederacy over the next two years and help mold the 
future of warfare.  
 Ulysses S. Grant was a persistent commander. His lighting fast victories at Fort 
Henry and Fort Donaldson had opened up Tennessee to invasion, and his Vicksburg 
campaign was (while slow at times), unrelenting and dominating. Due to his string of 
victories, he was made General-in-Chief of the Union armies, and in 1864 set a plan in 
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motion that would a year later defeat the Confederacy. Grant’s plan was similar to the 
plan Lincoln had wanted for many years, concentration of Union armies on the offensive 
at all points along the Confederacy to overwhelm them through coordinated attacks 
(McPherson 2008, 215-216).  
 Grant deployed with the Federal Army of the Potomac, and ordered its 
commander to doggedly go after General Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia and not 
the Confederate capital of Richmond, would be its objective. The Overland Campaign 
and Siege of Petersburg/Richmond that would follow would be campaigns of continual 
fighting, and heavy casualties. In effect, it was a war of attrition and direct action, where 
Grant would utilize his manpower advantage at a high cost in casualties to both sides in 
order to over-extend and overwhelm the Army of Northern Virginia and destroy it 
(McPherson 2008, 218-224). In April of 1865 Grant would force the Army of Northern 
Virginia to retreat from Petersburg and Richmond, and in 9 days of dogged pursuit 
surround it and force it to surrender. A scant few months later, every other field army in 
the South would surrender to the Union, ending the War.  
 The second main element of the Grant’s plan was to have continued pressure 
upon the main Confederate field army in the Western Theater, the Army of Tennessee. 
General William T. Sherman, who was Grant’s right hand man in 1862 and 1863, would 
take command of the western theater when Grant became General-in-Chief. Sherman 
would move his combined armies into northern Georgia in an initially slow campaign as 
he chased after General Johnston and his army (McPherson 2008, 221, 231). Sherman’s 
war was one of maneuver, avoidance of battle, and psychological warfare.  Sherman 
outmaneuvered the Confederates to capture Atlanta. Sherman then pushed for something 
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only tried on a smaller scale and through short durations: march several armies for 
months through the enemy’s heartland destroying everything of value, but with the intent 
not of destroying military capabilities or armies, but the will of the enemy. While General 
George Thomas destroyed the remnants of the Army of Tennessee at Nashville, Sherman 
marched several armies deep into the heartland of Georgia. Sherman wrote to Grant that 
his plan would “cut a swath through Georgia to the sea, divide the Confederacy into two, 
and come up on the reach of Lee” and “if we can march a well-appointed army right 
through [Jefferson Davis’s] territory it is a demonstration to the world, foreign and 
domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot resist. This may not be war, but 
rather statesmanship” (McPherson 2008, 251). He would follow up his march through 
Georgia up into the Carolinas, eventually affecting the surrender of General Johnston’s 
army shortly after Lee’s in 1865. The debate rages today whether or not Sherman’s 
March was effective, but there is evidence from the Army of Northern Virginia of 
desertions rising after news of the march began to spread.  But as to breaking southern 
will, that question is one left unanswered. Whatever the pros or cons of the ‘March to the 
Sea’, it certainly illuminated southern weakness and highlighted northern power, and left 
an indelible mark upon the Confederacy and the war itself, as well as proving to be a 
brilliantly run operation. The combination of Grant and Sherman devastated the 
Confederacy as no two other commanders did, and helped bring about victory though a 
combination of direct and indirect action against the Confederate armies and populace.  
 Prussian Chief of the General Staff, General Helmut von Moltke, rose to his 
position based upon his intelligence as an officer (van Creveld 2000, 126). He was not a 
theorist, but a practitioner like Grant and Sherman. He and his staff drew up extremely 
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complex and accurate mobilization plans utilizing the railroads as never before (to an 
extent far beyond the American’s use in their Civil War). Von Moltke created a system 
that was highly flexible, where field commanders and their armies would be separate 
from each other in order to lessen the stress upon supply lines, but could still converge 
from several directions to encircle and destroy an enemy. Due to the firepower from new 
rapid firing rifles and artillery, his forces would be strategically and operationally 
offensive, but tactically defensive (something later seen in WWI by the Germans, but less 
followed by many commanders in the wars of the 1860s). The command and control 
methods, along with the strategic and operational vision of von Moltke would be proven 
as justified in Prussia’s victorious wars against Denmark, Austria, and France in the 
1860s and 1870s, as Prussia’s field armies encircled and destroyed massive Austrian and 
French armies at the famous battles of Koniggratz (Austro-Prussian War) and Sedan 
(Franco-Prussian War). After 1871 Germany would become not only a continental land 
power, but a military force that would be emulated by many other states around the 
world. 
 By the end of the nineteenth century, the lessons from the previous century of 
warfare (after the Napoleonic wars) were that Napoleonic tactics of massed fire no longer 
worked. Field defenses had become important, as was the use of superior firepower on 
the decisive point in the enemy line, but offensive operations still won wars. The ability 
of railroads to move supplies changed the entire logistical structure and plans of armies. 
With ever growing amounts of manpower, armies would use it to their advantage to 
either break through enemy lines, either through attrition (Grant), maneuver (Sherman), 
or encirclement (von Moltke). The goal of the armies in the field was to seek out and 
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destroy the enemy’s will by either destruction of the enemy’s production (Sherman) or 
encirclement of enemy field armies (von Moltke, Grant) and the enemy’s national capital 
(von Moltke). While the lessons learned from the wars in the nineteenth century 
involving interstate or large scale war was varied and vast, armies at the time continued 
to think in offensive terms at the strategic and operational levels at least (if not tactically). 
The lessons ultimately led leaders to think that even if tactically defensive, the only way 
to win wars was through strategic and operational offensives. By the end of the century 
these lessons were tinted with the belief that superiority of morale and technical expertise 
(especially with railroads) would overcome any obstacle, and thus the grand visions and 
maneuvers of Grant, Sherman, and von Moltke became slaves to timetables of railroads 
and mobilization (van Creveld 2000, 135-141). 
Naval Theory: Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett 
 Naval warfare was not created in the 1800s, for it had been around since the 
Peloponnesian wars, and in early wars “ships and navies had often figured prominently, 
sometimes even decisively” in Greek and Roman wars (van Creveld 2000, 144). Before 
1890, the writings on naval warfare were vague, so much so that where “as to Sun-Tzu 
and Clausewitz, the greatest writers of all, to judge by their published works one would 
think they did not even know that such a thing as the sea existed” (van Creveld 2000, 
144).  
 The operation of navies required highly technical training in navigation, 
weaponry, and later engineering, and the building of ships and training of crews was 
expensive and time consuming. Therefore most literature on naval warfare revolved 
around the technical aspects of sailing and navigation, administration, and naval tactics. 
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Thoughts in the use of naval warfare at the operational and strategic level were not well 
discussed. It was not until after the Napoleonic wars that the study of naval warfare at the 
strategic and operational levels began to flourish. 
 The first “prophet” of naval warfare was a US Naval Captain Alfred Thayer 
Mahan. While serving as the lead lecturer at the newly created US Naval War College 
from 1886-1889, he wrote and compiled his lectures into two volumes, titled The 
Influence of Seapower upon History: 1660-1783. This seminal work was the first work to 
put forth why states should have navies in the first place, and how navies should be used.  
 Mahan believed that there were timeless principles in naval warfare and strategy, 
utilizing the country of Great Britain and its Royal Navy as the example of naval 
excellence.  
The history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of 
contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently 
culminating in war. The profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth 
and strength of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which 
governed its growth and prosperity were detected. To secure to one’s own 
people a disproportionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to 
exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or 
prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence              
(Mahan 1987, 1). 
 In order to secure one’s shipping a state must maintain a navy in order to defend 
the benefits of its merchant naval trade (Mahan 1987, 27-29). Navies were therefore 
“confronted by a double task: a negative one and a positive one. The negative part 
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consisted of halting and destroying the enemy’s commerce, the positive one of making 
sure that one’s own ships got through to their destination” (van Creveld 2000, 148). In 
wartime, Mahan believed that a navy must concentrate itself to defend its lines of 
communications (i.e. naval bases and resupply vessels) and go after the enemy’s navy 
with its full concentration of its battlefleet. Commerce raiding was of secondary 
importance to destruction of the enemy battlefleet. By destroying the enemy’s battlefleet, 
command of the sea would be achieved as there was no longer any enemy ships left to 
attack one’s own battlefleet or merchant fleet, all while maintaining a blockade upon the 
enemy. Mahan’s argument that only a concentrated battlefleet, ready for battle against an 
enemy battlefleet, could provide victory in war through decisive battle that would lead to 
command of the seas. This argument that won favor with many naval officers and those 
in industry and political circles that would benefit from an enlarged navy. Those who 
would not benefit from Mahan’s ideas doubted his concepts, believing that “fleets-in-
being” and commerce raiding could serve as an effective deterrent to starting wars. Both 
sides would be proven wrong. 
Despite the flaws in Mahan’s concepts and the varied responses his theories of 
seapower have received over time, his theories do have a certain form of logic for a type 
of warfare that is platform centric (i.e. ships, etc.). Ships take time to build, and it takes 
even more time to train the crews to sail (navigate and operate) and fight on warships. 
Thus when you sink a warship (or disable it), it is not as easy as it is in land warfare to 
reconstitute the lost unit. Instead of finding more soldiers to fill in the losses in a ground 
unit, new sailors (like soldiers) must be trained, but also a new warship built, or lesser 
ship converted for the task. And by concentrating one’s forces, you maximize the ability 
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of your forces to inflict the greatest amount of damage upon the enemy while providing 
greater separation of firepower concentration upon your own ships (since there are more 
to attack), and thus providing greater defense. In a theoretical world, destruction of the 
enemy’s ships would provide control over areas of the ocean, and the enemy, without 
ships would be unable to respond to the movements of one’s ships and fleets, and 
theoretically could strike anywhere upon the enemy coast. Destroying the enemy’s fleet 
however is not an easy task. There are many ships that will need to be sunk, and one will 
also suffer some level of losses in a naval engagement in order to defeat the enemy. 
Further, the oceans are extremely vast places, and locating the enemy’s fleet requires a lot 
of efforts and dispersion of forces to achieve. While Mahan’s concepts are theoretically 
sound, its implementation is much harder.  
 Mahan proved not only very divisive, but very popular with his work. Even if 
many of the specifics were proven wrong, his concept of seapower and command of the 
sea would hold true over time, just as he had believed that command of the sea had 
propelled Britain to its superpower status. However, his thoughts were not the only 
thoughts on naval warfare. In many ways, what Mahan wanted to achieve was impossible 
through a single glorious battles where the fate of nations were decided in an afternoon 
(what commander would risk their fleet and the fate of the war in one battle?). Instead 
many saw naval warfare as a form of attrition, and only through attrition over time could 
command of the sea occur, not after one gigantic battle.  
 Julian Corbett was a British civilian (lawyer) naval theorist, who created much 
divisiveness himself through his seminal work Some Principles of Maritime Strategy and 
his numerous lectures and articles published throughout his life on naval warfare. 
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Supports of Mahan, and many there were in the Royal Navy at the time, did not care of 
Corbett, believing that Corbett was the anti-Mahan. Where “Mahan had written almost as 
if policy did not exist – Corbett proceeded to explain that, on the whole, the fact that 
‘men live upon land and not upon the sea’ meant that warfare on the latter was less 
importance, and less decisive, than the former”, which is why we can see naval officer 
did not like this view (van Creveld 2000, 152-153).  
 Corbett believed that the decisive battles that Mahan and many admirals of the 
Royal Navy envisioned were impossible. Historically, decisive battles were the exception 
instead of the rule. Instead wars of attrition were the norm to Corbett. In Corbett’s view 
navies had several missions, “safeguarding one’s own commerce, disrupting that of the 
enemy by every means that came to hand, and using the navy to land forces at selected 
points in the enemy’s rear so as to disrupt his plans and throw him out of gear” (van 
Creveld 2000, 154).  
 The differences between both men and their theories are vast, but not as vast as 
might be thought. “Mahan looked into the objectives of naval warfare per se; Corbett 
linked it to policy, which might be less limited or more so” (van Creveld 2000, 156). 
Supporters of each school of thought believed that new technological innovation 
(submarine, aircraft carrier, etc.) would further their theorist’s claims, and both sides have 
made arguments to that effect.  Mahan’s and Corbett’s influence continues to dominate 
naval thinking today, if only through their theories’ evolution (and in many ways melding 
together for some states to include the US, Japan, and Great Britain). “As the twentieth 
century draws to its end both schools are alive and well, thought it must be admitted that 
the debate has become somewhat academic. Command of the sea in the grand style, 
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implying operations that stretch across entire oceans, is now an object sought after by one 
country only [the US]” (van Creveld 2000, 157).  
World War I: Offensive and Defensive Warfare 
 In the run up to the First World War, military leaders analyzed the events of the 
Boer War and Russo-Japanese War within the context of the frameworks established by 
either Jomini or von Clausewitz and through the lens of the actions of Grant, Sherman, 
and von Moltke: that entrenchments could be overcome by mixtures of attrition, 
maneuver, and firepower. Firepower was no longer to be massed infantry in tight 
formations. Now infantry were to spread out, utilizing cover and rapid firing rifles, 
machine guns, and artillery instead of lines of massed men. These new spread out 
formations would advance until such a point when it was no longer tenable to do so 
without heavy casualties, and then utilize improvised battlefield entrenchments until 
superior firepower or a flanking maneuver would force the enemy to retreat. As such, 
divisions were seen to have awesome offensive firepower, and whoever could bring that 
firepower to the battle first, and in a controlled and coordinated manner, would win 
(Keegan 1998, 21-22).  
With the rapid expansion of manpower in each state, conscription became a major 
focus of European armies (Keegan 1998, 20). By the start of World War I there were over 
200 divisions in Europe (Keegan 1998, 22). War plans became of great importance in 
order to bring the most amount of firepower as quickly as possible to decisive points 
along the front. However the war plans created by the major powers in 1914 were noted 
for their “inflexibility”, and “None was integrated with what today would be called a 
“national security policy,” made in conclave between politicians, diplomats, intelligence 
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directions and service chiefs, and designed to serve a country’s vital interests, as for such 
a concept of national leadership did not then exist” (Keegan 1998, 27-28). Therefore 
when initial diplomacy failed, service chiefs thrust upon their political masters’ their 
inflexible plans for mobilization and war, which was political suicide to ignore, and in 
late July and early August 1914 the armies of Europe mobilized and went to war.  
All the major combatants immediately went on the offensive. The Austro-
Hungarians began moving into Serbia, Russian mobilized armies that went into the 
offensive East Prussia, France launched an offensive into Alsace-Lorraine under Plan 
XVII, and Germany invaded Belgium and the northern French frontier under the 
“Schlieffen Plan”. In all of these offensives every army would utilize similar tactics, 
seeking battle in the open, and attempting flanking movements while bringing in superior 
firepower to break up enemy positions, and digging in with temporary defensive 
positions when required. All of these offensives would end up bogged down as all 
combatants suffered such heavy casualties (from both offensive and defensive action) 
that all armies needed time to recover, resupply, and reinforce lost manpower (Keegan 
1998, 127-128). Every army then sought defensive positions that would allow for the 
greatest possible defense while allowing for follow on offensive operations. The Germans 
however, believed they should be tactically defensive while strategically offensive, and 
picked ground on the Western front that was uphill of enemy positions and stronger for 
defensive ops. This forced the Allies into inferior entrenched positions. These defensive 
entrenchments were then connected to each other until there was a continuous chain of 
entrenchments all along the Western Front. Germany’s 1914 offensive in France almost 
pulled off a repeat of 1870, however the gigantic mass of such large armies made what 
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occurred in 1870 extremely difficult if not impossible to achieve without some level of 
attrition. While the armies fought mostly a war of attrition, WWI ended in maneuver, 
where offensive maneuver was achieved by the Allies which led to victory. 
In the East, the nature of the war was of “titanic battles” that “closely resembled 
those fought by Napoleon a hundred years earlier” both in size, scope, and distances 
(Keegan 1998, 161-163). These early battles led to horrendously large causalities similar 
to the Western front, and the war bogged down into entrenchments, though with much 
more maneuver then anything seen on the very static Western Front.  
1915 to 1918 were spent by the warring powers in attempts to break the stalemate. 
New tactics and technologies were tested, to include new artillery schemes, chemical 
weapons, armored tracked vehicles (tanks), and the old massed offensives. None of these 
were able to break through the enemy’s line. Germany’s new Chief of Staff, General 
Erich von Falkenhayn, realized that Germany could not break through the allied lines, 
and instead attempted to “bleed them [the French] white” by attacking a critical point 
along their line and forcing them to use up manpower and wearing them down to the 
point where German armies could resume the offensive and breakthrough French 
entrenchments. Germany however didn’t follow their own plan, and instead of utilizing a 
minimum number of men to inflict the greatest number of losses, poured more and more 
men into the Battle of Verdun, causing high casualties on both sides.  
By 1918 however, the war began to take a dramatic turn. Heavy losses and 
political upheaval brought upon by economic and political stressors of the war had forced 
Russia out of the war in 1917. Germany and Austria-Hungry were beginning to become 
desperate as well due to manpower shortages and economic troubles brought upon by the 
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blockade emplaced by the Royal Navy, along with a failure to implement a wartime 
economy. France and Britain were also severely weak, surviving on American weaponry 
and now the massive influx of (inexperienced) American divisions. Germany would fail 
to break through the Allied lines on the Western Front, and with its strength diminished, 
the British, French, and Americans were able to push back the Germans, forcing them to 
request an Armistice. The final campaigns of 1918 were much like 1914, with movement, 
maneuver, and open battles occurring as trench lines that previously were impregnable 
broke due to a lack of manpower by Germany and new technology by the Allies 
(coordinated artillery and tanks attacks and coordinated air attacks). 
World War I created a huge scar on the psyche of all the world’s militaries, and 
different lessons learned by all. Two prominent British land warfare theorists would 
come out of the “War to End All Wars”: J.F.C Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart. 
J.F.C. Fuller was a staff officer in World War I. In that role he had planned the 
Cambrai offensive, and many other tank operations in the offensives of 1918. He also 
drafted a plan for the British Army to in 1919 to utilize massed attacks of tanks and 
mechanized units. After the war he pushed for the British Army to mechanize itself and 
use maneuver over the attrition in war. Fullers ideas were expanded upon by B. L. Hart, 
who was a most famous (and controversial) figure than Fuller. At the end of World War 
I, Hart was enamored with the British Army, but this quickly changed and his early 
writings criticized the conduct of the high command (van Creveld 2000, 175-176). Hart 
believed that the folly of World War I could be traced back to Carl von Clausewitz, 
whom Hart labeled the “Mahdi of Mass” and had caused the world to fight total war in 
World War I (van Creveld 2000, 176). In response to his (erroneous) belief in the failure 
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of von Clausewitz, he formulated the ‘indirect approach’, where armies would utilize 
surprise and secrecy to attack an enemy’s line, breakthrough it, and get behind them into 
their lines of communication. To Hart, wining war meant operational movement (van 
Creveld 2000, 178-179).  
Liddell Hart was a very canny man and shrewd salesman (Mearsheimer 1988).6 
His works before World War II were predictive failures, as he believed the defense to be 
stronger than the offensive due to technology (and thus failed to predict ‘blitzkrieg’), and 
that wars would be won through the use of blockade and air power by small professional 
forces and not conscripted armies (also wrong). After World War II, he presented himself 
as a man who actually predicted ‘blitzkrieg’, and his writings became even more famous. 
Hart’s overall abilities as a theorist were flawed, and owed much to Fuller whom had 
actually planned tank campaigns. At best Hart was misguided and only partially correct 
in his thoughts and predictions. At worst a fraud who covered up his mistakes and twisted 
comments and theories of others to support his own self-interest.7  
Soviet Strategic and Operational Innovation 
 In the 1920s and 1930s, military innovation in strategic and operational thought 
came from an unlikely place: the Soviet Union. The Russian Civil War of 1917-1922 
between the Reds (Bolsheviks / Communists) and the Whites (Nationalists / Royalists) 
had devastated the Russian homeland, its economy, and society. As the party grew in 
power in Russia, so did its hold and influence over the military. Communist ideology 
began to make its way into the study of war, with particular emphasis in the science of 
war (as in making the art of war a true science).  
                                                             
6 Mearsheimer (1988) is an excellent analysis of the works of Hart over time.5 
7 I believe the latter, that Hart was a fraud.  
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 The first time operational warfare was called operational warfare (in this case 
operational art) was by the Soviet military theorists Aleksandr Svechin. Svechin was a 
tsarist-era general on the Imperial General Staff during the First World War; he would 
eventually join the Red Army in March of 1918, serving in both operational and training 
commands.  
 After the Civil War, Svechin began to formalize his thoughts on the study of war. 
In his major work Strategy (published in 1927) Svechin states “The history of the art of 
war is a completely necessary introduction to this book, because without it we would risk 
becoming completely incomprehensible” and that “In essence, all of strategy is basically 
a contemplation of military history” (Svechin 1992, 77). During his lectures on strategy 
in 1922, Svechin began utilizing the term operational art where he “defined operational 
art as a critical conceptual linkage between tactics and strategy, therefore senior 
commanders were to transform tactical successes into operation ‘bounds’ to achieve 
strategic objectives” (Kipp 2011, 65). Because of the interlinking nature of tactics, 
operational art, and strategy, operational art had “become so broad and so significant that 
currently we consider the conduct of military operations to be the art of war in the narrow 
sense of the word” (Scechin 1992, 67).  
 In regards to strategy, Svechin believed there were two options (or dualistic 
strategic paradigms) in which states would follow: destruction or attrition (Kipp 2011, 
66). Under the strategy of destruction, the armed forces were to seek out and destroy the 
enemy’s armed forces in the field of battle. Svechin believed, unlike most Napoleon 
supporters, that Napoleon had made major errors in his campaigns because “Napoleon 
reduced an entire campaign to a single operation in a main theater” and thus the strategy 
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of Napoleon became “strategy of destruction… [which] comes down to destroying the 
personnel deployed by the enemy in this theater” and thus ignored other theaters of war 
and as such lost the war (Svechin 1992, 240). Further this type of war was even in the 
1920s still seen by many historians and theorists as the predominant type of war to be 
fought, much to Svechin’s distress. 
Under a strategy of attrition, the political and economic efforts of the state would 
be utilized in conjunction with the armed forces to seek destruction upon the enemy’s 
ability to wage war while avoiding large battles and destruction of the enemy’s armed 
forces. Therefore, wars would be won by vigorous defense and selected offensives by 
select and powerful armies breaking through the enemy’s lines and breaking into their 
rear to destroy their infrastructure and homeland (Kipp 2011, 68-69).  
A second theorist was Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who served as one of the 
top commanders within the Red Army during the inter-war period. As a cavalry officer, 
he was enthralled with the speed that mechanical units could cause disruption behind 
enemy lines, along with the success that horse cavalry had had during the civil war.   
Tukhachevsky put forth that the Soviet economy must rapidly industrialize in 
order to help fulfill his dream of mass mechanized armies with abundant armored forces 
(tanks, etc.) and aviation units (in particular long range units) (Kipp 2011, 70). His 
studies had concluded that victory in war was a result of the “deep battle”, where deep 
operations into the enemy’s rear would lead to encirclement of the enemy and its 
annihilation through the use of large numbers of mechanized forces. In order to achieve 
the “deep battle”, he experimented with mechanized and air forces to rapidly maneuver 
forces over large areas, and all the resources necessary to achieve it. He rejected the need 
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for a small force (like J.F.C. Fuller) and instead wanted a mobilization of the state in 
similar terms to Svechin that would allow for deep operations and battles of annihilation 
(Kipp 2011, 70-71).  
Svechin and Tukhachevsky would be purged by Stalin, and they never saw their 
ideas come to fruition. Only their writings would live on, and their codification in 
Temporary Field Regulation-36, eventually saw their ideas utilized to an extent in World 
War II (Kipp 2011, 73).  
After the Great Purge of 1937, Soviet development of strategic and operational 
theory fell to the wayside. It would not be until Germany invaded in 1941 that theory 
(and more importantly practice) of strategy and operational art would again come to the 
forefront. New and inexperienced commanders had to learn how to fight at levels they 
had never been trained for, and the Soviet Union suffered greatly in the first years of the 
World War II.  
Airpower Theory 
 The carnage of the First World War motivated an Italian staff officer, Giulio 
Douhet, to seek out ways to minimize casualties and end war more quickly. He was an 
engineer who became enamored with new technology, and in his work Il Commando del 
Aereo (The Command of the Air) he put forth ideas that would shape the actions of all air 
forces for the next century.  
 Douhet believed that as with other technical innovations that airplanes would 
revolutionize warfare once again. Because trench warfare had rendered land warfare far 
too bloody and stalemated, only aircraft could break through the enemy’s defenses and 
attack them where they were most vulnerable: the home front. In Douhet’s view, the 
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mobilization of populations were the primary threat to a state and that because of the 
sophistication of aircraft, there was no possible way to defend against a determined air 
attack. Therefore the aircraft and only the aircraft was the supreme offensive weapon 
war. And with them delivering conventional and chemical weapons in such large 
amounts as to devastate enemy population and production centers, no enemy would be 
able to maintain its will to fight.  
 When wars began, small professional air forces would attack enemy “air bases 
with the objective of gaining ‘command of the air’. Once command of the air had been 
attained  and the enemy air force destroy, an air force should switch from attacking 
military targets to civilian targets and destroy their will to resist, thus ending the war 
quickly (van Creveld 2000, 166).  
 Douhet however much overstated his case (van Creveld 2000, 167). Bombing 
methods in World War II were notoriously inaccurate, gas was not used, and radar 
directed fighters caused grievous damage to bomber formations (only rectified with better 
fighter protection in the case of the Americans and the British switching to night 
bombing) (van Creveld 2000, 167-168). Douhet’s message of air power and ‘command of 
the air’ however would continue on in one form or another, and while certain 
technologies and tactics may make certain aspects of his theory incorrect (as is the 
incorrect belief that air power alone wins wars), he made a valuable contribution of 
military theory which would be further developed in theory by such men as the American 
Billy Mitchell, and in practice by the Americans Harold  ‘Hap’ Arnold, Carl Spaatz, 
James Doolittle, Curtis LeMay, George Kenney, and Otto Weyland, and by the British 
Hugh Trenchard, Hugh Dowding, Arthur Harris, Tafford Leigh-Mallory, and Charles 
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Portal who would turn these varying concepts into air superiority and air supremacy, 
utilizing air power to very successfully if incompletely attack tactical, operational, and 
strategic targets with overwhelming force in World War II (discussed further in the case 
study).  
World War II: Total War in Europe 
 If anyone could be called a prophet of ‘total war’ as it is known today, then Erich 
Ludendorff would be that person. After World War I, a bitter, defeated, and self-serving 
Ludendorff set out to define the future of war and keep himself relevant in the ever 
changing dynamics of Germany’s new Weimar Republic. He blamed liberals and 
communists for defeat, and helped promote the “stab-in-the-back” theory that stated 
Germany had not lost the war militarily, but because of collapse at home.8 While after the 
war Ludendorff was a crazy and imbalanced person, it should not detract from his 
knowledge of war, nor the ideas he put forth in the inter-war period, as having run a state 
during a world war, he had quite a bit of knowledge and experience in the matter. 
“Ludendorff did not believe that a first-class modern state could be brought to its knees 
rapidly and cheaply by aircraft dropping bombs on civilian populations. Nor could this be 
achieved by fleets of tanks engaging in mobile operations, however indirect and however 
brilliant” (van Creveld 2000, 183). Instead he continued along the line of thought of 
Jomini, von Clausewitz. Wars were won by mass mobilization of the population and the 
economy and large armies that would utilize the modern elements of production, 
transportation, and communication to win wars (van Creveld 2000, 184). And only would 
                                                             
8 Note: It should be noted that Germany lost due to not placing the economy on a wartime footing, 
famine, the inability to end the blockade, and exhaustion and defeat of its armies along the Western and 
Eastern Fronts.  
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those states with the greatest will power win in a struggle where everything was “put on 
the table” and where everything was “on the line”. He believed that the theories of von 
Clausewitz should be thrown overboard, because no longer in a total war could politics 
serve master to the military and war. Politics would be “swallowed up by the war; the 
two would become indistinguishable” (van Creveld 2000, 185). Of all the twentieth 
century theorists, Ludendorff’s vision would hold the most truth. 
 During World War II, Germany operated under a system where political concerns 
always trumped military considerations. At the beginning of the war this worked out in 
favor of Germany. While much has been written about the vaunted “blitzkrieg”, there 
was little doctrinal basis for it, only expediency. “The Polish campaign of 1939 invites 
comparisons with Schlieffen’s vision of Cannae on an operation level… [where] The 
objective was the Polish army; the plan called for breaking through the Polish frontier 
positions and creating a double envelopment, the spearheads meeting somewhere east of 
Warsaw” (Showalter 2011, 52). This double envelopment took longer than expected, but 
achieved the desired result.  
 The original Wehrmacht plan for the war against France was to fight a massive 
meeting engagement in Belgium, similar to that of the Schlieffen Plan, where it sought to 
break a hole in the enemy line, and “see what developed” (Showalter 2011, 53). Hitler 
was incensed with the plan, and utilizing two junior field grade officers (and his most 
brilliant tactical and operational commanders: Guderian and von Manstein), forced upon 
the Wehrmacht a plan which would force a short war in the West. It was a politically 
motivated move as Germany and the Nazi party could not handle an offensive stalling out 
like had occurred in the First World War.   
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 The German offensive through the Ardennes was brilliant, as it was a weak spot 
in French defenses (sitting beyond the Maginot Line). While other offensives into 
Holland and Belgium drew the main Anglo-French armies into a march north, the 
Germans attacked and cut off the Allies in the north, leading to the famous evacuation of 
the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk, and the fall of France within a month. 
Germany was able to translate tactical victories, and operation surprise with strategic 
victory over France.  
 However, after this victory, tactical and operational success would not translate 
into strategic victory for Germany. Its air campaign in the Battle of Britain failed. 
“Rommel’s triumphs in North Africa, although they represented masterpieces of 
operational art, lacked the resources to be translated into strategic achievements” 
(Showalter 2011, 55). Operation Barbarossa stretched Germany to its limit in material, 
manpower, logistics, infrastructure, and morale. “Barbarossa’s scale exceeded the 
German grasp of operational art. The successive victories won by the panzers, the huge 
losses inflicted on men and equipment, the great encirclements of Minsk, Kiev, and 
Smolensk were essentially exercises in grand tactics, in the context of unraveling 
strategic objective that were poorly defined in the first place” (Showalter 2011, 56). After 
the failures of 1943 in the East (Battle of Kursk), Germany was on the defensive 
everywhere, and allied offensives in the East and West would build off of each other 
(North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, Southern France, etc). Germany went into 
damage control mode, where it could only “plug a hole and hope for the best” (Showlater 
2011, 56).  
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Its best however would not be enough, and Germany would be overwhelmed 
materially, in manpower, by sea power, by airpower, and through better land tactics and 
operations in 1944-1945 by the Allies. The Allies utilized a mixture of the theories of 
tactics and operation art that had put forth in the inter-war period (though they were all 
greatly modified), and saw success as they translated tactical success into offensive 
operations which in turn achieved strategic and political objectives. The Axis however 
failed to turn tactical victories into operational and strategic success. 
 The Allies for their part (in particular the Big Three of Great Britain, the Soviet 
Union, and the United States of America) were certainly not without fault and problems. 
However they were able to mobilize their economics and populations in such an efficient 
manner as to render new technologies (and some have perceived superior fighting spirit) 
of the Axis irrelevant. They were also able to turn tactical success into operational and 
strategic success in a way never before seen, and thus won the war. 
Centers of Gravity, Strategy, and the Operational Art of the Modern Era 
 The American military thought was shaken to its core as a result of the Vietnam 
War. Before and during Vietnam, the US had relied on overwhelming firepower to defeat 
its enemies; however in Vietnam this did not work (Echevarria 2011, 152). The Cold War 
had forced the US to change its tried and true strategy of war mobilization that required 
mass manpower and economic mobilization (as was done during the Civil War, and 
World Wars I and II) was no longer an effective strategy as nuclear weaponry would 
destroy those targets. Instead a “strategic reserve was constituted and a system of reserve 
call-up implemented and reformed” where military equipment and ammunition had to be 
pre-propositioned ahead of potential conflicts, and in which the active military and follow 
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on reserve formations “had to be prepared to fight with what they could carry, or could 
obtain through local means. Operational theory and doctrine, while still centered on the 
idea of concentrating overwhelming combat power at the decisive point, also began to 
consider the idea of fighting outnumbered and winning. The concept of active defense 
was one expression of that” (Echevarria 2011, 152).  
 The debate in the post-Vietnam world for the United States was a debate between 
‘manoeuvrists’ and ‘attritionists’ in how to combat the Warsaw Pact in a conventional 
war (assuming it would not go nuclear) (Echevarria 2011, 155). Both sides of the debate 
believed strongly that victory was achieved by the destruction of the enemy’s military 
capabilities (as expressed in the Air Land Battle concept and the Army’s Operations 
Manual FM 100-5); just how to accomplish it was the question. Thus the United States 
(in particular the Army and Air Force, with the Navy and Marine Corps not completely 
buying into the concepts) had made a fundamental shift in its thinking. The US would (as 
expressed through the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines) seek to fight conventional wars 
on its own terms, and avoid unconventional wars (i.e. Vietnam) as to maximize the US’s 
firepower advantage to win decisively (and thus training and doctrine was focused on 
kinetic conventional war and not unconventional war) (Echevarria 2011, 155). 
 During the 1980s, operational warfare became a permanent level of warfare and 
focus of study and research within the US and NATO. Jomini fell out of favor with von 
Clausewitz replacing him as a focus on emphasis within the US military. This dramatic 
change in US military strategy and operational art seemed to prove dividends in the First 
Gulf War, where the US using superior firepower and mobility out maneuvered and 
destroyed vast elements of the Iraqi Army, Air Force, Navy, and Republican Guards with 
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few allied casualties. Foremost amongst the changes was the utilized the concepts of John 
Boyd, that of the “OODA Loop” (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act decision making process). 
 In the 1990s, the Gulf War loomed large in American military thinking, with the 
events of Somalia seen as an anomaly. Doctrine, training, and technological development 
centered on ‘decisive victory’ in a conventional war where such things as standoff 
weaponry, computerization, information expansion, data links, etc. would prove decisive 
(Echevarria 2011, 157-158). Many declared a ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA) had 
occurred, and that new theories of network-centric warfare (NCW) and effects-based 
operations (EBO) would end von Clausewitz’s ‘fog of war’ and allow domination of the 
battlefield (and they grew to immense levels of popularity in defense circles- though at 
the expense of many critics). These concepts of RMA, NCW, and EBO would be killed 
off however with the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, as it “ran counter to the 
history of warfare” (Echevarria 2011, 157-158). 
 In the past decade, the US has undergone a transformation similar in scope to that 
after Vietnam. The US was forced to come to the realization that while it dominated the 
realm of conventional warfare (as seen in the first days of the Iraq War), it was not well 
prepared in operations that occurred after the conventional fighting ended. In the case of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, it was woefully unprepared in doctrine and training for stability 
and counter-insurgency operations. The US military has spent the last decade re-learning 
(and finding new) lessons from past counter-insurgency wars it (and other nations) have 
fought (Echevarria 2011, 158-159). “American operational art continues to develop war’s 
second grammar with energy. Its progress has been rapid, if uneven” (Echevarria 2011, 
159). 
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 Today strategy revolves around a new version of the ‘schwerpunkt’, where 
instead of a concentration point for attacking forces in a battle, but now something much 
more. Schwerpunkt is now translated as the theoretical ‘center of gravity’ (CoG). In this 
new view of the schwerpunkt, a CoG serves as the center of power for the state in which 
is draws all strength from, and without it can no longer fight. The CoG can be either a 
material or non-material item or concept, which makes it hard to truly identify. Its use has 
extended from the tactical both the operational and strategic levels of war in its usage. 
Thus the key to strategic victory in war today is to destroy the enemy’s operational CoG 
which will in turn lead to being able to attack their strategic CoG and win the war.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the study of warfare has seen inconsistent growth throughout 
history. Much of it has been built upon the theorists before them and based upon the 
experiences of actual war. The study of warfare and its conduct however is so extremely 
vast with many variables (and opinions). While the field of military theory may never 
come to the level of knowledge that other sciences have (due to the information 
problems), it is an important field of study and should not be discounted merely because 
it has yet to attain a level of scientific certainty that other fields of study have attained. 
War is about people, and they are unpredictable at times. Maybe the day will come when 
we will have a more complete understanding of war beyond what we have now, and we 
can create models that can take into account the vast numbers of variables involved in 
war and all the people and technology associated with it and accurately model war down 
to its finest details. As of right now, we have yet to achieve anything near that level of 
complexity.  
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The Study of War in Political Science 
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For many in political science, the study of war should be left to others. For a 
growing minority however, this view is changing. The coupling of warfare with politics 
has been central to the study of political science throughout its history. The early political 
philosophers and theorists wrote not only on governance, but warfare as well. However, 
this changed over time, especially in academia in the past fifty years. “To the extent that 
there is knowledge to be gained by understanding what goes on within wars, its study is 
both appropriate and necessary subject of scrutiny for academics” (Gartner 1998, 255). 
The study of war onset and deterrence has been a central part of the study of political 
science in American academia for the past one hundred years. War outcomes and 
termination have only seen major advancements in the past twenty years. The section is a 
discussion of the early political philosophers and their views on war, along with a 
literature review of politics and warfare within political science along with the current 
trends in the war outcomes, war termination, game theory in relation to war, and the 
‘Bargaining Model of War’ literatures, all of which have seen not only great 
advancement in research in the past twenty years, but excellent cross-pollination between 
them as well.  
This is, like chapter 3, an extended overview of the literature in the field of 
political science and its dealings with war. As this study is written for audiences in both 
the fields of political science and military art, this chapter, as like the previous chapter, 
may be skipped for those very familiar with the literature, and continued with the main 
theory in chapter 4.  
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A Brief History of Political Science in Respect to War Outcomes up to World War II  
The passing of knowledge in the earliest of days for humanity was that of stories. 
Eventually those stories were written down. What could be considered the first text of 
political science was that transcribed were the stories, told by Homer in the Iliad and the 
Odyssey, and in particular the Iliad. “The Iliad is the first of key texts through which 
classical Athens and Rome probed the foundations of international order” (Hill 2011, 9). 
The Iliad (in the dramatic flair of an epic) used story telling as an instruction for how 
Greeks should utilize (or conversely avoid) elements of statescraft, diplomacy, and 
strategy in order to be a good and just citizen, through the context of the great Trojan 
War. The Iliad was in effect a “poem of force” (rather a instructional manual or 
theoretical work) that allowed the early Greeks to pass down words of wisdom to future 
generations, moving away from that of the word of mouth and into a new medium, that of 
the written word (as it is believed that Homer compiled many stories of the ‘Trojan War’ 
saga into one epic) (Hill 2011, 10-15). This method of a poem should not be viewed with 
the lenses of scholarship today, but instead as one of the first methods of passing down 
knowledge and the first step to where we are today in academic scholarship. While the 
Iliad is not very scientific by modern standards, it should be considered the start of the 
field of political science, and that study would evolve for the Greeks in two realms: the 
politics of the polis (the community), and that of the politics of war or command and 
generalship (‘strategia’, or what we now know as strategy). 
 Thucydides however, along with others such as Aristotle, Plato, and Xenophon, 
dramatically changed the nature and study of history and political science. Thucydides, a 
former Athenian general who had commanded Athenian and allied forces during the 
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failed campaign defending Amphipolis, wrote the first narrative on an historical event in 
chronological order the Peloponnesian War (Hill 2011, 21). Thucydides’ work The 
History of the Peloponnesian War is an incomplete work, as Thucydides died before the 
Peloponnesian War ended. It is also not only a historical record of events, but a narrative 
full of comments and observations that attempt to explain why events occurred and in the 
manner they occurred. It should be noted that his work would serve as the basis from 
which the theoretical concepts of “realism” and “deterrence” were derived from today 
The History of the Peloponnesian War is the first attempt to show how and why 
this war began, how war aims were created and evolved, political-military interaction, 
mobilization of the city-states, alliances and their strategies, the strategies, campaigns, 
tactics, and weaponry utilized by the combatants, motivations of individuals, and how all 
of these variables caused other certain events to occur.  It is a detached, markedly 
unbiased, coldly cynical, and crucial view of the events and the decisions made by 
leaders during the war. Though Thucydides died before the war ended, it was finished by 
another author, who wrote in the similar fashion as Thucydides, and thus carried on his 
work till the end of the war.  
 In deciding to go to war and enacting strategies, Thucydides states, “It is a 
common mistake in going to war to being at the wrong end, to act first and to wait for 
disaster to discuss the matter” (Thucydides 1998, 44). When engaged in war, states 
should seek control and rationality, not giving in to the fears and hysteria that may occur, 
“For war of all things proceeds least upon definite rules, but draws principally upon itself 
for contrivances to meet an emergency and in such cases the party who faces the struggle 
and keeps his temper best meets with most security, and he who loses his tempt about it, 
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with correspondent disaster” (Thucydides 1998, 67). No other book (non-religious) from 
ancient antiquity, (other than Sun-Tzu’s The Art of War, has had such an enduring legacy 
as Thucydides’ work. 
 While The History of the Peloponnesian War has captivated readers since it was 
written, Virgil’s the Aeneid continued the Homeric tradition by writing on the founding 
of the Roman after the Trojan War, but most documentation on war outcomes was in the 
form of historical analysis by Roman scholars. Early and Middle Roman scholars 
emphasized the styles of warfare that its legions fought: “disciplined ferocity” that 
manifested itself into as the Romans called “punitive war” or “destructive war” (Carr 
2002, 17-30). Late Roman and early Western political scholars were heavily influenced 
by the Catholic Church (such as St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas and their writings 
on the ‘Just War’ Theory) and by the anarchy of the fall of the Empire. It was not until 
Thomas Hobbes and Nicollo Machiavelli that the interplay of warfare and politics come 
to the forefront of theory and written scholarship.  
 Thomas Hobbes, writing after the English Civil War (1642-1651), feared the 
disorder that came about due to civil war. Because of this, in his substantial work 
Leviathan, he puts forth the idea of a “social contract” in which the population of a state 
submits certain rights to their sovereign in return for peace and security from foreign 
intervention and domestic unrest (Hill 2011, 88-92). Hobbes, who had translated 
Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War, admired the lessons that could be 
gained from the work and incorporated them into ways to protect the state from disorder.  
 Nicollo Machiavelli, on the other hand, weaves military advice not only into his 
great political works, but even writes a book on the Art of War. Machiavelli, lived in an 
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era where the Italian states were small and numerous and in a constant state of fighting 
(that relied on mercenaries), developed ideas that have had mixed acceptance. He 
strongly believed that through the lens of Roman history, certain truths can be gained. 
Machiavelli believes that while a Prince’s (or republic’s citizen) first duty is the defense 
of the state, that defense should be upheld by the citizenry and not mercenaries or allies, 
both of which he despised (Handel 1992, 130-133). Machiavelli also believed in 
offensive action, which can expand the power of the state, and in his case, unite all of 
Italy. But offensive action to Machiavelli should only be achieved by the least expensive 
option (much in line with Sun-Tzu’s Indirect Approach). At the same time, he was 
fascinated by decisive battles (a very Clausewitzian view). His works show that he is 
unable to come to terms with the contradictions in these two very different thoughts. In 
spite of his logical inconsistency, he places warfare of prime importance to the state and 
its leadership, which in turn attempts brought the debate of warfare back into the field of 
political science from which it had fallen. 
 Machiavelli’s efforts fail however. The study of warfare however was mostly 
abandoned by many political scientists, and was left in the hands of professional military 
members, theorists, and historians to be dealt with (as discussed in previous chapter on 
military strategy). It was during this time (as it had been during the Middle Ages and the 
Age of Absolute Monarchs) that the nobility and leadership of states were heavily 
engaged in the practice of warfare, even if theorizing about war and politics remained 
separate or non-existent. Over this period war became more limited, as troops were 
formally uniformed, and rules governing troops utilized (almost harkening back to the 
Roman Empire, as if some methods had been lost, or changed, or deemed unnecessary 
73 
 
during the Middle and Dark Ages). Any research conducted on war outcomes and the 
political-military interaction revolved around attempts to resolve the errors made in 
previous wars and previous peace treaties (notably the Franco-Prussian War and World 
War I and II). It was not until after World War II that any systemic and analytical 
research into war outcomes would be renewed in political science.  
Basic (Modern) Theories of International Relations 
 Within the field of International Relations (IR) in Political Science, several 
theories dominate the field at one time or another. These theories provide the context in 
which states and wars should be viewed, and states operate within the international 
system.  
 One of the first and most dominating theories in IR was that of Realism. It is more 
of a way of thinking then a true theory, and it has fallen out of favor by many in political 
science, but less so by actual policy makers. Basing itself upon ideas from Thucydides, 
Machiavelli, and others Realism argues that in the modern inter-state system states seek 
not only to maintain their current power, but expand and accumulate more power. 
Realism assumes that the world is anarchic and only states, and not multi-national 
corporations or non-government organizations, can exist, operate, and flourish within this 
world view (Keohane 1986). Since states are the primary actors in this world, they utilize 
their power to maintain and accumulate more power that gives states meaning. Whenever 
states act, they do so unsure of the intentions of other states (even their allies) and any 
actions are based upon strategic, rational decision making in order to maintain and gain 
power. Within the theory however, power is an ambiguous thing, a combination of 
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economic, political, military, and technology that (when added together in various 
methods) somehow equals a state’s true power.  
 While the theory has major flaws as a theory, it does provide an excellent 
framework for which people will operate it. It is not a theory of states, but of an inter-
national system, and while many within political science may scoff at it, the fact remains 
many world leaders and those in positions to influence them have in the past and still 
today subscribe to this view.  In a realist world, wars are fought to maintain and gain 
power, and are won by those states with greater amounts of power that are not forced to 
utilize as much of their power to maintain their position. This view is further expanded 
upon by the Power Transition Theory, where great-power wars are when one state is 
trying to supplant a larger (perceived or actual) and more powerful state (i.e. Germany 
against the UK, France, Soviet Union, and US in World War II).  
 In response to realist claims of anarchy and wars fought over a nebulous and ill 
defined ‘power’ gain, a segment of the political science field rejected the claims. In its 
place to counter it was a theory (as much of a ‘theory’ as realism was) called ‘liberalism’.  
Unlike realism it believes that states and the people in them tend to be naturally good 
(following the ideals of Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson), and thus states and their 
citizens will favor peace between states in the international system and will come 
together to maintain peace and stability (Weber 2009). Also not only are states actors in 
the international system, but so are smaller players such as MNCs, NGOs, etc. 
 From this theory sprang an ‘democratic peace thesis’, based upon observation 
that democracies do not fight each other in wars since the modern inter-state system arose 
after the Napoleonic wars (Hook 2010).  Further observations show that not only do 
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democracies not fight each other (with the exception of two or three examples depending 
on how one codes and labels democracies), but that they tend to fight and win against 
non-democratic nations more often than they lose (Bennett and Stam 1998, Reiter and 
Stam 2002). As such, all sorts of testable and non-testable theories and ideas have sprung 
up for these observations. Some have stated that democracies do not fight each other 
because of the nature of democracies promoting peace, stability, values of a peaceful 
process, and trade. Others have stated that democracies are just as warlike as autocracies 
and other non-democracies, but are more efficient at fighting wars on and off the 
battlefield.  
To counter these arguments, some of asserted that there are liberal biases to these, 
or that they are not a causal relationship (Rosato 2003). The most interesting argument is 
that it is not democracy that causes peace, but trade and economic entanglement between 
states. Whatever the cause may be, in liberal tradition today, the belief is that 
democracies do not fight wars unless it will secure a greater peace or it is force upon 
them. However, when they do fight wars, they fight it with a ferocity and total-ness that 
will seek the removal of the non-democratic government when possible, and fight more 
efficiently on the battlefield in order to secure victory.  
Many found these theories were enough, but to others these theories were lacking. 
Rational Choice theory was a theory that came about out of how actors will behave in 
certain situations (Eriksson 2011). It moves away from the view as the state is only an 
actor (as if the state were a ship viewed from the outside only, and not as hundreds of 
people machinery operating it). Thus research and theoretical work began into leadership 
and how leaders respond to crisis and normal decision making. In rational choice theory, 
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actors act “rationally”. What it means to be rational is not that actors behave in a manner 
that everyone would find as acceptable, but that actors will act in their own best interests 
by ranking their preferences in an hierarchical order from most preferred to least 
(Eriksson 2011). The problem is no actor can ever act irrationality when they rank their 
preferences in the order they most prefer. The problem for decision makers is to 
determine what is in their best interest and highest preference that will lead to victory in 
war.  
Prospect theory is another leadership decision-making theory. Based off an 
economic and psychological theory of how actors make decisions during times of risk 
(risking for a chance at gains with the ‘prospect’ of losses), prospect theory is applied to 
leaders (and everyday people) under the proposition that people are not “risk-adverse” 
when making decisions but instead “loss-adverse” (Vis, 2011). When decision making 
occurs, it is dependent on how the perception of the situation is framed: are they in the 
domain of gains or the domain of losses? If in the domain of gains, people will act more 
conservative as to minimize potential loss. But if in the domain of losses, people will be 
willing to take greater and greater chances in order to leave the domain of losses and 
acquire gain, and become more of a risk taker, trying to maximize gains as they are 
already losing (Vis 2011). Therefore in wartime, the losing side will become more 
desperate and willing to take greater risks in order to achieve victory because if they 
don’t they will lose anyway. Those who perceive themselves as winning will be less 
likely to take risk and take courses of action that will ensure fewer casualties and less 
potential for defeat.  
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Another avenue of approach was that of game theory, and in a related strain, 
deterrence. Game theory is a decision-making theory (like others stated above), where 
leaders take rationality into account when making decisions (Zagare 2011, Quackenbush 
2011). However in this case, every decision is made within the context of mathematical 
rules that govern the gains and losses a ‘player’ will receive with each decision. 
Depending on the format of the game and how it is played (determined by placement of 
numbers for optimal strategies), a number of different possibilities may arise. Game 
theory has been utilized in arms races, deterrence, and conflict resolution. Depending on 
the game (such as ‘Chicken’, ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’, ‘Stag Hunt’, etc.), information may 
be perfect (every player has the same information), complete, incomplete, and imperfect, 
and the orders of players sequential or non-sequential, etc. Whatever the type of game, it 
seeks to maximize a player’s outcome while taking into account the other player’s action.  
 Out of game theory came ‘Deterrence theory’, where one side attempts to 
convince the other side that an action they were to take would lead to a response that 
would be unacceptable and inflict damage to the point where they would not want to take 
the action and thus avoid the damage associated with that action. Though most writings 
during the Cold War were based upon nuclear deterrence, today it has spread to 
conventional warfare as well. While deterrence comes in many different forms based 
upon differing basic assumptions and differences in the models for the specific game 
theory utilized (such as classical deterrence, perfect deterrence, etc.) the basic premise of 
each (that an action will lead to unacceptable losses) remains the same.  
While these theories describe how leaders may act, or how states may act in the 
international system of states during war, they do not go into more detail than that, nor 
78 
 
the decisions brought up to leaders for them to make. These theories however were only 
part of the puzzle of understanding warfare and politics. As such, more was required 
beyond how leaders may think, or states acted, but how wars were fought, and how they 
ended. As such, new areas of study were required.  
Modern Studies of War Outcomes in Political Science 
 The study of war outcomes has predominately focused itself around two major 
themes: the determinants of war outcomes, as in what factors lead to victory or defeat in 
war, and how leaders of a state respond to events during war, and when those leaders 
decide to end the conflict. There are several formal theories as to why wars end, and what 
causes wars to end the way they do. Instead this area of study revolves around asking 
questions based upon observations of war and seeking their answer, where the eventual 
accumulation of knowledge will lead to a combined theory that will connect with such 
other areas of study as war onset, war termination, and military capabilities within 
International Relations.  
The study of what occurs during a war has only taken hold in political science 
since the 1990s. It would take the seminal work of Allan Stam, Win, Lose, or Draw, in 
1996, and the famous “Opening of the Black Box of War” articles by Gartner and others 
in the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1998 to open up war outcomes as sub-field of true 
study and interest within political science (Gartner 1998, 252-258). Even with the 
opening of the box, war outcomes still embraced in political science beyond a small, but 
growing group of scholars. Modern studies of war outcomes can be broken up into two 
periods, before Stam’s Win, Lose, or Draw, and after Stam’s Win, Lose, or Draw in 1996. 
This pivotal book changed the way war outcomes were viewed. Before Stam, research 
79 
 
was conducted over national capabilities and resources. After Stam, not only did national 
capabilities play a factor, but of even more importance, military events that occurred 
during the war became the important factor (in Stam’s case that of strategies utilized).  
While a few writers wrote on war outcomes after World War II, efforts were 
scattered, focusing on large-N data sets with the use of ratios of national power (based on 
military expenditure, strength, GDP, natural resources, etc.) and findings revolved around 
the “larger side wins”, “initiator wins”, and descriptive models in use (Stoll 1995, 144-
145).  Many of these early studies on war outcomes find that the larger side will normally 
win a war (Rosen 1972; Organski and Kugler 1980; Kugler and Domke 1986; Altfeld and 
Sabrosky 1990). While this view was not universally held (others believed that the war 
initiator normally won), it held the dominant sway in the early studies of the literature. 
Rosen (1972) for example uses a capability “power” ratio created from the cost 
tolerance of side A divided by the strength of side B, divided by the cost tolerance of side 
B divided by the strength of side A. The equation Rosen creates is written as:   
Power Ratio =   Party A / Party B = 
[(Cost-tolerance of A / Strength of B) / (Cost-tolerance of B / Strength of A)] 
Blainey (1973, 123) on the other hand in his Causes of War, states seven factors 
that affect relative strength and lead to determining capabilities: 
1. Military strength and the ability to apply strength efficiently in the 
chosen war zone. 
2. Predications on how other states will behave during war onset.  
3. Perceptions of internal state cohesion of the enemy.  
4. Memories of previous wars outcomes and realities of warfighting. 
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5. Perceptions to maintain war efforts economically and logistically. 
6. Nationalism and political ideology. 
7. Leadership qualities of leaders and their abilities.  
 Others have developed formulas that use some type of total (resources + military) 
capabilities ratio (Cannizzo 1980; Altfeld and Sabrosky 1990; Maoz 1989; Wayman, 
Singer, and Goertz 1983). Most of the literature, including the Correlates of War (CoW) 
data sets, utilized a wide range of “capabilities”, mainly empirically measurable (non-
binary) coding to conduct statistical analysis. Because of this, the use of variables that 
was applicable to all the nation-states over a large time period were rather small, 
revolving around total numbers of troops, total losses, GDP, natural resources, and trade. 
In addition, “these variables measure potential military power rather than allied military 
power” (Sullivan 2007, 499). Yet this was a very small number of variables to take into 
account for determining the outcome of a war.  
 Added to this, the study of wartime actions was blocked by two other constraints. 
First, the field was consumed by realist theory, and any theories that challenged realism 
failed to look at what occurred during a war (such as democratic peace), thereby 
conceding any research to theorists of a particular point of view (Gartner 1998, 252-253). 
The second constraint was the study of warfare and military affairs itself. “Many scholars 
remain reluctant to study the conduct of war. A strong normative bias against the study of 
war has constrained analysis of interwar behavior. On one hand, there is a widespread 
view that the study of war requires information about military matters that is either highly 
subjective or unique to military personnel” (Betts 1982). On the other hand, there is also 
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a strong belief that the study of the conduct of the war suggested that one was somehow 
pro-war (Gartner 1998, 254-255).  
In Stoll’s (1995) chapter on the “Evolution of War” (a wonderful synopsis of all 
aspects of the study of war literature in political science up to 1995), he concluded that 
“The picture is not clear when trying to predict the primary summary characteristics of 
war” and that “a variety of measures have been used in this [who wins a war] area, and 
further research is necessary to pare down the alternatives if we hope to uncover the 
single best (or a small set) measure of power when predicting the outcome of war”, but 
that “the picture brightens when we move to consider predicting who wins a war” (Stoll 
1995, 154). Thus by 1995, many believed the debate over war outcomes was solved, and 
that “capabilities” (however defined) of a state when the war started determined 
everything. 
 It was not until Allan Stam’s Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the 
Crucible of War in 1996 that really brought strategy and military variables were brought 
to the forefront of the war outcomes literature. Using a non-formal rational choice theory, 
he compares several factors that would lead to victory, defeat, or a draw in warfare.9 
Stam divides up those factors of determining war outcomes into two groups, “1. Factors 
that affect the costs associated with fighting, which are determined by the actors’ choices 
prior to and during the war. 2. Factors that are structural constraints or factors that the 
actors do not get to choose, such as population, democracy, and so on” (Stam 1996, 25).  
 According to Stam, “states go to war to compel or coerce an adversary to do 
something. The actor in the war that has been attacked is also trying to execute a policy 
                                                             
9 Where there is no formal game theory involved, rationality of leadership though is assumed: that is 
leaders act in their own self-interests based upon what is believed to be in their best interests, even if 
others may not view it as such. 
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of coercion once the war has begun, at a minimum trying to get its adversary to stop 
waging the war against it” (Stam 1996, 31). With this in mind, he puts forth three basic 
assumptions for his study of war outcomes. “1. That the basic factors that determine war 
outcomes are the expected benefits of victory, the rate that the two actors are able to 
impose costs upon each other, and the duration of the war. 2. At any moment during a 
war, there are four possible outcomes: one of the two sides winning, a draw, or the war 
continuing on. At the conclusion of the war, there are then three possible outcomes- win, 
lose, or draw. The final point to be made is that war outcomes are not necessarily zero-
sum, meaning that changes in capabilities or duration may increase (or decrease) both 
side’s chances of victory simultaneously” (Stam 1996, 40-41). What is most compelling 
about the “zero-sum” point is that what would make one side surrender is not necessarily 
the same for the other side to do the same, nor conversely lead it to victory.  
 In order to determine the costs and benefits of fighting, and continuing to fight, 
Stam uses quantitative analysis in the forms of logistic regression (multinomial logit) 
modeling, ordered logistic regression, and ordered probit regression. He begins with 
coding his two most important variables of his study, “strategy” and “doctrine”, which is 
a “main variable by which leaders can affect the duration of a war, which is a key 
concern of decision makers” and by extension war outcome (Stam 1996, 51). Stam 
defines strategy as “the general way in which a state uses its military forces in a war”, 
and doctrine as “fundamentally offensive or defensive depending on whether state 
objectives are to maintain or alter the status quo” (Stam 1996, 52). In strategy, the state 
has three main strategies to pursue, “maneuver” (strategies of speed and mobility), 
“attrition” (destroying or capturing an enemy, with large confrontations), and 
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“punishment” (insurgencies, and impose high cost upon opponents military and civilian 
populations) (Stam 1996, 52-55). These strategies, combined with doctrine, create a 
matrix for both offensive and defense, with 9 possible strategies that a state can utilize in 
war (Stam 1996, 88).  
 These two variables of military strategies a state pursues in war is the crux of his 
work. It is one of the first times that military strategies up to this point were empirically 
and quantitatively tested within war outcomes. With the dependent variable of win, draw, 
and loss in a war, and using the strategic-doctrine variables as independent variables, 
Stam also utilized terrain, democracy, troop numbers, quality of troops ratio amongst a 
total of twenty-three independent and control variables. Using this, Stam finds that 
optimally, states should pursue offensive-maneuver strategies in areas of light and flat 
terrain, and defensive-punishment strategies in heavy-mountainous terrain. Stam also 
finds that the longer a war lasts, the more likely it will end in a draw between the warring 
states. Most important is that military strategies play a major (if not the major) role in 
determining war outcomes.  
 Stam couples this finding in his study with domestic political constraints. Certain 
states may not be able to carry out certain strategies, or may favor ones over others. 
Certain states might have the ability to follow punishment and attritional strategies, while 
other nations might be constrained by domestic concerns for casualties and forced to rely 
on more maneuver strategies. (Stam 1996, 162-165, and 196-199). Therefore, Stam 
ingeniously connects military success at the higher levels of war to domestic political 
considerations, and how decision makers may respond to certain situations. This also 
furthers ideas on how and why certain nations choose to fight certain enemies and not 
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others. Overall, Stam’s contribution to war outcomes was immense, as he shifted the 
debate and further research from just pure national capabilities, balances, and ratios to 
taking into account military strategy (beyond that of Offense-Defense Theory, a 
problematic theory at best, and rejected by me as illogical and inconsistent with the way 
weapons and tactics are developed and utilized in battle, but which is discussed later on).  
 While Stam finds the very strong findings of correlation between a wars outcome 
and military strategy utilized, the strategic-doctrine variables themselves are a very 
simplistic form of military strategy, and are not without fault.  It does not take into 
account changes during a war, instead only the most dominant strategy or the strategy 
with the most resources utilized during that war as the ‘primary’ strategy (and thus only) 
strategy-doctrine coded for the war. The War is just that, a view of the entire war, at the 
highest level, and not the operational or tactical levels of war.  
 The strategy-doctrines are somewhat confusing. First off, the coding of the 
Offensive-Defense variables is in reality “War Initiator” and “War Defender” instead of 
how he defines doctrine in his book, making it a less about actual war fighting and more 
about war onset. Second, the theory heavily concentrates on the strategy utilized by 
ground forces (forgoing air and naval strategies in the analysis- a problem in itself), his 
examples for ‘punishment strategies’ ranges from strategic bombing (an air strategy), to 
irregular or unconventional warfare. Counter-insurgency does not really have a place 
(unless viewed as an ‘attritional‘ strategy). It primarily relegated inter-state warfare to 
conventional warfare of either maneuver or attritional strategies by ground forces. And 
many theorists (including myself) could accurately claim in that in order to conduct a 
maneuver strategy, you may first have to conduct an attritional strategy. World War I is 
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an good example of this from 1915-1918 on the Western Front as the Allies and Germans 
conducted attritional warfare until the Allies were able to break through the Hindenburg 
Line in late 1918. It could also be posited that the two are unrelated. Attrition is occurring 
all the time in war, it just depends if that attrition of forces is proportional or 
disproportional between the states engaged (disproportional in the First Persian Gulf War 
of 1990-1991 between Iraq and the US-backed Allies). Third, the use of strategic-
doctrine variables would seem mutually exclusive in all cases of warfare, but are not. 
Stam uses the US bombing of Dresden and Tokyo in World War II and of Hanoi in the 
Vietnam War as examples of defensive punishment strategy and offensive punishment 
strategy. One would think that the different strategy-doctrine pairs are mutually exclusive 
and elsewhere Stam gives every indication that they are. Therefore, these cases cannot be 
examples of both defensive punishment and offensive punishment strategy-doctrine 
combinations at work.10 Finally, the over-simplification of strategy-doctrine has led to 
many of the nuances of warfare, strategy, operational art, and doctrine to be lost in 
Stam’s analysis (not to mention that his definitions of strategy, operational art, or 
doctrine put do not match those put forth in Chapter Two) and thus the ability to clearly 
identify the specific variables beyond that lead to victory inside these broad categories is 
problematic. While Stam’s work is not only valuable, revolutionary, and a move in the 
right direction (with the correct assumptions on war outcomes are based on wartime 
actions), many of the specifics are either too broad, or mis-coded. 
 After Stam’s book, research into war outcomes grew, as did research into what 
occurred during a war and the political-military relationship.  The momentum for 
                                                             
10 Thanks to Stephen Quackenbush for pointing this out and expanding upon this idea with me during 
several discussion sessions we had. 
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wartime research saw a major advance in June of 1998, when the “Black Box of War” 
was opened through several articles in the Journal of Conflict Resolution. In it Dan Reiter 
and Allan Stam put forth that democracies win wars more often because of better 
battlefield effectiveness due to better soldering and personal initiative (Reiter and Stam 
1998). Alastair Smith uses a Markovian random-walk model of war to connect domestic 
considerations to battlefield outcomes and war outcomes, along with modeling wars as a 
series of battles until one side capitulates, and that how those states act is dependent on 
how well they are preforming in the war (Smith 1998). Bennett and Stam  find that 
democracies tend to be highly selective when they initiate a war, and are more likely to 
win wars they initiate, though the longer a war lasts, the greater the decrease in public 
support for the war (Bennett and Stam 1998).  
After Win, Lose, and Draw, and the “Opening Up the Black Box of War”, 
research into wars and war outcomes expanded. Arregiun-Toft looked into why strong 
states lose wars to weak opponents when materially and economically they are stronger. 
He found that strong states “lose asymmetric conflicts when they employ the wrong 
military strategy in relation to their weak opponent’s strategy” (Sullivan 2007, 499). 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) found that democratic states not only choose their 
opponents more selectively than autocratic states, but that they allocate more resources to 
fighting (and thus winning) the wars they engaged in (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). 
David Clark and William Reed (2003) looked into combining war-fighting strategies and 
capabilities with war selection, finding that evidence for both and that both variables 
complement each other when determining war outcomes. 
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In “Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness”, Stam and Dan Reiter 
(1998) look into why democracies tend to win the wars they fight (along with their follow 
up book and quantitative analysis Democracies at War in 2002). Stam and Reiter find 
that democracies tend to have slightly better logistics, better personal initiative on the 
battlefield, and better leadership.  
In Democracies at War, Stam and Reiter (2002) expand upon the article, going 
into not only the previous stated reasons why democracies do well, but also empirically 
show that democracies who starts wars normally win them, that they fight shorter wars, 
tend to lose when public support wanes, and use less force when causalities mount (Stam 
and Reiter 2002, 198). Further they extrapolate from the evidence that democracies 
choose the wars they fight more carefully (as in choosing weaker targets), and as 
democratic leaders lose more in defeat, and are more willing to fight harder and longer to 
attain a victory and avoid defeat (which would cause their removal from power). Overall 
they find some interesting findings tending to show that democracies tend to perform 
better in war than non-democratic countries.  
Further, Patricia Sullivan conducted researching to the effects that “uncertainty 
about the cost of prosecuting a war to victory on the duration and outcome of military 
interventions” has upon leadership and its effects decision making (Sullivan 2008, 49). 
She found that while investigating this question that “Unfortunately, predicting war 
outcomes is much more complicated than arriving at an accurate measure of relative 
military capabilities. In fact, the relative balance of military capabilities is not likely to be 
the primary course of prewar uncertainty and even complete information n about the 
distribution of war-fighting capacity is unlikely to directly translate into accurate 
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predictions about the cost and outcome of many wars” (Sullivan 2008, 51). She 
concluded in her study that (using Stam’s strategic-doctrine coding along with her own) 
stronger states will attain a quick victory when they overthrow a regime or seize territory 
(as compared wars fought for other political goals), but troop commitment however has 
little bearing on the outcome. Further when a state’s leadership makes major 
miscalculations on the enemy’s resolve, they will normally lose the war (Sullivan 2008, 
62). Therefore, leaders must not only have accurate intelligence, but use it wisely and for 
specific policy goals. 
Perhaps the most interesting note on war outcomes has been the utter lack of data 
and studies over anything beneath the strategic level of war with one notable exception, 
that of Stephen Biddle. In his study Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in 
Modern Battle (Biddle 2004). Biddle’s theory revolves around the idea that the modern 
force employment system is key to victory on the battlefield- described as tactics of 
firepower and force concentration that lead to (offensively) breakthroughs and 
(defensively) containment (Biddle 2004, 28-51). Biddle uses the “operation” which in his 
analysis is the tactical and lower level operational-tactical levels of warfare (Biddle 2004, 
6). While the model he postulates is strong (it has some weaknesses), it deals with only 
for the lower levels of warfare, with no mechanism for connecting battlefield victory to 
operational and strategic victory. One of the case studies utilized in Biddle’s work is the 
British ‘Operation Goodwood’, where British armored forces attempted to break out of 
the Normandy beachhead in July of 1944. The operation (i.e. large battle in this case) was 
a complete disaster. The Germans delivered punishing and disproportionate level of 
casualties to the British. This victory though did not push the Allies back into the English 
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Channel, nor change the outcome of the war, but delayed the Allies breakout of the 
Normandy Beachhead. The Allies were trying to break out of their beachhead from 
wherever they possible could, and Field Marshal Montgomery’s attempt was one 
amongst many. Shortly after ‘Goodwood’, General Omar Bradley would launch 
‘Operation Cobra’, and using saturation bombing, pierce the German lines with an 
infantry and then armored spearhead, breaking through the German lines and into their 
rear (leading to the collapse of the German line and its retreat to the Franco-German 
border).  
Biddle’s work is also solely concerned with land warfare, leaving out sea and air 
warfare. It also has flaws in a few of its variables are a bit off the mark (One example 
given in the book is technology superiority, which is based on date it was made. 
Therefore the question becomes, is the newest Chinese built J/F-10 fighter from 2005 
really superior to the F-22 Raptor first built in 1997 and in readiness in 2005? Most 
military analysts would say that the F-22 is markedly superior to the J/F-10, since the J/F-
10 is a Fourth Generation Fighter compared to the F-22 which is a Fifth Generation 
Fighter). Overall, Biddle’s work is a valuable piece of the puzzle if applied with other 
theories and improved upon for each warfare area and technology determinant in weapon 
versus weapon. While battles are important, and Biddle helps to pave the way by showing 
that they can in some ways be modeled, battles do not win wars without proper execution 
of campaigns and strategies to further and attain political policy goals. 
 When it comes to the topic of war outcomes in the field of Political Science, there 
is no disagreement that the capabilities, strategies, and target selection of states all play 
some type of role in not only the outcomes of wars but their duration as well. What has 
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only become of great importance and of study in the past twenty years is the level of 
importance in these variables, and how these variables, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively should be coded and analyzed.  
Thus far in regards with the study of war outcomes, only board sweeps of analysis 
with large generalizations that are lacking in detail and specifics have been found. It is 
this lack of detail and specifics that should be the focal point of researches in the 
determinants of war outcomes. Whether using statistical models or game theory, the field 
has greatly expanded from early political theory and individual historical case study 
analysis. This should only be the beginning however, as there are still major gaps in the 
literature. The field is ripe for further developments beyond what has already been found. 
Only until the variables that are involved with all the levels are connected, and expanded 
upon military strategy to national strategy and the state as a whole can war outcomes 
become more effective, specific, and meaningful (useful) for not just academia but policy 
makers as well. 
The Bargaining Model of War 
 In addition to qualitative and quantitative research into war outcomes through 
determinant variables, there is also a related process on determining war outcomes and 
war termination, called the Bargaining Model of War. The Bargaining Model of War is a 
game theoretic model that is based on the decision political leaders make in war time: the 
continue fighting or seek a negotiated end (be it unconditional surrender or something 
more like a draw). The Bargaining Model has two broad interpretations, first that war is a 
purely military contest and that states fight each other until one side no longer has the 
will to continue. The second is that bargaining between countries continues even after the 
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fighting starts, and its continual as the war reveals true (vice projected) expectations in 
which over time, both sides will seek an end before the true outcomes of war occur and 
are forced upon each state (thus avoiding that end through the loss of resources, goods, 
and time, and instead ended via diplomacy). As Dan Reiter states “The bargaining model 
of war sees war as politics all the way down”, and “the bargaining model does not see 
war as a breakdown of diplomacy but rather as a continuation of bargaining, as 
negotiations occur during war, and war ends when a deal is struck” (Reiter 2003, 27).  
 In theory, a Bargaining Model process would proceed like this: State A attacks 
State B because it believes it can quickly take control over a disputed territory. State B 
chooses to resist on the belief that its forces can defeat State A if the war last long 
enough. Both states await the results of the first “battle” (or better described as 
‘campaign’ or ‘operation’), from which both sides will have gained a better ideas of the 
true capabilities and aims of each other’s forces and will after the first encounters. Then 
State A has a choice, it can seek to end the war (negotiate) or continue fighting depending 
on how well it believes it can still achieve its resources. State B will make a similar 
decision based upon its new knowledge of battle if it can defeat State A. Eventually this 
process will occur over and over until both sides find the negotiation offers both send out 
to each other are acceptable. This can be a return to status quo ante, a loss of some 
territory (or whatever good, resource, etc.) by one State, and conversely gained by the 
other state, or the complete capitulation and occupation of one state by the other.  
 An example of this would be the United States in World War II in dealing with 
Japan. The United States had stated its political aim of ‘unconditional surrender’ of the 
Axis powers would be the only thing they would accept. During the course of the war, 
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both sides had continued to re-evaluate their position during and after each battle or 
campaign, only to choose to continue fighting. Even after the securing of Iwo Jima and 
Okinawa (and the heavy casualties received), the US chose to continue to fight, through a 
strengthened blockade, strategic bombing of cities and transportation nodes, atomic bomb 
attacks, and plans to invade the Japanese Home Islands. Japan however, reeling from 
defeats in the Pacific by the US, in Manchuria by Russia, and widespread destruction 
wrought by strategic bombing, was willing to surrender and accept occupation, but only 
if the Emperor could remain on the throne. The US then backed away from its 
‘unconditional surrender’ demand due to its fear of a costly invasion of Japan and 
Russian influence in the occupation of Japan, allowed the Emperor to remain on the 
throne (though answering to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General 
MacArthur) in order to ensure Japanese surrender.  
 The Bargaining Model came about during the 1960s, when economist Thomas 
Schelling stated (when trying to explain why most wars do not end like World War II in 
Europe- complete and utter destruction of the enemy and total occupation) “most conflict 
situations are essentially bargaining situations” (Schelling 1960, 5). The Bargaining 
Model began to grow from this observation. “Paul Kecskemeti framed the question of 
war-ending surrender in bargaining terms”, while “Fed Ikle [pushed to find exits for the 
Vietnam War] to think about how wars end, also within an informal bargaining 
framework” (Reiter 2003, 28). “By the 1980s, the bargaining model of war was 
increasingly expressed in formal terms, as part of the burgeoning literature on ration-
choice models of politics and war” (Reiter 2003, 28).  
93 
 
 The Bargaining Model began to take on a very Clausewitzian tone when a second 
wave of scholarship appeared in the late 1990s. They began to utilize what they perceived 
to be von Clausewitz’s theories of war: comparing absolute and real (or limited) war in 
order to express the theory that wars are rarely total and always end in some type of 
negotiation. This interpretation is flawed in several ways, as seen in the previous chapter. 
Von Clausewitz’s total and limited war had nothing to do about the severity of it, but 
about how military leaders react to imperfect information and fight in the “fog of war”, 
and that von Clausewitz advocated the need for destruction of the enemy’s armed forces 
in order to avoid negotiations. Therefore, researches implemented this view warped view 
of von Clausewitz, and found ways to express it in formal mathematical models.  
R. Harrison Wagner is one of the first to create a formal model based on this 
assumption, finding through his model that “the relation between war and bargaining is to 
interpret war as a competitive struggle to determine the disagreement outcome in a 
bargaining game in which states use force and the threat of force to influence other stats. 
A state is in the strongest bargaining position if its uses of force against another state will 
be unopposed, and that is why states might hope to gain by disarming other states. But 
because a contest in which states try to disarm each other will be both risky and costly, 
there is likely to be some concessions that one state could make to the other that both 
would prefer to participating in this contest” (Wagner 2000, 481-482). Wagner goes on to 
state that due to differences in opinion about the outcomes of war and the consequences 
of fighting that both sides hold, states will fight in order to change those perceptions to be 
more in line with reality (Wagner 2000, 481). Wagner also states that there is an 
incentive for states to fight. To expand upon this, states might fight a larger opponent for 
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numerous reasons, be it national honor, miscalculation of forces capabilities and power, 
domestic constraints, and better negotiation position (‘attrition’ and or ‘punishment’ 
strategies in Stam’s wording).  
 In 2004, Alastair Smith and Allan Stam created a model that combined war 
initiation, duration, and recurrence using determents of war and the ‘Bargaining Model’. 
In their model, both states’ will have a divergence of beliefs (pre-war and during the war) 
that makes bargaining difficult even when both sides experience the same event, and that 
this divergence takes time for both sides to converge their mutual beliefs together to end 
a war (if it will bring about a stable peace as shown in their findings). They find that wars 
with very high cost battles will lead to shorter wars, but will lead to greater frequency in 
wars occurring between the two later on compared to longer wars (which would reveal 
more information to each side on the enemy’s capabilities and will) (Smith and Stam 
2004, 809). However, wars that are longer and have fewer costly battles will lead to a 
much more stable peace and post-war period. Therefore, short wars do not “influence 
actors’ beliefs less than wars that are low cost per period but longer” (Smith and Stam 
2004, 810). 
 Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner have written (with each other and between 
them) several important articles on the ‘Bargaining Model of War’. In their article “A 
Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of 
War”, they develop a formal game theoretic model which concentrates on the role that 
private information and “incentives to misrepresent that information” have on war onset, 
duration, and outcomes (Filson and Werner 2002, 819). To Filson and Werner, wars start  
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When an attacker underestimates the defender’s willingness to make 
concessions and make a demand that the defender refuses to accept. Wars 
continue so long as the attacker continues to demand too many concessions, or 
if the attack has retreated, to offer too few concessions. Wars end when one 
side is defeated militarily or when the attacker alters their negotiating position 
sufficiently such that the defender is willing to accept the proposed settlement 
(Filson and Werner 2002, 819-820).  
As with most ‘Bargaining Models’, “private information about his [both sides] 
military ability is revealed both by the outcomes on the battlefield and at the negotiating 
table” (Filson and Werner 2002, 820). Filson and Werner find that “war[s] end as soon as 
one side’s resources fall below the minimal amount of resources necessary to continue 
fighting. If both sides’ resources fall below the minimal amount then the status quo is 
restored” (Filson and Werner 2002, 822).  
 However, this model fails to take into account domestic political considerations, 
type of government, third party interventions, or the military strategies utilized by both 
sides. In order to rectify some of these issues, Filson and Werner published several more 
articles that attempt to fill in some of these gaps. In 2004 they look into regime type and 
war outcomes using the ‘Bargaining Model’, finding support for democratic states 
winning wars more often, unless the war drags out (Filson and Werner 2004). In 2007 
they expand their model even further, taking into account the dynamics of the war: cost 
of each ‘battle’, initial distribution of benefits, and sensitivities to cost of fighting the war 
(FIlson and Werner 2007, 47). They find in this study several important conclusions. In 
regards to redistribution of resources due to fighting, “When state benefits are close 
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together [at the start of the war], no redistribution of benefits occurs. An imbalance of 
benefits relative to resources leads to redistribution” (Filson and Werner 2007, 47). In 
regards to the effects of fighting wars, less costly battles will lead to longer wars, and that 
“the total costs of war and duration of war may not be related in a straightforward way. 
The longest wars occur when wins and losses tend to alternate” (Filson and Werner 2007, 
47). They conclude that “It is possible that asymmetric information and commitment 
problems both provide incomplete explanations of the evolution of the international 
system, but alternatives have difficulty explaining how war can occur in a context where 
agents are rational… unless we assume that wars occur because some rational agents 
have a test for war” (Filson & Werner 2007, 48).  
The Bargaining Model suffers from discrepancies and defects at several levels. 
First, the math behind the Bargaining Model does little to take into account the vast 
elements and organs of the state, and the math leads to only one conclusion: that only the 
leadership of the state can end wars, and that domestic, economic, and population 
considers play little role in decision making. 
 This view of only leaders deciding war termination has been expanded upon by 
H.E. Goemans in his work from 2000. To Goemans, wars end because of a change in war 
aims based upon a cost-benefit analysis of a state’s leadership. The cost-benefit analysis 
is different dependent on the type of regime, in which the leadership of the state is 
supposed to take into account domestic variables. While it is a novel concept that regime 
types will have different motivations for ending wars at different times, it only takes into 
account the leadership ending wars, with no other possible way for wars to end. This fails 
to, along with the entire Bargaining Model of War sub-field, take into account that wars 
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can end not only by the decisions of mutual agreement by both state’s leadership, but by 
the citizens of the state as well who can overthrow the government, or through the 
overthrow and complete occupation of a state by another state.  
 Furthermore, the Bargaining Model assumes that leaders will do all they can to 
stay in power. What is not recognized is if they as leaders only will be brought down, or 
their entire system of governance (i.e. coupe vs. rebellion). This line of thinking assumes 
that leaders are more willing to accept a loss, and in particular to do so when they are 
under a certain form of government. Using Rational Choice Theory, Goemans states that 
“Only leaders of Mixed Regimes, therefore, have disincentives to settle on moderately 
losing terms and instead have incentives to continue the war and gamble for resurrection” 
(Geomans 2000, 70). This line of thinking is flawed, as it fails to take into account three 
things: first victory is the only sure way to ensure a regime’s survival, for defeat invites 
internal discontent and questions the legitimacy of the government, where victory does 
not. Thus not just mixed regimes, but leaders of all regime types have an incentive to 
continue the war and gamble for later success in the war. Second, this view ties in more 
closely with another element found within Rational Choice Theory, that of Prospect 
Theory, where when the prospect of losing grows, humans will on average continue to 
maintain the current strategy in the hope of it prevailing. Thus instead of accepting a 
lesser loss, the leader will gamble more for a chance at victory or even greater loss. And 
finally, states and leaders may choose to follow the same strategies and tactics as before, 
even if in defeat, and will only change because circumstances beyond their control which 
forces them to change (i.e. manpower losses, etc.).  
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 The Bargaining Model also ignores what actually occurs during those battles that 
they ambiguously define. “In most of them, battles occur with no variable in the way 
sides employ forces (that is, military strategy is often absent), the working assumption 
being that the likelihood of one side winning any given battle remains constant across all 
battles throughout the war, and termination is made possible reducing each side’s 
uncertainty about that constant probability” (Reiter 2003, 34). This is, of course, 
madness. Battles and campaigns do not only provide greater information to each side’s 
leaders and each state about the ability of the other, but they produce actual results as 
well, victory and defeat, losses and gains of territory, manpower, etc.  
 The Bargaining Model also places one of its foundations upon that of von 
Clausewitz’s total war – limited war concepts. According to Bargaining Model theorists, 
war is mostly limited, as in limited goals, vice total war, for total goals (i.e. complete 
destruction and occupation of the enemy). This reading of von Clausewitz is an incorrect 
interpretation of his work, and as explored in chapter 2, what von Clausewitz was 
discussing was how one was to fight a war, not its goals, for he leaves that up to the 
politicians to decide. Total war in the Clausewitzian sense is war that is impossible to 
ever achieve, it is the theoretical pure war to be fought, without the influence of imperfect 
and missing information, poor communications, and the general “fog of war”. Thus every 
battle, in every war, all battles will be limited, as it is impossible to actually completely 
destroy an enemy in battle in his perfect theoretical world. This misreading of von 
Clausewitz (along with continual quotation of him) further shows that the Bargaining 
Model may be right on leaders in a decision making process, but in the details of actually 
fighting wars, campaigns, and battles, is severely neglecting.  
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 The ‘Bargaining Model of War’ has shown great promise, and is an important 
element to understanding why wars will continue and how they will end, and research 
should continue. However, it revolves around the leadership of the state making 
decisions, and should be viewed only as a piece of a greater puzzle: that of the state a 
war. What is missing from the various Bargaining Models are the military considerations 
at the strategic and operational levels of war, other elements of the state at war 
(population, economy, etc.), and most importantly that wars do not always end in 
negotiation (see Chapter 4 for more information). Thus the Bargaining Model needs to be 
expanded beyond its current form into a much larger and accurate representation of 
decisions and influence upon decision makers of the state while at war.  
War Termination  
 War Termination differs from War Outcomes as its central focus is not who wins 
or loses, but on how and why a war ends the way it does (and can be related to studies of 
war duration). This sub-field tends to take a more qualitative approach as thus far most 
data involved is missing and will likely never be found (especially from direct sources).  
 Most of the literature involved with war termination has dealt with the 
‘Bargaining Model’ described above (mostly based upon the research done by Smith, 
Filson, and Werner). They all however utilize the broad definition of “battle”. After each 
“battle”, a state’s leadership will decide whether or not to continue the contest. Some 
might argue that “battle” could mean a single battle, others a campaign, etc. The concept 
of ‘battle’ is undefined, and thus, suffers due to this coding and identification problem. 
Instead of incorporating the levels of war, they have forgotten it complete, and as such, 
weaken their case. As such, their models for how was end are based more upon theory, 
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vast mathematical equations, and case studies. To them, wars end when they do because 
the leadership views it is time. (Note from author: While some may find my critiques of 
the ‘Bargaining Model’ harsh, you will find no greater supporter of it than myself). 
 Others however, utilized different means other than the ‘Bargaining Model’. H. E. 
Goemans applied a model of rational choice theory with statistical analysis for war 
termination. Using his model, he applied it to the ending of World War I and all of the 
major powers involved in his book War and Punishment. His model utilizes a mechanism 
where states have “private information” which they use to measure their own strength 
and resolve against the expected costs/losses in the war. This in turn is still an incomplete 
picture, and causes leaders to misrepresent the true costs of fighting. Thus leaders will not 
react in the same manner as their opponent when presented with the same information. 
Therefore a type of game theoretic bargaining process is utilized until one side finally 
reaches the point to no longer wishes to continue to the war. Goemans’ argument can be 
seen not only through rationalist lens, but a decision-making lens as well.  
 A major proposition of Goeman’s theory is that the type of government a state has 
will play a major role in how a war will end due to organization and specific domestic 
considerations. In Goemans’ view there are three main types of governments: repressive 
governments, semi-repressive governments, and democratic/non-repressive governments. 
The weakest of these three is the semi-repressive governments because it has the most to 
lose if a war is lost and is the most difficult type of government to maintain in power. 
Thus, it has a low desire to pursue a settlement in war, for a draw or defeat of any type 
will see the semi-repressive government fall and replaced by some other form. 
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Repressive and non-repressive regimes on the other hand will change their war aims 
based on probability of victory, semi-repressive will do the reverse. 
 Statistically Goemans utilizes models similar to everyone else in the War 
Termination field. His models conclude that leaders of mixed regimes suffer when their 
country loses moderately or disastrously, where the repressive and non-repressive 
regimes only suffer when their countries suffer disastrously. Goemans concludes after his 
case studies of World War I that “leaders decide to continue or stop fighting at least 
partly based on how the terms of settlement affect their postwar fate” (Goemans 2000, 
310). 
 With so much of the political science world turning to quantitative analysis, Dan 
Reiter (by no means a qualitative researcher) took an interesting qualitative look into War 
Termination in his 2009 book How Wars End. Reiter utilizes the bargaining theory of war 
termination as the mechanism for analysis. Reiter states that uncertain information (such 
as capabilities of a country) and unenforceable commitments (such as defense of terrain 
that does not lead itself for use by a defender) lead to war onset (how and why wars are 
started) and wars are terminated (ended) when these two “problems” are reduced or 
eliminated (Reiter 2009, 3). The author takes the ‘commitment theory’ and the ‘uncertain 
information theory’ of previous research and combines them into one theory. Unlike 
earlier War Termination theories, it takes the uncertainty of future events (such as the 
rebirth of a hostile state) and makes that uncertainty a key element in the reasoning for 
ending a war (beyond the results from military engagements).  
 The author first explains the model using the commitment and information 
models and puts them together, and then applies them to 20 different situations in 6 wars, 
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from major wars in the 20th Century (World War I, World War II, Finland-Soviet War, 
Korean War, and the oddly placed 19th Century American Civil War), using the case 
study format. (The author believed that an empirical quantitative/statistical research 
would be impractical for this endeavor). Reiter provides a good case study analysis of 
several of the major factors, from the military situation, domestic situation, leadership 
goals, and commitment issues for the reasons why a state terminates a war. He is able in 
case study format prove his hypothesis that the issues of uncertain information and 
unforeseen commitments play a major role in war termination. It is perhaps the best work 
of war termination to date from political science, and what makes it unique is that it 
acknowledges the problems that a lack of information has upon quantitative analysis in 
the field and the need to use qualitative analyses at this time. If Reiter or others can 
someday quantify this into mathematical modeling, it would be a major achievement for 
the literature beyond what it has already uncovered.    
Offense-Defense Theory 
 One of the most peculiar and debated theories in political science is Offense-
Defense Theory. It is an off-shoot of realism (defensive realism), which believes that 
weaponry, technology, terrain, tactics, and doctrine affect how states will behave. In 
times of offensive ascendency, the capture of enemy territory is easier, and thus wars are 
more likely. In times of defensive ascendency, the ability to capture enemy territory is 
difficult, and thus wars are less likely and the status quo will be favored. The main 
example that Offensive-Defense Theory utilizes is that of World War I, where proponents 
of this theory believe that all states believed wrongly in the offense, and that the doctrine 
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and weaponry of the time favored the defense, and thus a long and bloody stalemate and 
attritional warfare occurred.  
 This theory however, does not hold up well to examination of the facts of World 
War I, yet alone other wars. The idea that warfare can be broken down into tactical 
supremacy over the doctrines and practices of operational art and strategy is lunacy. It is 
as if these authors have forgotten all the levels of warfare except that of the tactical level. 
There are numerous examples throughout history of battles where one side had a strong 
defensive position and strong defensive weaponry, and still lost to an attacker who 
attacked under unfavorable odds. Therefore, this theory is hotly contested in political 
science, and because of its ignoring of the operational and strategic levels of war, it 
should be considered at best an incomplete theory, and at worst a theory that has long 
outlived its usefulness.  
Conclusion 
 Only in the past sixty years has political science taken a renewed interest in 
warfare, and even then, only in the past twenty has that grown to large sub-fields of 
dedicated researchers. While the War Outcomes and Bargaining Model of War sub-fields 
have expanded greatly in their knowledge in the past twenty years and has proven to 
show some valuable if conflicting results. In War Outcomes, the measure of war 
resources, strategies, and domestic political considerations still provide conflicting data, 
even while most researchers are in agreement that all three play a major role in 
determining the outcome of a war. Bargaining Model proponents have expanded formal 
modeling quite well, and yet, have yet to take into account the strategies utilized in war, 
and have findings have both confirmed and conflicted with researchers of the 
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determinants of war outcomes have found. It is with this knowledge that the pursuit of 
war outcomes in political science is only at its infancy and that much more research and 
testing is required in order to fully understand the determinants of war outcomes and 
duration.   
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Within political science there has been a vast amount of research conducted into 
war outcomes (and war termination) in the past twenty years. While this research has 
provided us new insights into how and why wars end, the field has generally accepted the 
research conducted by Allan Stam (1996) almost twenty years ago as the pinnacle of 
knowledge without expanding upon his ideas further. It was a revolutionary idea for 
political science, though one hardly new for those who study warfare: that the uses of 
various military strategies are the major determinates in how and why a state will win or 
lose a war.  
 Since this time however, research into this area has stagnated. Stam’s work since 
then has been combined with elements of the bargaining model of war, and other various 
models and tests with impressive if limited results. The limited results however have 
created some gaps of knowledge within the field of study which need to be filled in. 
 Because of the stagnation and flawed assertions within the war outcomes sub-
field, this chapter will take the field of research into a new direction. The view of the 
state at war must change and be expanded upon beyond that of a state’s leadership or a 
“unitary state” coding into something more. How wars are viewed and how they are 
fought must also be expanded upon from their current forms in political science. As such, 
I re-conceptualize the view of the state, the state at war, how wars are fought, and how 
and why certain outcomes occur, taking the knowledge already established by Allan Stam 
(1996), and those who have written on the Bargaining Model of War, and build upon 
their work by putting forth a ‘Informal Theory of Interstate Warfare’, in order to create a 
better understanding of war outcomes (and by extension war termination).  
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This theoretical chapter begins with a closer examination with the work of war 
outcome determinants and the Bargaining Model of War, and why changes to them 
should be made. Building off of the earlier works, I shall re-conceptualize how a state 
should be viewed and how it operates, breaking them down into their key components 
(pillars), and how those ‘Pillars’ operate together in the theoretical form of the ‘Core of 
the State’. Then the theory shall show how the defense of a state (via the ‘Shield of the 
State’) occurs and the interactions that occur between the state’s ‘Core’ and ‘Shield’. 
From there, I shall put forth a new ‘Informal Theory of Inter-State Warfare’, a framework 
that will allow one to conduct analysis of inter-state wars, along with hypothesis that will 
be tested in later chapters using both qualitative and quantitative methods. 
This theory is an informal, non-mathematical framework that seeks to help answer 
the ‘what’ (determinants), ‘how’, and ‘why’ certain war outcomes occur. It should be 
noted here that the current level of information and data on wars that this theory requires 
is insufficient to create a true mathematical model of war outcomes. While there are 
certainly many books on warfare, much of the data that is required for a true 
mathematical model are simply not available (and forever lost) due to a multitude of 
factors ranging from state secrets, misinformation, information being lost and destroyed 
in the chaos of war, lack of extensive study and documentation, or availability of certain 
knowledge to western sources.  
The study of warfare in both the fields of political science and military art has 
been quite extensive, if uneven and different in their approaches. However, there is a 
major gap in both literatures which this theory attempts to address and combine many of 
the traditions of both fields together. In order help better illuminate this gap, we move 
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beyond ‘national power capabilities’ or ‘military power’ variables to analysis of the entire 
state. It is a look beyond how the armed forces fight wars to how states and all their 
components fight wars, and thus how states win, lose, or come to a compromise in war. 
Only a comprehensive theory, backed by case studies and statistical analysis (of certain 
elements of the theory that can be tested based upon current information), can provide us 
an understanding of how states fight and win, lose, or compromise in interstate wars. 
Problems with the Traditional View of War, War Outcomes, and the Bargaining Model 
 Current research into war outcomes has thus far only viewed war mostly as a one-
time event, labeled and coded through the lens of one variable that accounts for the action 
of the state during the entire war, which fails to take into account the changes in strategy, 
operational art, and technology, etc. which does occur in war. Furthermore, war is viewed 
either through the prism of the unitary state, or the state’s leadership.  
 While the vast majority of authors within political science acknowledge that the 
state is hardly a unitary actor, many have treated it as such in order to simplify the 
understanding of the state at war. Same can be said of using the leadership of a state as a 
proxy for a state. Because of this, the current level of research has reached is ceiling of 
usefulness.  
The first major gap in the field of study is the ‘traditional’ view of warfare, which 
holds that in order to achieve victory in an interstate war one must simply defeat the 
enemy’s armed forces. However, the defeat and destruction of the enemy’s armed forces 
is a difficult task, and rarely accomplished in war. As this is such a rare event, the defeat 
and or destruction of an enemy’s armed forces must be important if it is discussed so 
often and promoted by so many scholars and professionals. Battlefield and campaign 
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results however are only part of the equation when determining war outcomes. When one 
thinks of war, one thinks of two armed forces fighting each other, either as the only 
instruments, or as proxies for the state. What is missing in the traditional thinking is the 
state itself which has so much to do with the formation and employment of the armed 
forces. The armed forces are only one element of the state. What is required is a view of 
war beyond that of the armed forces, encompassing entire states at war, utilizing some or 
all their available resources in order to achieve the desired political outcome.  
Wars are not won by battles alone. Wars are won by connecting victory in battles 
to victory in campaigns (operational level of war) in order to achieve strategic objectives, 
which will translate into political results. Victory in war requires the state to mobilize and 
utilize their resources in such a way as to enact offensive operations and offensive 
initiative with the goal of placing the enemy on the defensive and thus impose its ‘will’ 
upon the enemy. In order to place one’s ‘will’ upon the enemy, one must not think of the 
armed forces of the enemy as their only target, but the enemy as the entire state. This 
requires the view that there are elements of the enemy’s state beyond their armed forces 
that serve as legitimate targets and should be actively pursued. Under this framework 
(which serves as the basis for the following theory), wars are won only through a 
combination of attacks made against the enemy’s armed forces and elements of the 
enemy’s government, economy, and population, which in turn makes war in practice is a 
vast and complicated event. 
The second major gap in the field of study is the basis for the determinants of war 
outcomes. In Allan Stam’s 1996 work, he rightly asserts that wars mutual coercion 
between two states, that military strategy plays the major role in the determinates of war 
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outcomes, that wars are based upon a cost-benefit analysis, and that domestic politics 
plays a major role in war outcomes. However, the areas of concern develop when they 
are applied to his use of quantitative variables: wartime strategy and doctrine coding, and 
domestic considerations. Both are treated as one time, unchanging events in the coding, 
even if they do change.  
 Because of Stam’s one time coding for wars, limited information of how the state 
fights a war, and ambiguous definitions and coding of strategy and doctrine hampers his 
great work (Stam 1996), and only allows one to utilize his data set so far. Stam’s 
simplified coding needs to be expanded to include the operational level of war, principles 
of war, and other military and civilian variables in order to pinpoint more precisely how 
and why certain war outcomes occur. 
 The third major gap in the field of study is the implications and assumptions that 
the Bargaining Model of War utilizes. While the Bargaining Model is an ingenious 
method to describe the decision making process of the leadership within a state during 
wartime, the assertions and foundations upon which it is built upon has some flaws to it, 
which were discussed in the last chapter and is in need of being addressed.   
 Because of these theoretical gaps in the literature, the ‘Informal Theory of 
Interstate Warfare’ seeks to fill in these gaps. What is missing is the view of the entire 
state at war. These gaps have allowed for leaders of the state to serve as proxies of the 
state, or making the state a unitary actor in order for analysis, and has left out major 
elements of the state in analysis of states at war. Also missing is a true accounting of 
what occurs during the war, how wars are fought, and the full range of strategies utilized, 
along with that of doctrine, and the important operational level of warfare.  
111 
 
 The ‘Informal Theory of Interstate Warfare’ seeks to combine the excellent ideas 
put forth by those such as Allan Stam in the determinants of war outcomes studies and 
those of the Bargaining Model of War with that of an expanded institutional view of the 
state at war, and together with Prospect Theory11, bind the two areas of study together 
into one cohesive theory to further the field of study, while making it more in line with 
historical and current military thinking. While this may seem an ambitious task, it is only 
a natural extension of the work already generated by those within the war outcomes and 
war termination fields of study, and without their efforts, my theory and thesis would be 
sorely lacking in detail and methodology, and it is to them, along with my studies of 
military strategy and operational art through the Naval War College that has given me the 
insight to bind these two fields of study together, something that has yet to be done 
within International Relations in such a comprehensive extent.  
What Makes Up the State? The ‘Pillars of the State’ 
 I argue that there are three main ‘Pillars of the State’, which like legs of a three 
legged table, combine to form a table only when it has three legs. In this case these three 
pillars form the ‘Core of the State’. The first pillar of the state is the citizen population, 
the very heart and soul of the state (for without people there can be no economy or 
government). The second pillar of the state is the economy, and the third pillar is the 
government. These three ‘Pillars of the State’ combine to form the ‘Core of the State’, in 
which no state can function without the relationship and connections between each pillar. 
Any theory of statehood and/or war that seeks to divide up these pillars is in such 
disagreement with the real world as to be useless. Therefore, any theory of warfare must 
                                                             
11 A modification of Rational Choice Theory 
112 
 
be rooted with a theory of the state. Despite the claims of some military theorists and 
political scientists, the two areas of study are inseparable.  
 The ‘Pillars of the State’ do not merely occupy the material world, or are just an 
institutional design, but are in fact a conglomeration of many different views and factors. 
They are made up and a part of not only the material world made up buildings and 
institutions (which happen to use technology), but something larger, that of a 
psychological and philosophical worlds as well, and most importantly are inhabited by 
people.   
The first ‘Pillar of the State’ is the most important of the Pillars: the citizenry 
population. This pillar forms the basis of the state from which all other pillars and 
elements of the state are created from. This population of citizenry are groups of people 
who have banded together to form a common union (either peacefully or by force), with 
nominally common interests. Without a population, there can be no state. In order to 
facilitate better commerce and governance, they manifest two major unions between 
themselves and the other elements of the population: the economy and the government.  
The second ‘Pillar of the State’ is the economy. This Pillar allows economic 
transactions to occur between actors within the state. These actors consist within the state 
as representing some small portion of one of the Pillars.  Transactions that occur are 
between members representing a corporation or business within the economy, citizens 
serving in the capacity as a buyer for the state, or members of the population buying 
goods for private use. Following basic economic theory, these transactions come in the 
forms of goods and services in which are exchanged for other goods and services through 
the medium of bartering or currency.  
113 
 
The economy forces the population spread out its resources and abilities in order 
to allow for further expansion of the economy and to optimally create an economy that 
maximizes effectiveness over redundancy, making the economy competitive with 
domestic and foreign trade partners. From the point of view of the citizen, each citizen 
has some skill set or attribute that is unique or limited to a certain number of citizens 
(depending on the skill set). In order to attain survival for one’s self and one’s family, the 
citizen must utilize their skill set in such a way as to create some good or service that 
some other citizen desires and is willing to trade and/or pay for. It is this very interactive 
union between citizens that allows for an economy. The economy then serves as a 
medium in which specific (non-governmental) transactions occur, allowing for both 
necessary and luxury goods and services to be traded between citizens and the population 
at large. Ultimately, the economy serves as a type of institutional moderator and medium 
in which trade between civilians can occur, and facilitates the pursuit of certain goals by 
the population (food, wealth, etc.). 
 The third ‘Pillar of the State’ is the government. This pillar is composed of 
participatory members of the citizen population (in a democracy everyone is a member of 
the government to some extent- if they are allowed to vote) and citizens who specifically 
are employed by (and help to operate the mechanisms of) the government. In order to 
regulate trade, social interactions, and internal security between members of the 
population (not to mention provide external security), members of the citizen population 
were forced to create institutions that would facilitate the regulatory goals set forth by the 
population. Because of this the citizens of the population entered into a “social contract” 
(Hobbes 1660, Locke 1690) between themselves and their government, in which the 
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citizens gave the government certain powers and authority in order for that government to 
provide the population with certain goods and services. The government therefore serves 
as the focal point and interpreter of power and authority within the state, with 
stakeholders (i.e. voters in a democracy or republic) serving as the ultimate authority.  
Combined, the three “Pillars of the State’ form a larger unit of analysis, the ‘Core 
of the State’. By taking into account the citizenry population, economy, and government, 
domestic factors are now available for analysis of states engaged in war. No longer 
should states be viewed as solely a unitary actor, but instead, a composite actor made up 
of many inter-related parts. When the ‘Pillars of the State’ are functioning, they provide 
the necessary gears in order to ensure that the state is a functioning unit when dealing 
with internal (war production) and foreign (waging war) matters. 
The ‘Core of the State’ 
The ‘Core of the State’ is a composite unit made up of the population, economy, 
and government. Together it provides the necessary and sufficient abilities to act as state 
and operate within the international system. Following the Correlates of War (CoW) data 
set definition, for a state to operate within the inter-national system a functioning ‘Core’ 
not only must have a functioning government, economy, and legitimate population, but 
an additional four elements. Under the CoW definition, a State must provide “1) territory; 
2) population; 3) diplomatic recognition; 4) sovereignty; 5) independence” in order to be 
declared a state (Sarkees and Wayman, 17-19).  
The first requirement of a state according to the Correlates of War (CoW) data set 
is territory. A state must have territory, and in every example of a state throughout 
history, each of the ‘Pillars of the State’ own some amount of territory, and in which the 
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laws of the state are executed within the declared territorial boundaries. The second, 
population, is already a ‘Pillar of the State’. The third, diplomatic recognition is an 
element of governmental power that is an assumed power by the government which gives 
it the right to conduct foreign policy. The fourth, sovereignty, is related to the first, in 
which the state has absolute and ultimate authority to execute the laws of the state within 
its own borders. Finally, independence, each state is free to make its own decisions 
without direct influence from another state (as say compared to a tributary state).  
Figure 4.1 shows a graphic depiction of the three ‘Pillars of the State’ together 
when they form the ‘Core of the State’, with arrows to shows the interaction between the 
pillars inside the core. Every pillar of the ‘Core of the State’ performs some function in 
which goods and services are traded or exchanged between each pillar. These pillars form 
the backbone for domestic interaction allowing for a basic level of internal cohesion, 
economic transaction, political prosperity (to some degree), internal security (to varying 
degrees), and unity for a state.  
Figure 4.1: Visual Representation of the Core of the State
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The Transaction Exchanges within the Core of the State 
In order for the Core of the State to operate effectively, each pillar must interact 
with the others through what shall be termed theoretically as ‘transaction exchanges’, 
where the three pillars interact with each other to share resources and allow the state 
function properly.  
In the case of the population pillar, the population provides goods and services to 
the other pillars. In its relationship with the government, the citizens will provide to the 
government support and participation (or non-participation in some governments) and 
thus legitimacy to the government. The citizenry may also be called upon to provide 
more in the form of support than just allowing the government rule. It will do so in the 
forms of personal service to the state (if required, and in different ways- such as drafts, 
national service, etc.), and in taxes in order to fund government operations. In exchange 
the government will provide to the citizenry governance (in whatever form, be it 
democratic, autocratic, totalitarian, etc.), to include internal security within the state and 
external (national) security for dealing with threats beyond its borders. It will also 
provide (depending on the government) other goods and services, such as roads, 
education, medical benefits, social programs, and possible employment outside of 
national security all while imposing laws and regulations upon the citizenry for them to 
follow to ensure that internal stability, internal and foreign security, and perhaps 
economic growth occur. 
The population also has transactions with the economy and those who run and/or 
operate businesses within the economy. Citizens of the population give up their personal 
services to certain business and corporations within the economy in exchange for income 
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(and other potential goods and services from their employer). The citizens serve another 
role for the economy, that of consumer of products, where members of the population 
provide the demand (i.e. income) for goods and services that the economy will supply.  
The government and the economy also conduct transaction between each other. 
The economy will provide goods and services to the government (such as warships, 
electrical power, etc.) in exchange for such services as security (both internal and 
external). The government will also demand taxes from the economy in order to pay for 
these services. The government will also impose various types of laws, regulations, and 
economic/monetary policy upon the economy based upon various influences from each 
of the three pillars.  
In each of these exchange transactions that occur between each pillar, portions of 
every pillar have an effect or relationship with decisions made and carried out by the 
other pillars (Table 4.2). Every transaction made will have some direct or indirect effect 
upon the other pillars in some form. Most exchanges and transactions that occur are not 
only directly between two pillars, but strongly influenced by various factors and actors 
from the third, all while being influenced by actors and factors within their own pillars in 
order to facilitate a transaction (like the military-industrial complex).  
While not every transaction may be judged as “fair” or “right” (or even make all 
members involved in the transactions happy) what is important is whether or not the 
perceived imbalance between transactions is considered fair enough. If the system is 
considered fair and stable, then the citizens are willing to live within the current system. 
If it is not considered fair as a whole, the system may be seen as broken and elements 
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within the pillars seek to destroy the current system in the state and replace it with 
something else (be it a new economic, governmental, or cultural system… or all three).  
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Figure 4.2: Exchange of Goods and Services between ‘Pillars’ in the ‘Core of the State’ 
  Population provides Goods & Services to: 
Government: Support & Legitimacy 
  Taxable Revenue  
  Manpower for Shield of State (Defenses) 
Economy: Manpower for Production of Goods & Services 
  Income from consumers through purchased Goods & Services 
  Population receives Goods & Services from: 
Government: Security (Internal & External) 
  Medium for Participation 
  Social Welfare Programs 
Economy: Goods and Services (both Essential and Luxury) 
  Income through Labor provided to Economy 
  Economy provides Goods & Services to: 
Government: Support & Legitimacy 
  Taxable Revenue  
  Manpower for Shield of State (Defenses) 
Population: Goods and Services (both Essential and Luxury) 
  Income through Labor provided to Economy 
  Economy receives Goods & Services from: 
Government: Security (Internal & External) 
  Medium for Participation 
  Social Welfare Programs 
Population: Manpower for Production of Goods & Services 
  Income from consumers through purchased Goods & Services 
  Government provides Goods & Services to: 
Population: Security (Internal & External) 
  Medium for Participation 
  Social Welfare Programs 
Economy : Laws for Trade, Production, Standardization, etc 
  Defense of Trade Interests 
  Government receives Goods & Services from: 
Population: Support & Legitimacy 
  Taxable Revenue  
  Manpower for Shield of State (Defenses) 
Economy: Goods and Services (both Essential and Luxury) 
  Taxable Income through various means 
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The Core of the State and Clausewitz’s Trinitarian Analysis 
It should be noted that the composition of the state as envisioned in this theory is 
in some ways similar to that of von Clausewitz’s Trinity Analysis of the nature of war 
with the People, the Military, and the Government serving as the three elements of the 
trinity (Handel 1992, 102-106). Von Clausewitz restricts himself for most of his book On 
War to dealing solely with military matters while ignoring the economic, civil, and 
political for the most part (Handel 1992, 108). This is ironic as one of von Clausewitz’s 
most famous dictums is about the nature of politics and war and war’s subservient nature 
to politics. Von Clausewitz would lead one to believe that material and technological 
innovations were relatively stable and quickly adapted by both sides (negating the 
offense-defense capabilities debate, though he believed that the defense was stronger), 
“Very few of the new manifestations in war can be ascribed to new inventions or new 
departures in ideas. They result mainly from the transformation of society and new social 
conditions…” (von Clausewitz 1976, 515). Michael Handel (1992, 109) believed that this 
omission of the material aspects of war is Clausewitz’s most glaring weakness in his 
theory. Handel (1992, 109-111) then takes it upon himself to update the model by placing 
the Trinitarian Analysis into the material environment. This updated view however fails 
to take into account the exact roles economies play in war. It also fails to show the inter-
connected relationships of the people, economy, and government within the state, all 
while continuing to promote the military to equal status with the government and 
population instead of recognizing it as an element of the state. Since the military serves as 
an element of the state (unless the military leadership takes control in which it would be 
transformed from military leadership to government leadership with lower ranking 
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commanders serving as the true heads of the military), it proceeds and receives its 
political objectives from the government while utilizing resources from the citizenry 
population and economy to attain those objectives. Military actions therefore work at the 
direction of the government’s desired political objectives and through the acceptance of 
the population. As such, the military may or may not necessarily be political or bound by 
political necessities. Further, both von Clausewitz and Handel focus more on the military 
matters and less on everything else. This focus by von Clausewitz and Handel is 
manifested by details on the tactical and (most importantly) the operational levels of war, 
with little focus on military strategy, political strategy, or the ‘home front’. Because of 
the extreme focus on war itself, and that of tactical and operational matters, both von 
Clausewitz and Handel are missing the larger view of war. Therefore, the theory 
presented here, with its focus on the on the state as a whole to include not only the 
military, but the population, economy, and government makes this theory uniquely 
different (and improved) from that of von Clausewitz and Handel.   
The “Shield of the State” 
 “War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” 
- Generalmajor Carl von Clausewitz, On War  
If the state was created in and operated in a vacuum, it would only have to deal 
with internal and domestic issues and would not have to deal with external (foreign) 
issues. However, states operate within an international system, comprised of many other 
states and non-state actors. Because it operates in a system with other states, governments 
(and the other pillars of the core) cannot simply worry about domestic issues alone, but 
must also deal with other states. Because these interactions with other states may lead to 
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violent disagreements states needed to find ways to protect their own Core from attack by 
other states. 
Internal security and economic prosperity are not enough to defend the Core from 
attacks by foreign states, and thus, states were forced to create an institutional apparatus 
to defend the state from attack. States went about creating branches of their armed forces, 
intelligence agencies, diplomatic missions, police, and law enforcement apparatus with 
the intent of defending the state from foreign influence and interventions. The combined 
efforts of these various agencies for national defense and security form the theoretical 
construct of the ‘Shield of the State’ (SoS), which is an extension and function of the 
government and thus an extension of the Core of the State and the state as a unitary actor.  
The Shield of the State is the sum of all capabilities that a state can bring to bear 
against another state (or state-like or non-state actors) in times of war and peace. In its 
defensive role, it defends itself from destruction (via the protection of its own internal 
capabilities) while defending the ‘Core of the State’ simultaneously. In its offensive role 
the Shield it attacks the enemy’s Shield and Core. The capabilities of the Shield are 
dependent on the ‘Core of the State’ to completely fund, equip, and support the 
maintenance of the Shield which in turn is dependent on the political aims and will of the 
Core. The following figure explores the exchanges in goods and services provided 
between the ‘Shield of the State’ and the ‘Core of the State’.   
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Figure 4.3: Transaction Exchanges between the Shield & the Core 
 
Every state, whether in peace time or war time (no matter the state’s population or 
economic size), maintains and operates some form of the ‘Shield of the State’ or has 
some other state protect them with their Shield. Even before a war begins there are 
elements of the state that are actively training and preparing for national defense. In the 
case of the Armed Forces they are creating doctrine, training, designing and/or 
purchasing weaponry, planning for future operations, and possibly conducting ongoing 
operations of some type.  
The ‘Shield of the State’ by its very nature is involved (and perhaps an active 
participant) in the ongoing and continual political process for the state in which it 
operates. This participation is found most prominently in the governmental pillar of the 
Core. Because war is a form of political interaction between states, wars must have 
political aims and objectives set forth by political leaders. These political aims may be 
rather broad and open ended, or very explicit. No matter where the political aims fall 
Core Provides to Shield:
From Government: Directions and Guidance to Shield 
From Economy: Purchases Goods and Resources from Economy
From Population: Receives Manpower (Draft or Volunteers)
Shield Provides to Core:
To Government: Offensive and Defensive Capabilities
To Economy: Protection of Trade and Economy
To Population: Protection of Life, Property
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upon the spectrum of type, there are always political aims that the political leadership 
demand their military to pursue.12 
The Shield of the State is the instrument of the state that compels the enemy to 
accept the political demands placed upon them. Each state’s doctrine, strategies, 
operational arts, tactics, weapons, and philosophies utilized in war are heavily influenced 
by the state’s political environment and culture. While these elements of the military art, 
along with political aims, may change, they remain interlinked. Politicians in the 
government may demand the capture of a city, but that may not be possible without the 
leadership, doctrine, strategies, tactics, weaponry, etc. that would compel the enemy to 
cede control over the contested city. Thus, political aims are merely one link in a long 
chain, stretching from the halls of power to the individual soldier, sailor, airman, or 
Marine on the battlefield. While certain links may be weaker than others, it must be 
continuous. Just as winning battles does not necessarily lead to winning wars, political 
aims do not necessarily lead to victory in battle. It is the role of the ‘Shield of the State’ 
to transform the political aims of its governmental leadership into strategic, operational, 
and tactical (battlefield) success.    
Elements of the ‘Shield of the State’ and their Employment  
 The employment of the Shield can differ greatly between peacetime and wartime. 
While this is a theory of warfare, and thus events that occur in wartime are of prime 
importance for this thesis, it should be noted that some elements of the ‘Shield’ have 
greater roles in peace than in wartime, but all have roles to fulfill during both periods.  
                                                             
12 This is not to say that they create the political aims, or that the political aims do change, but that the 
political leadership must ‘sign off’ on them and give directives to the Shield 
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 There are five main elements of the Shield of the State. While the first four 
elements are critically important, they are skipped in the theory and in both the 
qualitative and quantitative testing conducted in this thesis.  
 The first element of the Shield is that of Diplomacy. The second element is 
Foreign Trade. The third element is Law Enforcement. And the fourth element is the 
Intelligence Services. The final and most important element for this thesis is the main 
element utilized during wartime operations, the Armed Forces. It is upon this element 
(with support of the other elements) that rests the main abilities of a state in wartime to 
not only defend the Core, but attack the enemy’s Shield and Core. The organization, size, 
doctrine, and other attributes of the armed forces are different from state to state, 
depending on the desired political aims and wiliness to pay for them. However, most 
armed forces are organized along similar lines composed of three main branches: ground 
(or land) forces, aerospace (air) forces, and naval (or sea) forces.  
 Ground forces are the very heart of any state’s armed forces. The seat of all 
political power and almost every aspect of the ‘Core of the State’ is found on land. As 
such, land warfare is “shaped by the nature of the environment in which it is fought” 
(Tuck 2008, 67). Ground warfare is fought by ground forces (armies or similarly 
organized organizations) in which units from these armies maneuver across some 
territory to engage the opposing enemy. This might include offensive operations (the 
attack), defensive operations (defending), stability operations, counter-insurgency 
operations, guerrilla warfare, armored warfare, infantry warfare, etc.  
Armies may be composed of a professional force, a large conscript force, a militia 
force, or a mixture of the three. They may be small or large, or designed as a small force 
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that can ramp up to a much larger force. There may be multiple ‘Armies’, such as in the 
US with the US Army and the US Marine Corps, or Germany in WWII with the Heer 
(Army) and the Waffen-SS (Nazi Party’s armed wing). They may operate together, 
independently, etc. They may be very large encompassing entire army groups whose 
subordinate units stretch across a continent with millions of troops all the way down to 
battalion, and company sized formations of hundreds of troops. They will be organized 
along lines of arms employed, such as artillery, armor, infantry, airborne, etc. No matter 
how armies are trained, equipped, organized, and doctrinally fought, they serve one 
overriding purpose: ground forces seek to hold and gain ground while denying the enemy 
the ability to do the same to them. 
A second component to the armed forces is that of the aerospace (air) forces. 
While a relatively recent addition to armed forces (since the evolution of flight at the 
beginning of the 20th century), air forces are composed of capability based platforms and 
utilized in a multitude of ways as to bring damage to the enemy. Air power is designed to 
utilize assets in the atmosphere and in space to further military and policy goals. Air 
power can perform a multitude of missions (depending on the platform), including air 
superiority (control of the aerospace and denying use to the enemy), tactical ground 
attack (attacking enemy vehicles, emplacements, etc.), interdiction (attacking enemy 
supplies, communications, infrastructure), strategic bombing (attacking strategic level 
targets), and surveillance and intelligence gathering. Depending on the capabilities, air 
forces allow a joint force commander to attack the enemy’s Shield and Core beyond the 
ongoing efforts at the front by ground forces and into the enemy’s rear areas which may 
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be inaccessible to ground forces at the time, while protecting their own Shield and Core 
from the enemy attack. It cannot however secure territory.  
The third (but not least) component to the armed forces is that of the naval (sea) 
forces. Naval forces have been around since the first humans put to sea thousands of 
years ago and had to defend themselves from other ships. Naval forces are similar to air 
forces in the respect that they are composed of capability based platforms that are utilized 
in a multitude of ways as to being damage to the enemy (air craft, ships, submarines, 
etc.). In a peacetime role, naval forces “show the flag” as a method of deterrence though 
a presence in an area that would dissuade someone from attacking while safeguarding 
their sea traded resources (Sea Lines of Communications or “SLOC”) and national 
merchant fleet from piracy and other crime related activities. During wartime naval 
forces can deny the use of the sea to the enemy though the concept of ‘command of the 
sea’ by denying its use to the enemy and allowing their own naval forces freedom of 
movement. Naval forces can also project power ashore in support of naval, air, and 
ground operations (such as shore bombardment, naval strike via missiles or aircraft, 
landing ground forces on a beachhead, etc.).  
Thus, states utilize their armed forces in many different ways. However, the 
‘Shield of the State’ in wartime is more reliant on the armed forces than another element 
of the ‘Shield’. It will ultimately be how well the armed forces perform and how well that 
Core supplies the Shield in war that will determine the strength and capabilities of the 
‘Shield’, and thus, how well the state preforms in war.  
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The Core and Shield of the State at War 
 With an understanding of the Core and the Shield in place, how does a state’s 
Core and Shield interact during wartime? Depending on its political goals, the state will 
utilize varying amounts of resources from both its ‘Core’ and it’s ‘Shield’ in order to 
achieve a desired political objective set forth by the political leadership of the state. 
Therefore, at the heart of any war are the politicians and their political objectives.  
 Political objectives are influenced by many different factors, but mainly come 
from the state leadership. The leadership of the state is influenced (depending on the type 
of government in the state) by the population, economic leadership, leaders within the 
governmental pillar, and by leadership of the Shield as well. When deciding on war aims, 
they are also deciding on aims not only to gain goals for national security, but for their 
own domestic political survival as well. As stated earlier, they will operate under that of 
the Prospect Theory. As only victory in war can ensure their survival domestically, 
ending the war earlier involves the prospect of internal strife and fall as a leader or 
regime. Thus when taking any action short of victory, leaders do so under great risk to 
their future survival, and only as a last resort. Therefore, the incentive is for a leader is to 
win. No ordering of preferences changes the fact that without a win, their domestic 
position becomes harder to maintain.  
 Once the political objectives are decided upon (though they can change over the 
course of a war), governments will begin to mobilize its economy and population as 
necessary in order to support the Shield in its attempts to gain the desired political 
objective. Throughout this process, tradeoffs are being made between decision makers 
based upon the requirements and influenced of the Shield and the other pillars.  
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 The Shield in wartime has two primary goals. First is the protection of its Core 
from enemy attack (stressors). Second is attacking (stressing) the enemy’s Shield and 
Core in order to achieve the desired political objectives. In order to achieve this, the 
government will require transaction exchanges from the population and economy in order 
to support the Shield. Throughout the course of the war the state may be required to 
exchange more from the population and economy, all while ensuring that the Core 
remains capable of functioning. The more the Core is damaged by attacks (stressors) or 
the more the Shield is utilized and damaged (stressed) in war, the more pressure that will 
be placed on the Core to replace the damage to the Shield and the Core while keeping the 
Core at a level that it can function as a state and keep the population’s support behind the 
government.  
Figure 4.4: Graphical Representation of the State and Shield at War 
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A Theory of Inter-State Warfare 
 War is not just a military action, but military action for a political purpose. As 
such, wars are the use of violence in an attempt to force another state to accept the 
political demands placed upon it. While this comment implies simplicity, war is not a 
simple affair, and how a state achieves victory something much more difficult. 
 War is perceived at times to be a one-sided affair, as in State A utilizes this action 
or that action upon State B. What is forgotten is that war is a “two way street”, and that 
both sides are continuously attempting to force a preferred political outcome upon the 
enemy whom they are engaged in war with. This makes asking such question of ‘How 
does one state compel the other state to give into its demands?’ a more complicated 
question, as it is in fact two interrelated and simultaneously occurring questions. In war, 
both sides are conducting operations simultaneously in order to convince the other side to 
accept their political aims.  
Wars therefore can be thought of as races between two different competitors. It is 
a race where both competitors are trying hard not to be the first to quit the race before the 
other racer or be the first one to be tackled by the other racer. Two different competitors 
are different in their physical shapes and abilities, racing on courses of different lengths, 
with different obstacles that vary during the race, and in which your opponent can add to 
(and you can remove) those obstacles depending on actions made by both. It is a race 
without a definite end, where the competitors must endure as long as they see their 
competitor quit the race first. It is not a race to victory, but a race to force the other racer 
to quit or if not quit then finally tackle the other. This view is more in line with the 
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thinking of Allan Stam than those of the Bargaining Model, who view war as a 
transaction of information without actual results in those battles.  
In this inter-state war, various complex combinations of violent force and political 
variables are constantly changing and evolving due to the actions and reactions of both 
belligerents. Wars are won or lost due to the actions of states as they attempt to 
compensate for stressors placed upon their ‘Shield’ and ‘Core’ by the enemy while 
simultaneously attempting to place stressors upon the enemy’s ‘Core’ and ‘Shield’. In 
inter-state warfare, the state that is best able to protect its own ‘Core’ from enemy 
stressors while placing stressors upon the enemy ‘Shield’ and ‘Core’ will win. 
Conversely, a state will be defeated when it sees its ‘Shield’ defeated on the battlefield, 
its ‘Core’ devastated and unable to support both itself and the ‘Shield’, or some 
combination of defeat to the ‘Shield’ and damage to the ‘Core’ that will exhaust its 
ability to continue the conflict (such as citizen opinion, government will power, etc.). The 
defeated state will have at some point crossed a threshold (which is unique to each state) 
where the additive (and multiplied) effects of stressors placed upon its Core and Shield 
will be so great that it no longer wishes to continue the conflict and will give into the 
political demands that the enemy placed upon them. When both states have suffered 
stressors to their Shield and Core to the point where they are not willing to give in to the 
enemy’s demands, but are also unwilling to continue the conflict, both sides will seek a 
negotiated settlement (i.e. draw). 
States are defeated in one of 4 possible outcomes: 
1. Total Defeat via the complete destruction of the Shield and capture of its 
Core. 
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2. Governmental pillar capitulates to demands of the enemy before destruction of 
the Shield and capture of the Core occurs (Bargaining Model outcome). 
3. Population pillar capitulation to demands before destruction of Shield and 
capture of Core occurs, via revolt, rebellion, revolution, removal of 
government, etc.  
4. Surrender or destruction of major portion of the Shield which leads to the 
opening of the Core and the Core’s surrender or capitulation to demands 
before the Core is damaged (Bargaining Model Outcome) 
All other outcomes are based upon either a draw (mutual negotiated agreement) or 
victory for the state as the other state has given in to its demands. This holds in line with 
the third outcome of Allan Stam, the draw.  
In order to achieve victory, states will attempt to target not only the enemy’s 
Shield, but their Core (through either direct or indirect means). Placing stressors upon the 
enemy’s Shield is perhaps the most familiar with readers, as it invokes the use of military 
force in tradition means: military on military engagements. Placing stressors on the 
Shield and the damage it receives is fairly straightforward and well detailed throughout 
military history and theory: the defeat and/or destruction of the enemy’s armed forces. 
This is done in a multitude of ways to include (though not exclusively) offensive and 
defensive actions, conventional and unconventional means, use of maneuver and attrition, 
and so forth. However, only offensive operations can truly allow for a state to achieve its 
political objectives.  
What are more complicated to analyze and quantify are attacks made upon the 
Core. Damage to the Core entails not only direct and indirect attacks on the Pillars, but 
133 
 
that of the links between the Pillars. Direct attacks upon the Core utilize the Shield to 
make direct (military) attacks upon the government, economy, or population. Examples 
of such can be seen in the use of ‘strategic bombing’ by the Western Allies in WWII 
against Germany and Japan, where cities, factories, infrastructure, government and 
military facilities, and even at times the citizenry population were targeted through the 
use of strategic bombing of heavy, medium, and light bombers and fighter-bombers.  
Indirect attacks upon the Core and its effects are even harder to quantify and 
define than direct attacks. It is easy to quantify such things as the destruction of enemy 
production facilities, a drop in oil production, etc. It is however harder to quantify how 
morale is affected, how a leadership’s opinion of the war changes, or how hunger or a 
loss in food production territories affects the population and not only their support for the 
war but their ability to work at maximum efficiency at their normal daytime places of 
employment, or how a blockade affects the economy. These types of attacks also rely on 
“second order” effects, where stressors are placed upon the state as a byproduct of attacks 
upon the Pillars or by directly attacking the links between Pillars. By blocking the ability 
of the Pillars to conduct exchange transactions, the effectiveness of the Pillars diminish, 
and transactions must occur to rebuild that lost effectiveness, or sacrificed in order to 
support the Shield. Thus indirect attacks over time may have a significant impact upon 
how the Core operates and how the Core supports the Shield. 
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Figure 4.5: Visual Representation of Dyadic Inter-State War 
 
When the Core and Shield are damaged due to stressors placed upon it by the 
enemy, the government is placed in a quandary when engaged in war. When the Shield 
cannot defend the Core the state is more susceptible to defeat. The government leadership 
has several options. It can attempt to strengthen its defenses by making up for the losses 
its Shield has suffered in battle through the redistribution of goods and resources in the 
core and redirection away from the population and economy for use by the shield.  
This however, runs the risk of alienating the population or economic leaders who 
may not support further conflict. It also leaves open the Core to attack by the enemy’s 
Shield, which could place pressure on the government leadership to accept the enemy’s 
political demands. With attacks on the economy and population, the population may be 
inclined to raise pressure to end the war, or remove the government. Conversely, direct 
attacks upon the Core may steel the resolve of the population to remain in the fight. Thus 
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the government leadership is taking a gamble on whether or not to continue fighting once 
its Shield has been damaged through losses in combat and/or when the Core is damaged. 
In conclusion, victory, defeat, and settlement in Interstate Wars occur because of 
the ability (or inability) of the state to protect its own Core while channeling enough (or 
not enough) resources to its Shield and whereupon its Shield can be effective (or 
ineffective) in placing stressors upon and damaging the enemy’s Shield and Core to the 
point where that state will have become stressed to such an extent it is unwilling to 
continue the war and acquiesce to the political demands placed upon it. 
‘Quantifiable Equation’ for the Theory Inter-State Warfare and War Outcomes 
One must look beyond simply ‘bean counting’ of assets, resources, GDP, 
population, and mobilized troops, etc. that states utilize in war. One must look at how a 
state chooses to fight the war, and how it utilizes its resources. This view must be at the 
strategic level of war and, even more importantly, the operational level of war. It is in 
these variables that any determinants of how war outcomes occur will be found.  
Determinants of war outcomes should focus not only at on success on the battlefield, but 
that of the ‘Pillars of the State’ as well. This will help determine both direct and indirect 
influences that lead to victory, defeat, or settlement in war. 
If inter-star war was reduced a math equation in order to determine its outcomes 
and terminations, it would not only be a complex problem, but an unbalanced equation 
where both states are expressed on opposite ends of the equation, and are only equal in 
the sense they are both states engaged in war. Beyond that, there can be no truly two 
equally paired states ever. As such, any equation is unable to show equality between the 
states. However, this should not deter one from thinking in such terms. What it does 
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require is to think of war in a much different manner because no matter what one would 
like to believe, the philosophical and mathematical truth is that states will never be equal, 
and any equation is bounded by the mathematical laws of inequality. As such, wars 
should be viewed as two inter-dependent problems vice one problem of equilibrium.  
 Any math that attempts to describe a war is an unequal problem. Each state would 
have their own equation (both states using the same equation, utilizing different data and 
inputs) where each variable would be calculated to a point where point a state no longer 
has the ‘will’ to continue the fight and will give in to the enemy’s political demands, even 
if such demands mean complete surrender or complete occupation and destruction of 
their Shield and Core first.  
If such an equation were to ever be utilized (with perfect information and data), it 
would like something like this: [𝑋𝑃 (𝑃𝑆  + 𝑃𝐺 − 𝑃𝐿)] + [𝑋𝐸 (𝐸𝑆  + 𝐸𝐺 − 𝐸𝐿)] + [𝑋𝐺 (𝐺𝑆  + 𝐺𝐺 − 𝐺𝐿)]  +[𝑋𝑆 (𝑆𝑆  + 𝑆𝐺 − 𝑆𝐿)]  ≥  Ω   
Where 𝑋𝑃 +  𝑋𝐸 + 𝑋𝐺 + 𝑋𝑆 = 1 
Ω = State’s Surrender Point (Where they completely agree with enemy’s demands) 
X = Comparative Weight of Sum of Variables (different for every state) 
S = Start Point, G = War Gains, and L = War Losses 
Where P = Population, E = Economy, G = Government, and S = Shield of the State 
 Therefore under this equation, one would find the Ω to be, along with the weights 
of the sum of variables to be different for every state, and in this case an arbitrary 
number, as states do not have some magical number where they will surrender, only 
determinants. With perfect information and perfect modeling, wars could be predicted, 
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and this equation in some modified form, would be highly useful. Until that time 
however, it shall serve as an ideal that may never be reached, but one that should be 
continually thought of and modified and worked towards.  
Because wars are so infrequent (as compared to years of peace) and suffer from a 
lack of data (explained above), this math equation will always be incomplete. With this in 
mind, the study of war and the resulting data and analysis (as expressed in an earlier 
section) is very much incomplete, and it is a problem that can never truly be rectified. 
Since it is and will always be an incomplete problem, attention must be paid to indicators 
or determinants of war outcomes, within the Core and Shield framework of the theory. 
These indicators should primarily look to the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of war outcomes. The 
‘what’ as in what is needed to be done to bring about victory in war, and ‘how’ a state go 
about achieving victory in the war. Because of the imperfect and incomplete data 
problem, only case studies and determinants can provide us with the pieces of the puzzle 
on how war outcomes occur. 
Theoretical Hypothesis to be Tested 
 As put forth or implied in the theory above, the rest of this study will attempt to 
verify the theory through both qualitative and quantitative methods depending on the data 
available.  
H𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒  = States with stronger Core’s and Shields, who are able to defend them while 
defeating the enemy’s Shield and/or damaging the enemy’s Core will be more likely to 
win wars. H𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠  = The greater the state’s casualties (damage to the population pillar), 
the less the likelihood of victory. 
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H𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 = The greater the state’s economic losses (damage to the economic 
pillar), the less the likelihood of victory. H𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  = The greater the state’s government cohesion, the greater chance of victory 
(as it is more resilient to stress placed upon it). H𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  = States who maintain offensive initiative will have a greater chance 
of victory. H𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑  = States that utilize ‘unrestricted war’ means of both conventional and 
unconventional warfare will have a greater chance at victory than those who solely utilize 
purely unconventional or purely conventional methods. H𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑣𝑒𝑟  𝐷𝑜𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠  = States that utilize maneuver doctrines will have a greater chance of 
victory. H𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑠 = States that utilize mass at the point of attack on offensives will have a greater 
chance of victory. H𝐵𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠  = The greater the losses to a state’s battlefleet, the greater the chances of 
defeat. H𝑆𝑒𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 = States that utilize sea control doctrines will be more likely to win wars. H𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠 = States that utilize conservation of force strategies and operational 
art will have a greater chance of a prolonged war and defeat. 
Conclusion 
 Through this theoretical framework, it is hoped that how wars are fought and how 
they end and why they end the way they do is better understood. Due to the missing data, 
quantitative analysis can only provide part of the answers sought. Therefore, qualitative 
analysis is required to test the full breadth of the theory. If the majority hypotheses hold 
true, then the Theory of Inter-State War-Fighting will hopefully be seen as a valuable tool 
for evaluating inter-state warfare, how they are fought, and why certain outcomes occur.  
139 
 
 
 
Chapter 5:  
 
Qualitative Analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
140 
 
 Using the hypotheses from the last chapter, I now examine two case studies of 
two very different inter-state wars in order to evaluate the ‘Theory of Interstate War-
Fighting” and the determinants of war outcomes. 
 The intent of this chapter is to expand upon two wars in order to show the process 
of war beyond just statistical analysis of what determines war outcomes. Factors 
themselves do not lead to victory in war. How those factors are utilized is what leads to 
victory. Case studies are rich with information that is either lost or misconstrued by pure 
quantitative analysis. Quantitative analysis is imperfect, and depending on the coding, 
can construe or minimalize important factors and leave us with imperfect information and 
knowledge. Quantitative analysis can show us trends over time. Qualitative research is 
also imperfect, where it only shows trends over the case study’s time period. However, 
qualitative research can show things that quantitative analysis cannot, such as the 
evolution of strategies, operational art, and doctrine throughout the length of a war. This 
level of detail provided by qualitative analysis is necessary for situations where data is 
lacking. In the study of war there is plenty of missing or contradictory data.  I argue that 
qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis are complementary, and that much useful 
information can be gained from utilizing both types of analysis and in particular the level 
of detail found in case studies. This level of detail can be of great help discerning the 
determinates of war outcomes more so than just cursory numbers of a state’s raw 
resources and manpower can ever determine. With that said, there is great value to 
quantitative research, but as in football, not every offensive play will work every time 
when utilized against an opposing defense, and the same is true in the study of warfare 
and in waging war itself.  
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 In order to analyze the theory in general and the hypotheses in particular, each 
case study will be broken up into several sections (stated below) in order to determine the 
progress of each war, and help show how certain determinants of war outcomes came 
about. It is through these two broad case studies that this study shall attempt to show how 
states engage and produce certain outcomes in inter-state warfare. This will be achieved 
through the lens of the ‘Theory of Inter-State Warfare’. 
 In these case studies (as well as in the quantitative analysis) the dependent 
variable is the particular war outcome, either a win (enemy accepts that states political 
demands), a loss (state gives in to the enemy’s political demands), or a draw (both states 
change their demands in order to find a mutual agreement to end the war).  
 The following case studies utilize a process called “process tracing”, a process 
that was utilized by Dan Reiter in How Wars End where process tracing is “a procedure 
for identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome of a given dependent 
variable of a particular case in a particular historical context” (Reiter 2009, 52). Reiter 
(2009, 52) however argued that it is impossible to create universal rules for success in 
battle and that “interpreting battle outcomes is highly context-dependent.” And perhaps it 
is true that there is no one universal rule for battles, as they are highly dependent on a 
vast amount of variables. But the same can be true with any such event one was to study, 
and going down one logical path, one could never truly interpret anything. I agree with 
Dr. Reiter that in war, many events and variables are “highly context dependent,” 
however I also believe that certain universal themes can be found in war, and in particular 
variables at the operational and strategic levels of war, but less so at the tactical levels of 
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war due to the great influence tactics, topography, training, and technology play (amongst 
other variables) in tactical engagements.  
Both wars utilized in the case studies show many similarities, and what is most 
striking is how the belligerents utilized similar methods, or maintained similar war aims, 
but for various and highly different reasons. Therefore these wars have variation in the 
independent variables utilized, allowing for a broad spectrum of variables to an analyzed 
in just two case studies. 
 Case studies do present a problem however, which allow for a possible distortion 
that can where the lessons of a few wars are applied to all wars when it may not be 
appropriate or even valid. In order rectify this, while still recognizing the data problem, 
this chapter is complemented with quantitative analysis in the next chapter. Case studies 
also create tunnel vision for those involved, and can lead researchers to find elements that 
are not involved in all wars, or allow researchers hold hypothesis true when they are not 
(as in a matter of interpretation). Thus one must tread carefully when using case studies. 
Case studies however present an important bonus beyond what quantitative analysis can 
achieve. It allows for context of variables (especially during real life actions and 
decisions) that pure quantitative variables cannot (say for example why one strategy was 
pursued over another even if that other one was “militarily more efficient” etc.). 
Furthermore quantitative data are sorely lacking in many variables utilized for this study 
(and in the study of war in general), and require further (and deeper) research into all 
inter-state wars. Even then that research may not prove fruitful, as much data and 
knowledge has been lost due to the expanse of time and the destruction caused by war. 
To test wars quantitatively to achieve true accuracy of detail would require mathematical 
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equations that would been highly subjective due to the lack of data and information on 
wars at this time, and thus only certain determinants can be tested for with any level of 
accuracy, requiring the use of case studies.  
With these factors taken into account, a two pronged approach is necessary when 
studying wars. Despite the orthodoxy many researchers have fervently stated when 
upholding quantitative analysis over qualitative analysis, both qualitative analysis and 
quantitative analysis complement each other in such wonderful ways that to ignore one 
over the other is to lessen one’s true understanding of the subject and limiting one’s 
ability to discover new things.  
Case Study Sectional Organization 
 Each case study will begin with a short overview on the events that lead to war 
onset. Next each case study shall analyze the status and capabilities of the core and shield 
of each state involved in the war at time of war onset, along with the initial political aims 
of the war. Then the case study will analyze the progress of the war through the lens of 
strategic, operational, and doctrinal factors, and how these factors helped or hurt a state’s 
war outcome. Finally I shall conclude with a test of the hypotheses from the previous 
chapter, seeking to find which ones held true, and which ones were found lacking in each 
of the two case studies, if the general theory holds true, and what factors led to why the 
specific war outcome occurred. 
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Russo-Japanese War 1904-1906 
I. Background to the War 
The roots of the Russo-Japanese War can be found in the outcome of the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894-1895. In the Sino-Japanese War, both China and Japan fought for 
control over Korea. While Japan had defeated China decisively on land and at sea, it 
failed to completely gain the political objectives it desired due to European intervention 
(and mainly that of Russia).  Imperial Japan’s original peace terms to Imperial China 
demanded were quite generous to Imperial Japan, and Imperial China seemed on the 
verge of acquiescence to Japan’s demands.  
 However, the Imperial Russian government was not thrilled with the political 
aims of Japan, and fearing that Japanese expansion would ruin their designs for 
Manchuria in particular and in the Far East in general. To forestall the Japanese, they 
moved troops into Manchuria and worked diplomatically with other European powers 
in order to “deprive Japan of its gains in both Korea and Manchuria,” which it 
succeeded in doing (Jukes 2002, 8).  
China also in turn handed over the Liaotung Peninsula to Russia, leaving Japan 
with only a non-Chinese (but pro-Russian and pro-American) Korea, a line of indemnity, 
and Formosa and some surrounding islands. Japan was angry at this outcome caused by 
the intervention of Western powers. “Instead of building railroads in Korea and 
Manchuria as it had planned, Japan now used its indemnity to build battleships in 
England. The Japanese had tasted victory. Now they planned for revenge” (Warner and 
Warner 1974, 60). 
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By 1904, Japan felt severely threatened by Russia’s maneuvers in the Far East. 
Russia was building railroads all over Manchuria, deploying more forces to the region, 
and beginning to exclude foreigners from entrance to and trading within Manchuria. 
Japan believed Russia to be weaker in the Far East compared to the forces it could bring 
to bear, but the stronger opponent overall as it could bring vast numbers of forces from 
all over the Russian Empire. Because of this, Japan wished that if there was to be war, 
then it should be sooner rather than later, though Japanese leaders where under no 
illusions that it would be an easy war, but feared what might occur if they did not strike 
the Russians after 1904 as they were growing in power (Jukes 2002).  
II. Imperial Russia’s Core and Shield at the start of hostilities 
 The Russian Empire in 1904 was a mass of contradictions. It was largest state in 
the world in geographic size, and large in population, and because of its size it was 
perceived to be very powerful. This perception was incorrect however. The state itself 
was weak due to domestic unrest amongst its population and by its corrupted and failing 
bureaucracy. Russia’s core was an unsteady and failing core in great need of restructuring 
and improvement.  
 Russia had a very vast population. Its population contained a mixture of cultures 
and nationalities that was spread out over gigantic area in Asia and Europe. Its population 
was oppressed because of the cultural structure of the state and society, which allowed 
the majority of the population to be greatly underpaid, greatly overworked, poor, sickly, 
and illiterate. Thus the population pillar in Russia’s core had great potential, but was 
undereducated and disgruntled with their limited freedoms. 
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 Russia’s economic pillar was also a major work in progress. It had vast areas 
within its large territory that held many natural resources, but the size of the territory and 
its extreme weather patterns severely hampered the ability to extract those natural 
resources. Russia not compete with other states as well as it could have because it relied 
on manpower and not industrialization to achieve much of its output. Russia only 
belatedly and haphazardly began to industrialize at a ferocious pace. By 1904 only the 
sheer size of its resources, rather than its industrial prowess, made Russia an economic 
power. It also had a very poor ability to supply its forces in the Far East, due to both 
production abilities and infrastructure/transportation issues.  
 Russia’s governmental pillar was the crux all problems within Russia. Russia’s 
empire seemed daily to court corruption, revolution, and a yearning for the past (or 
willful ignorance of the current situation). Russia was led by Tsar Nicholas II, who in 
1904 was still an absolute monarch. Corruption was high amongst the aristocracy and 
those who served in government. Tsar Nicholas was a poor administrator and leader, as 
were many of the people he trusted. Russia’s governmental and economic leaders were 
pushing for greater and greater industrialization of the economy at the expense of the 
workers. They also pushed for greater and greater crop yields from the peasant farmers, 
which due to the infrastructure of Russia made the entire farming process highly 
inefficient and caused much discontent with the peasant-farmers. Russia was constantly 
under the threat of revolution, and many different revolutionary and rebellious 
committees and cells operated in the country, but did so not in plain sight as they had to 
go into hiding from the Tsar’s ruthless security forces. Russia’s government from the 
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outside world at the time seemed all powerful, but was in reality the weak link in 
Russia’s core.  
 Russia’s shield was, like everything else in Russia, a massive contradiction (or 
perhaps even paper tiger). Russia’s army was massive, and in 1904 Russia had a 
population of over 130 million people, of whom about one-fourth to one-fifth were of age 
to be called up for military service (Jukes 2002, 21). Russia’s army was feared, but only 
because of the historical success of defeating Napoleon and the luster that accompanied 
that great victory a century earlier, though defeat in the Crimean War and actions in the 
Russo-Turkish War (which they had won) had partially tarnished that luster.  
Russia utilized mass conscription to man its armed forces, but it did not conscript 
Muslims and other ethnic minorities within its borders as it did not trust them (Jukes 
2002, 21). Further the conscription program was corrupt as it “provided so many 
opportunities for evasion that to be actually called up was widely seen as a misfortune” 
(Jukes 2002, 21). “Relations between officers and men were far more distant in the 
Russian than in the Japanese Army, partly because most officers came from well-to-do 
urban or rural aristocratic background or at least from the gentry, while most men were 
illiterate peasants” (Jukes 2002, 81). Russia still had mass (of numbers) on its side, and in 
the Far East at the start of the war, it had 100 infantry battalions, 30 artillery batteries, 
and 75 cavalry squadrons to defend its territory, not to mention hundreds more battalions, 
batteries, and squadrons that could be called upon from Russia’s vast regions to the fight 
if necessary (Jukes 2002, 20).  
 Russia’s navy on the other hand, while larger than Japans in pure numbers, 
suffered from many problems. Its navy was spread all over the world, from the Baltic 
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Sea, to the Black Sea, in Murmansk, and in the Pacific, and thus concentration of forces 
would be difficult in any Mahanian concept of the term. In the Pacific the Russians had 
begun a buildup of forces after its acquisition of Port Arthur and the Liaoyang Peninsula, 
which offered Russia constant access to a warm water port.13 Its 1st Pacific Squadron had 
“seven battleships, seven cruisers, 25 destroyers and 27 smaller ships”, where “Russian 
ships were a hotchpotch of different types, armaments and speed, and varied in the 
amount of amour protection they had” (Jukes 2002, 21). Thus the Russian Navy could be 
effective, but due to multiple types of ships and armament, lead to a difficult supply 
system for Russia to maintain. Furthermore, Russian doctrine and training regimes kept 
the all the fleets in port when only half of its fleets that were iced in, even if half of its 
fleets were in warm water ports, which greatly reduced the time ships and their crews had 
not only for training, but the general practice of seamanship and just being underway. 
 Officer and enlisted training on the whole was rather poor. While there were 
certainly brave soldiers and some very exceptional officers, on the whole poor training 
and doctrine lead to poor leadership within the Imperial Russian armed forces. Most 
enlisted were peasants who were illiterate and had low morale. Officers were a mixed 
bunch, with most coming from the aristocracy and lacked quality military training which 
made for many incompetent officers.  
 Russia’s internal security forces were mainly concentrated on suppressing their 
own internal revolutionaries, and believed the Japanese so incompetent as to do very little 
spying with their intelligence agents. Thus Russia’s shield looked formidable, and if 
utilized properly could bring about victory in a war, but glaring weaknesses in training, 
doctrine, supplies, and morale were serious faults within the shield. If it were up against 
                                                             
13 Unlike that of Vladivostok which froze for several months of the year. 
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its tribal foes it had defeated in the past century, or the Turks, the Shield was enough in 
its current condition. Against a well trained and equipped enemy, the Russian Shield was 
thought to be ‘just enough’ due to its size. 
III. Imperial Japan’s Core and Shield at the start of hostilities 
Imperial Japan in 1904 was a state on the rise. While it was a small island state, it 
had a growing population and booming economy due to rapid industrialization in the 
forty years before the war.14 Japan’s Core was a strong core in many ways, though this 
came at great cost and dramatic change.  
Japan’s governmental pillar was the very heart of Japanese society, for it revolved 
around the Emperor. All power was invested in the Emperor, who delineated powers to 
his cabinet and ministers.15 Japanese citizens were “now… required to believe that this 
son of the deities… was divinely inspired to rule it all” and that “if it were not for Japan, 
therefore, the other nations of the world would not exist” (Warner and Warner 1974, 45). 
It was through the Emperor that the ministers exercised vast power, and helped make 
Japan a highly industrial and militant nation. 
Japan’s government was in 1904 ruled by men from mainly two clans in Japan, 
and exercised total authority. As such, the strange divisions of its organization that 
hampered Japanese governance in World War II would not play much of a role in this 
war. The Japanese civil government worked in partnership with the Army and Navy 
instead of working for the civil government. Thus the military exercised great power and 
                                                             
14 This was due to the arrival of a US flotilla under Commodore Matthew Perry, who sailed into Tokyo Bay 
and “helped” open up Japanese ports to US commercial interests. This in turn forced Japan to modernize 
rapidly out of fear of being taken over like China had been by European states.  
15 While the Emperor was in many ways all powerful and revered, there is much debate as to the actual 
power the Emperor had, and their influences upon national decision making and policy, both in the Russo-
Japanese War and in World War II. 
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influence within the civil government, its economy, and society, but civilians and the 
Emperor still retained final authority. Both the civil and military leaders worked in 
harmony to achieve their goals of hegemony, dictating the structuring of society and 
economy in order to maximize military efficiency in wartime.  
Because of the power of the central government, the economic pillar of Japan was 
heavily influenced not by free markets (though it did a growing amount of civil-domestic 
and foreign trade), but by the dictates of the governmental pillar. Industrialization had 
come rapidly to Japan, and it quickly became a key manufacturing center in Asia. Japan’s 
great weakness however was that it had very few natural resources of its own, and was 
forced to rely on trading with foreign powers for the resources to build up their state and 
military. It also lacked the ability in 1904 to build very large warships and heavy 
weaponry on its own at this time.16 Therefore, Japan was force to rely on foreign 
purchases from Britain, France, Germany, and the US for the Imperial Army’s heavy 
armament, Japan relied exclusively on Britain for its battleships. 
The population pillar of Japan was very strong and resilient, though nowhere near 
as large as Russia’s. It was a heavily indoctrinated society, which revered not only the 
Emperor, but also the new interpretation of the ideals of bushido.17 While the old feudal 
system of bushido and the samurai had been done away with, the leaders in Japan 
replaced it with a new form, dedicated less on personal honor and more dedicated to the 
Emperor and self-sacrifice for the state. This new form was imposed upon all members of 
society, which was accepted easily and readily by the population. This indoctrination or 
                                                             
16 Though within a decade, Japan would be producing some of the finest battleships in the world. 
17 Bushido is ‘ways of the samurai’, was originally used by just warriors and lords. But with the Meiji 
Restoration, it was transformed into a code to be utilized by everyone, as states could now mobilize vast 
amounts of manpower 
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super-nationalism, along with the Japanese society being fairly homogeneous society, 
produced a population that was internally cohesive and for the most part fanatically 
willing to accept deprivations in order to further the goals of the Emperor and the state.  
The strength of the core of Japan allowed Japan a certain degree of freedom of 
movement and policy that many other states did not enjoy. It could equip a vast army and 
navy for a prolonged struggle. Its armed forces were backed very supportive population 
and cohesive government. Japan’s industrialization and re-invention of bushido allowed 
it to field a very powerful ‘Shield’.  
The Imperial Japanese Navy was a relatively new institution, and a very modern 
military force, composed of “six battleships, ten cruisers, 40 destroyers and 40 smaller 
ships, and was generally superior in quality” (Jukes 2002, 21) to Russian ships. Unlike 
the Russian Navy, the Japanese Navy’s ships were “nearly all British-built, were more 
uniform, and faster” where “under British instructors, spent much more time at sea, and 
trained more intensively… All Japanese sailors were literate, while most Russian sailors 
were not. The effects of that difference area are unquantifiable; but steam-driven 
warships were the most technologically advanced weapon systems of the time; then as 
now, they were unlikely to reach peak efficiency in the hands of illiterates” (Jukes 2002, 
21-23). As per doctrine and organization, the Imperial Japanese Navy was broken up into 
several numbered fleets, which when called upon with come together into one power 
force, the “Combined Fleet.” The Combined Fleet operated under several advantages 
compared to Russia beyond that of technology and training: repair and operational 
maneuver. Japan had the ability to repair ships nearby in large dry docks and shipyards, 
where as Russia did not have any in the Far East. Japan also operated its fleet from ports 
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that were less susceptible to being blockaded via choke points, either from enemy 
blockade or being iced in.  
The Imperial Army was a very powerful force as well. While being several times 
smaller to the Russian army, it maintained an active force of 180,000 troops that could be 
augmented by a force of 200,000 in its reserves, and muster into the field a further 
850,000 if required (Warner and Warner 1974, 179). While their artillery was inferior to 
the Russians, and they initially shrugged off the need for machine guns, they had very 
high morale, nationalism, dedication, and internal cohesiveness that the Russians could 
not match.  
High morale would not win battles necessarily however, and as the Imperial 
Japanese Army was outmanned and out produced in many areas, Japan had strength of 
doctrine and tactics beyond anything the Russians would show during the war. “The real 
Japanese strength lay in the infantry… [when] The Japanese trained on the [gun] range. 
The Russian soldiers shot badly, the Japanese excellently. The Russians fired in volleys. 
The Japanese learned to aim and to shoot to kill. They were trained in close-quarters 
fighting” (Warner and Warner 1974, 181-182). Japanese commanders however feared the 
great weight of Russian armies would overwhelm them no matter how strong their 
fighting spirit, and professionalism was on the battlefield. Therefore, Japan’s only hope 
was for offensive actions that would destroy the Russian army before they could come 
together en masse and destroy the Japanese through its sheer size. 
IV. The war begins and Japan conquers Korea 
 Fearing that Russia would not only dominate Manchuria, but Korea, and seeing 
no diplomatic resolution in sight, the Japanese believed the only course of action was the 
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use of military force, even if its leadership was unsure of final victory in the conflict. 
“Japan severed diplomatic relations with Russia on 5 February 1904” (Jukes 2002, 24). 
Both sides saw the war as a limited war: limited in goals. Russia was not going to invade 
Japan, and Japan was not going to march on Moscow from the Far East. Thus as both 
sides entered into war, it was about gaining and expanding territory (and a limited 
amount at that), not total domination.  
The day after Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Russia, the Japanese 
Combined Fleet made a sortie from its several bases, with the main body of its force 
steaming to the main Russian naval base at Port Arthur, while other elements of the 
Combined Fleet provided convoy escort to ships transporting the dispersed elements of 
the Imperial Army to numerous locations in Korea and Manchuria.  
 Japan began to land troops in Korea on 8 February in the port of Chemulpo (now 
known as Inchon), while later that night the Japanese Combined Fleet attacked the 
anchored Russian fleet in Port Arthur which damaging two battleships in a daring 
nighttime torpedo attack. Because Japan had not declared war, Russia was taken by 
surprise.18 These early actions by the Combined Fleet cowed the Russian 1st Pacific 
Squadron into inaction, giving Japan de facto command of the seas and allowing the 
Japanese to safely transport their field armies to Korea.  
 After the initial attack on Port Arthur, the Combined Fleet achieved little true 
success. Japan feared loss of control of the sea, as it would isolate their armies in Korea 
and Manchuria and lead to defeat. The Russian fleet posed a threat as a “fleet-in-being” 
(as in its existence posed a threat, but was inactive) to the Japanese, who had to maintain 
                                                             
18 While the severing relations should have been seen as a step to war, Russia did not see Japan as a great 
threat and saw no need to increase their military’s readiness for combat operations. 
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its battle fleet at a constant state of readiness out to sea. The Combined Fleet failed 
several times from February to July to close the entrance to the harbor by sinking block 
ships, and Russian mines sank several Japanese ships including two battleships in May.19 
The only major Russian sortie out of Port Arthur that sought to engage a contingent of the 
Combined Fleet occurred in March of 1904 was a major failure, and the Russian 
Squadron was forced to flee back into Port Arthur.20 Squadron’s return to Port Arthur 
was an even greater disaster, where Russian ships ran into their own minefields and 
suffered the loss of a battleship and damage to another battleship. After this attempt, the 
naval war had turned into a war of attrition and posturing. In spite of its losses, the 
Russian Pacific Squadron still posed a credible if declining threat to the Japanese Navy 
and its control of the sea. This threat was of sufficient enough size as to force the 
Japanese land an entire field army to invest and capture Port Arthur and end the 1st 
Pacific Squadron’s threat once and for all. 
 By end of April 1904 the Japanese had landed enough ground forces to secure 
most of Korea, and were building up their forces to launch an offensive into Manchuria. 
The Japanese were highly confident that if they moved quickly enough, they could defeat 
the Russians and move into strong defensive positions from where the Russians could not 
defeat them and would force Russia to give up control over Manchuria. Most Russian 
commanders were contemptuous of the abilities of the Japanese, and believed Russia’s 
half-hearted mobilization and defensive measures would be sufficient to defeat the 
Japanese. Russia believed it would roll over the Japanese quickly, and from there they 
could consolidate its control over Manchuria and Korea.  
                                                             
19 Japan only had 6 battleships when the war started, and losing two was a major blow to Japan which is 
why perhaps Admiral Togo was and continued to be cautious with his battlefleet’s use. 
20 And with the failure, the fighting spirit of the Russian 1st Pacific Squadron was destroyed. 
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The Russian blocking force along the Yalu River was not well dug in, and it failed 
to make proper defensive field fortifications which would have been difficult to defeat as 
the Russians had occupied excellent defensive terrain.21 On the first of May the Japanese 
attacked and pushed back the Russian defenders along the Yalu, inflicting heavy losses 
on the Russians while receiving heavy losses due to the use of frontal assault against the 
Russian defensive lines.  The battle however showed to some Russians that the Japanese 
were indeed a competent force that could pose a serious threat to the Russians.22 As such 
the new ground commander in the Far Eastern District, General Alexey Nikolayevich 
Kuropatkin, changed Russian strategy from an active to a passive defense, where Russian 
armies would attempt to avoid a major engagement with the Japanese until such time 
(most likely in the fall) “when he had gained substantial numerical superiority” over 
Japanese that he would launch a massive counter-offensive that would defeat the 
Japanese once and for all (Jukes 2002, 31). 
V. Siege at Port Arthur and Japanese advances in Manchuria 
 The Japanese were able to quickly isolate Port Arthur after the Battle of Nanshan 
which captured the neck of the Liaotung Peninsula where the port is located. The 
Japanese followed up this with an offensive using frontal attacks in an effort to take Port 
Arthur quickly, a tactic which had worked when the Japanese took Port Arthur in the 
Sino-Japanese War a decade earlier. These attacks were decisively repulsed by the 
Russians. Japan was forced to dig entrenchments and begin a siege against the Port and 
its strong defenses. These defenses were extensive to include several large fortifications 
and an ever growing trench network as the siege progressed. 
                                                             
21 The Yalu River is border between Korea and China (Manchuria) both in 1904 and today. 
22 Many Russian politicians and military commanders were still dismissive of Japanese capabilities. 
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 General Kuropatkin was under immense pressure from both his superiors and his 
subordinates to relieve Port Arthur instead continuing the buildup he desired. By this time 
Japan had four major field armies deployed in theater, with three facing the main Russian 
armies in Manchuria and one was laying siege to Port Arthur. Kuropatkin was forced into 
an offensive that would attempt to relieve Port Arthur, and it was an offensive he did not 
want to take. While Kuropatkin was only a semi-competent military commander, he was 
a canny political operator, and utilized his political knowledge to his advantage by 
placing the main agitator for an offensive in charge of the offensive itself. It was a win-
win situation for Kuropatkin, for if the agitator, Lieutenant-General Georgii Stackelberg 
succeeded in the offensive, Kuropatkin would take the credit, and if General Stackelberg 
failed, Kuropatkin would have an excuse to remove the troublesome subordinate. 
Stackelberg met the Japanese in the field at Te-Li-Ssu Fanggou in June of 1904. Superior 
Japanese accuracy in artillery, along with poor Russian command and control quickly 
halted the Russian offensive, and an excellent Japanese flanking movement defeated the 
Russian army and forced it into retreat. Port Arthur was now left to hold out on its own 
now until Kuropatkin could muster the mass of forces required to defeat the Japanese, 
just as Kuropatkin originally intended.  
 By late summer in Port Arthur the Japanese army had moved close enough to the 
harbor as to allow their artillery to be in range of not only the city, but the Russian 
warships within the harbor. The Japanese artillery began to pound the city and the fleet. 
The First Pacific Squadron was in danger of being lost in port and the Tsar feared that 
reinforcements already being sent would not be enough to defeat the Japanese without the 
saving some portion of the First Pacific Squadron. On 10 August the squadron sortied 
157 
 
from port in an attempt to break out of the blockade and make way to the safety of 
Vladivostok.  
 For Admiral Heihachiro Togo, commander if the Imperial Japanese Combined 
Fleet, preservation of his fleet was his highest priority, as it had to remain a viable force 
when the Second Pacific Squadron arrived from the Baltic Sea several months in the 
future. There was great fear in Japan that the loss of more battleships would jeopardize 
Japanese naval superiority in any future battles and lead to a loss of its sea lines of 
communication with its ground forces.  As the Russian fleet sortie, Togo held back and 
only engaged the Russian squadron at long range. For a time it seemed as if the Russian 
squadron might be able to escape the Japanese fleet. However a lucky aimed shell hit the 
Russian squadron’s flagship bridge, killing the fleet commander and causing the ships 
helm to jam, which in turn caused the ship to turn. The rest of the fleet followed the turn 
of the flagship in error. With the Russian fleet out of position and having lost its lead over 
the Combined Fleet, the First Pacific Squadron retreated to Port Arthur.23 The First 
Pacific Squadron was then destroyed in port by Japanese siege artillery. The threat of the 
Russian Navy had temporarily receded and Admiral Togo took the Combined Fleet back 
into port for refit and repairs as it awaited the arrival of the Second Pacific Squadron.  
 The Siege of Port Arthur would continue until its defenders were worn down and 
out of supplies. The Japanese suffered heavily during the siege due to the large number of 
frontal assaults utilized. Many of the technologies, defensive entrenchments, and tactics 
utilized and seen in at this battle were later utilized and perfected during the First World 
War. The battle lasted for almost 10 months, and cost the Japanese 100,000 casualties 
while the Russia lost 30,000 casualties, its Pacific Squadron, and use of the port. The 
                                                             
23 Though some vessels did make it to Vladivostok, or made their way to be interred in neutral ports. 
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Russians had exacted a heavy toll on the Japanese, to the impressive casualty ratio of 3:1 
for the entire battle. 
 For Japan the war was going well, but it was proving a major drain on resources, 
which concerned the leadership of Japan far more than its citizens. Japan feared that the 
Russians may still gather enough strength to defeat them on land, and continued to push 
troops into Korea to advert defeat. Russia was devastated by the loss of Port Arthur and 
its fleet, but the Russians had a second fleet on the way, as well as moving more ground 
forces into theater. Both sides still believed in victory, but Japan feared it was much 
closer to defeat than did the Russians. Both sides still maintained their limited war goals, 
but the stress of the war upon both state’s governments, economies, and populations only 
grew, as did the need for more weaponry and manpower as the war had turned in many 
ways into a war of proportional attrition. Russia had the manpower if not the morale 
advantage, with Japan having the exact opposite.  
VI. Battles for the heart of Manchuria, epic Battle of Tsushima, and ending the war 
 While the siege of Port Arthur ran its course, the Japanese moved to secure a link 
in the railroad that spurred off the Trans-Siberian railroad into Manchuria at Liaoyang in 
August of 1904. General Kuropatkin continued to follow a strategy of defense while 
building up his forces. Japanese Marshal Oyama feared this buildup and went on the 
offensive.24 The Japanese once again utilized frontal attacks which cost the Japanese 
greatly in order to take the Russian outer defensive lines around Liaoyang. This was 
followed up by large scale assaults on the second defensive line. The battle became 
critical for both sides at the same time on 30 August during this multi-day battle where 
                                                             
24 Marshal Oyama was the senior ground commander, but was more a figurehead to his Chief of Staff, 
General Gentaro Kodama, who was the true architect of the ground campaign. 
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victory was in each other’s grasps as both sides had overextended their own lines. The 
Japanese were more effective with their artillery and had a more efficient command and 
control and were able to outflank and breakthrough Russian lines, which forced the 
Russians to retreat before they themselves could break through Japanese lines on the 
other side of the battlefront. The Russians then attempted a counter-attack to retake their 
lost positions, but poor command, control, and communications lead to its failure, and 
General Kuropatkin was forced to retreat to Mukden. While the Japanese had suffered 
more casualties in the battle than the Russians, Russian morale in its field armies was 
falling as once again the Japanese had forced the Russians to retreat.25  
 By the winter of 1904, both sides were exhausted and in need of rest and 
resupply. All of the battles fought in the interior of Manchuria had been close run events 
for both participants, and both still doubted the outcome of the war. During the lull of 
winter, both sides used cavalry raids to distract the other and disrupt their buildups, but 
were largely ineffective. Both sides built up their forces in an attempt to fight another 
major battle, a battle whose goal would be for both sides: the complete destruction of the 
enemy army. By January 1905 the Japanese army was gaining considerable strength 
thanks to the arrival of forces from the now ended siege at Port Arthur while Russian 
forces were augmented by troops brought in from Europe and Siberia.  
 Japanese commanders Oyama and Kodama knew through their excellent 
intelligence sources (which had performed well throughout the war) that they were 
outnumbered, something no military commander relishes (Jukes 2002, 65). Furthermore 
they were now under extreme political pressure from Tokyo due to the prolonged war’s 
effect on dragging down the economy, as well as fear of the loss of public support. Thus 
                                                             
25 Interestingly enough, General Kuropatkin declared the battle a victory, even as he retreated.  
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the Japanese advanced upon the Russian armies around Mukden in the hope of winning a 
decisive victory which would quickly end the war. The battle that followed would be one 
of the largest in history up to that point. 
 As the Japanese maneuvered their armies north, the Russians began further 
fortifying their entrenchments. Kuropatkin planned on launching an attack as soon as the 
Japanese arrived, but due to poor command and control and unwilling commanders, this 
did not occur. Japanese moves at the beginning of the battle where that of feints against 
the Russian left. Kuropatkin feared a massive assault, and thus positioned almost all of 
his reserves along his left to defeat the perceived attack. However the Japanese used the 
feints as a ruse in order to swing wide of the Russia’s right flank with an entire field army 
to outflank the enemy and actually attack the Russian right flank instead of the Russian 
left. By the time Kuropatkin realized what was occurring, it was too late, and the 
Japanese Third Army was deep into his rear. Fearing encirclement, Kuropatkin called for 
a retreat and for the destruction of all the vast amount of supplies he had stockpiled in 
Mukden. The Russians retreated further north in defeat, the morale of its soldiers had 
collapsed and Russian field armies were in no condition to fight another battle. But the 
victory was not the decisive victory the Japanese had wanted as the Russian army 
escaped. “The Japanese lost 15,892 dead and 59,612 wounded, the Russians over 40,000 
killed, missing or captured, and over 49,000 wounded” (Jukes 2002, 68). What the 
Japanese failed to achieve on the battlefield they achieved through influence upon morale 
of the Russians. Kuropatkin was sacked as commander of the armies in the Far East, but 
the Japanese did not pursue the Russians, as they were worn out.  
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 Both armies now rested to lick their wounds and regroup, awaiting other events. 
All eyes were upon their respective navies for the outcome of the war. If the Russian 
Second Pacific Squadron were able to defeat the Japanese Combined Fleet, the Imperial 
Japanese Army’s lines of communication and supply from Japan would be cut off, and 
eventually the war won for Russia. Should Russia lose, they had no way of stopping the 
Japanese without a massive influx of troops from other theaters inside Russia, which 
Russia could not afford to move.  
 The Second Pacific Squadron had taken a rigorous 7 month voyage around the 
world in its attempt to save the situation in the Far East. During those seven months from 
October 1904 to May 1905, the Russian squadron had suffered numerous mechanical 
problems and had little time to train or conduct live-fire exercises.26 It was a mixed force 
of new and older warships. In order to maintain formation, the squadron had to go as fast 
as its slowest ship. The Combined Fleet on the other hand had just come out of refit and 
was in top condition for battle. These two fleets would clash on May 27, 1905 in the 
straights of Tsushima between Japan and Korea. The epic battle was a very one sided 
affair, as the better armed and faster ships and the better trained crews of the Combined 
Fleet destroyed the Second Pacific Squadron in a decisive victory. This victory ensured 
Japanese command of the sea.  
 The war for most Russians was a ‘local one’ as that it was far away from most 
major economic, government, and population centers in Russia, while for Japan it was a 
war “close to home which absorbed proportionally more of its smaller population, and 
necessitated heavy taxation to pay for it, in a culturally homogenous society not 
                                                             
26 As the Russians had to save their ammunition against the enemy and consequently trained less with 
their weaponry than the Japanese. 
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otherwise discontented with its lot” whereas Russian society “was in a state of unrest 
before the war” (Jukes 2002, 82). Russia had even before the war suffered internal unrest 
which only grew during the war. After Tsushima Russia and Japan were wracked with 
internal problems.  
 In Japan, its inability to win decisive battles had caused the war to drag out, and it 
was near bankruptcy for war related funding, and running short on trained and untrained 
manpower. In Russia the conscription of peasants and requisitioning of animals for the 
army had further damaged an already poor harvest in 1904 and would contribute to the 
failed harvest in 1905. Russia’s economy was also in shambles as it had to readjust its 
industry for war production instead of goods and services for domestic use, further 
alienating large segments of the population. This in turn would lead to the Revolution of 
1905 in Russia and lead to dramatic changes to Russian society and governance after the 
war as Russian peasants demanded an end to the war and more freedoms (though the 
revolution had already begun during the war). Thus Russia’s shield and core had been 
stressed to its upmost, and revolution broke the core and helped end the war. Peace would 
come through the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1906. The treaty was not popular with either 
side, and Japan felt cheated. Japan would later annex Korea in 1910, and slowly gain 
influence over Manchuria.27 Russia gave up Korea and Manchuria in order to deal with 
its own domestic revolution, but thanks to the treaty did not have to pay an indemnity to 
Japan which an almost bankrupt Japan had demanded. Therefore, Japan is coded as 
winning the war and Russia as losing the war, even if the participants did not receive all 
they had wanted. 
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VII. Hypothesis Outcomes 
The following hypotheses were put forth in the preceding theory chapter and are 
tested qualitatively here: 
H𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒  = States with stronger Cores and Shields, who are able to defend them while 
defeating the enemy’s Shield and/or damaging the enemy’s Core will be more likely to 
win wars. 
Evidence for Hypothesis (Core): In this war there were not any direct attacks 
upon each other’s core. Russia was unable to attack Japan directly (via blockade or 
invasion), and Japan fought Russia in an area far away from most of its major political, 
economic, and political centers. Thus any observations must be made through indirect 
means.  
Russia and Japan were forced to fight a much longer war than both sides had 
anticipated. Both were forced to mobilize their state’s economies and manpower to 
unprecedented levels. Japan suffered a greater number of casualties in the war, along with 
a greater proportion of casualties compared to its population then the Russians, and had 
the war gone on longer, the Russians may had been able to press to their advantage the 
significant manpower advantage they held over the Japanese, and may have eventually 
won the war. Economically the Russians were forced to spend more once the war started 
than the Japanese, spending almost double on its military than the Japanese. Furthermore 
Russia’s economy declined significantly while Japan’s stagnated due to the war.  
 Unlike the Japanese who had very strong governmental and population pillars in 
their core, the Russians did not. Both states forced their populations to suffer economic 
hardships at home in order to support the war effort. The economic hardships, along with 
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the high level of casualties and conscription of peasants, would lead to a revolution in 
Russia. High casualties, conscription, and a static economy did not lead to revolution in 
Japan. Russia’s core was stressed before the war, and the war only placed more stress 
upon it, especially when the futures of war failed to go the way Russia desired. By 
pulling more resources from the core to support its shield, Russia further weakened its 
core to the point of revolution brought about by any peasants, workers, and intelligentsia 
that did not have a share in power or have rights in governance. Therefore, going into the 
war, Japan had a much stronger core via its government and population, where Russia 
had a weak core wracked by an inefficient economy and diverse and unruly population 
and incompetent government. When the Russian government pulled resources from its 
Core, it caused the unrest with the state to grow to the point of revolution which in 
addition to defeat on the battlefield, ended willpower to further the war and its own 
defeat.  
 Therefore we find strong support for this hypothesis (and the Informal Theory of 
Inter-State War as a whole) in this case study, as Japan was able to defend its core from 
indirect attacks and safely maintain stability within its core while drawing on the core to 
provide resources to the shield. Russia was unable to maintain stability with its weakened 
core and thus its core fell apart in revolution in 1905 and helped lead to its defeat in the 
war. 
H𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠  = The greater the state’s casualties (damage to the population pillar), 
the less the likelihood of victory. 
Evidence for and against Hypothesis (Population Losses): If one was to count 
purely battle related deaths, then Japan received the larger amount of battlefield 
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casualties during the war than did the Russians, then this one case study does not support 
this hypothesis. If one adds to this number the deaths caused by to disease and famine, 
and poor supply (along with captured and paroled), the Russians lost far more people 
than did the Japanese, and this case study would support this hypothesis. The Russians 
also suffered more wounded than the Japanese. In the Russo-Japanese War, casualties 
were a factor in the calculations by both sides, though Russia had a larger population and 
felt it could afford greater losses. Therefore depending on which numbers and variables 
one uses (and historians are not in agreement to casualties… as they do not agree for 
most wars), there is evidence for and against this hypothesis. The role that casualties 
played upon the willpower of the leadership and the population to continue the war 
however cannot be in doubt, as it played a major role in public dissent against the war by 
both sides, and thus further study into this hypothesis should continue.  
H𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 = The greater the state’s economic losses (damage to the economic 
pillar), the less the likelihood of victory. 
 Evidence incomplete with current data, but suggestive for Hypothesis (Economy 
Losses): While there is no reliable data on the GDP or other production factors for Russia 
during the war (as compared to the Japanese), the war had a drain on both economies and 
governments (via loans). For Russia however, the economic situation and added taxes 
and loans to pay for the war was a major contributing factor to the 1905 Revolution as the 
Russian economy could not handle the demand for war armaments placed upon it, and 
began to collapse as workers rejected working conditions and their pay.28 Russia’s poor 
and wastefully expensive management of its economy, along with the demands for the 
                                                             
28 There were also several large mutinies within the military at the time of the revolution. 
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war material, only added to its problems of supply of its armies in the Far East. Japan was 
able to handle the stress of war upon its economy, though at great expense. The Russian 
economy could not handle the demands of the war, and it was a major factor in the 1905 
Revolution and Russia’s defeat. Even without hard economic data for Russia, there is 
some support for this hypothesis, but requires further testing. 
H𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  = The greater the state’s government cohesion, the greater chance of victory 
(as it is more resilient to stress placed upon it). 
 Evidence for Hypothesis (Governance): Japan’s government itself was highly 
cohesive, and throughout the war, and continually made decisions following a general 
plan. Japan’s government also worked well with the other elements of its core, as well as 
with its shield. The same could not be said for the Russians, who had a highly defective 
and divided core. Russia’s governance was called into question due to the 1905 
Revolution, and was forced to change its structure in response to the Revolution, limiting 
the power of the Tsar. As Russia lost the war and was weak in governance while Japan 
won the war and had strong governance and government unity, there is strong evidence 
for this hypothesis.  
H𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  = States who maintain offensive initiative will have a greater chance 
of victory. 
Evidence for Hypothesis (Offensive Initiative): The Japanese went on the 
offensive at the very start of the war, and were able to quickly overrun Korea and move 
into Manchuria. Russia was thus forced onto the defensive and attempted to stop the 
Japanese offensives on several occasions, all of which failed, allowing the Japanese to 
continue the offensive and forcing the Russians to fight when the Japanese wanted to. As 
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the Japanese maintained both strategic and operational offensive initiative (through 
numerous offensive operations and actions) throughout the war all the way till the end, 
and as they won the war, there is strong evidence for this hypothesis.  
H𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑  = States that utilize ‘unrestricted war’ means of both conventional and 
unconventional warfare will have a greater chance at victory than those who solely utilize 
purely unconventional or purely conventional methods. 
Evidence incomplete for Hypothesis (Warfare Methods):  Both sides fought 
utilizing unrestricted warfare methods on the battlefield at the time, with limited war 
aims. However, both relied on primarily conventional military operations, and only relied 
on unconventional forces when their conventional forces were worn down and in rest. As 
such, this hypothesis is inconclusive due to the similarity of methods utilized in the war. 
This hypothesis is of greater need in large-n testing. 
H𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑣𝑒𝑟  𝐷𝑜𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠  = States that utilize maneuver doctrines will have a greater chance of 
victory. 
 Evidence for Hypothesis (Maneuver Doctrines): Japan throughout the war had 
very mobile field armies that consistently utilized flanking maneuvers in battle. Russia’s 
field armies and corps were slow and ponderous, and were constantly on the defensive. 
When the Russians did try to maneuver, it was normally out maneuvered by the Japanese. 
Therefore we find strong support for this hypothesis.  
H𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑠 = States that utilize mass at the point of attack on offensives will have a greater 
chance of victory (i.e. the “schwerpunkt”). 
Evidence for and against Hypothesis (Mass Doctrines): Japan and Russia both 
utilized frontal assaults, through it seemed to be a Japanese specialty. Both Japan and 
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Russia attempted to mass its forces to breakthrough enemy lines. Whenever Russia 
massed its forces, it failed to breakthrough Japanese lines, while Japan was able to either 
outflank or breakthrough Russian lines when they massed their forces. Japan seemed to 
have a much better grasp the concept of force concentration of mass, or the 
“schwerpunkt” than the Russians. However, both utilized mass in the schwerpunkt 
fashion, but Japan just was better at it, and won the war. Therefore there is mixed support 
for this hypothesis as both states utilized mass at the point of attack. and further testing its 
required, and perhaps refinement of mass for both offense and defense.  
H𝐵𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠  = The greater the losses to a state’s battlefleet, the greater the chances of 
defeat. Evidence for Hypothesis (Battlefleets): This hypothesis takes into account pure 
numbers lost during the war. Russia lost many more battleships (over 12) to Japan’s two, 
and were unable to gain command of the sea. Therefore there is evidence for this 
hypothesis.  
H𝑆𝑒𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 = States that utilize sea control doctrines will be more likely to win wars. 
 Evidence for Hypothesis (Sea Control): Japan exercised control over the sea lines 
of communication effectively, transporting all troops and supplies from the home islands 
to Korea and Manchuria with minimal losses and interference from the Russian Navy. 
The Russian Navy’s First Pacific Squadron remained a fleet-in-being, bottled up for most 
of the war in Port Arthur, under the prowling eyes of the Combined Fleet. When it 
attempted to breakout it failed. When the Second Pacific Squadron arrived in Japanese 
waters, it had no goal other than reaching Vladivostok and then “going from there.” Japan 
won the war through a mixture of blockade, prudent convoy protection, and destruction 
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of the enemy’s fleets. Therefore there is strong support for this hypothesis from this case 
study. 
H𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠 = States that utilize conservation of force strategies and operational 
art will have a greater chance of a prolonged war and defeat. 
Evidence for Hypothesis (Conservation Forces): Russia used a conservation of 
forces strategy as it attempted to build up its forces in the Far East. The Japanese 
however were continually on the offensive, and willing to take devastating losses in order 
to defeat the Russians in battle. Over the course of the campaign the Russians were 
pushed back, and lost the war. Therefore there is evidence for this hypothesis in this case 
study.  
VIII. Conclusion 
For a war fought with such vast numbers of troops, in up to then the largest battles 
of history, it was a war fought over very limited means: for control over Korea and 
Manchuria, and not the defeat and occupation of each other’s state. And it would be a war 
decided far away from the capitals of either state. There are many reasons why the 
Japanese won and the Russians lost the war, but neither was predetermined when the war 
started. In fact, Japan felt to have good reason to fear the Russian Army based on its size 
alone. But size alone is not enough to win wars, and the smaller military, who took more 
battlefield casualties, won the war.  
The Russian core was in disarray as it tried to industrialize before the war, and 
was generally dismissive of the abilities of the Japanese. When war started, they were 
caught unprepared, and in battle made a poor showing as tactically and operationally they 
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continually failed to defeat the Japanese, who were very offensive in their tactics and 
operational art.  
Russia relied on its mass to win battles, while Japan surprise and offensive action. 
Typically a defender can cause devastating casualties on an attacker, and this was true for 
this war as in most others. However, the tactics and operational art utilized by the 
Russians offset some of its advantages, and the Japanese were able to continually 
outmaneuver the Russians.  
While neither Russia nor Japan were able to directly attack each other’s core, both 
cores suffered from a prolonged war which required more and more resources and 
manpower to be taken away from the core to support their respective shields, and by the 
end of the war, both states were exhausted. However the war was of good timing for 
Japan and not for Russia. Japan could absorb high casualties with its very supportive 
population. Russia could not absorb high casualties and continual defeat, and its 
population began to revolt against the conditions it served under the aristocracy and 
bureaucracy that oppressed them. Japan won the war as it was better able to handle the 
stress placed upon its shield and core, where Russia’s shield in the Far East began to 
collapse in morale and ability after Mukden, and Russia’s core began to break down due 
to revolution, forcing the Russians to end the war. And while dreams of Russia’s empire 
in the Far East died, Japan’s dream of empire in the Far East only continued to grow, 
until its dreams were ended by the Allies in 1945.  
 
 
171 
 
United States vs. Germany- World War II 
I. Background to the War 
 The roots of World War II can be traced through the rise of the National Socialist 
German Workers Party (Nazi Party) which itself was a product of two major events: 
Germany’s defeat in World War I and the Global Economic Depression that began in 
1929. While many historians are divided on the role that the outcome of World War I had 
upon the war onset of World War II, it did have an effect. Its loss in World War I, 
coupled with the ‘Great Depression’, helped align events in Germany which allowed 
Adolf Hitler and his extreme right-wing Nazi Party gain power under the promise a new 
and better future for Germany.  
 Germany was a devastated state at the end of World War I. She had suffered over 
2.5 million dead (2 million on the battlefields), her armies on the brink of defeat when the 
armistice was signed, and her economy was in ruin due to the war, the Allied blockade, 
and reparations to the Allies. Her population was in the throes of potential revolution, 
with nationalists and communists/socialists vying for power in the streets of major cities, 
and a new liberal-democratic government under the Weimar Constitution was highly 
unstable. The Treaty of Versailles imposed tough restrictions upon Germany in order to 
prevent “German aggression” again.29  
                                                             
29  In Article 231, the “War Guilt Clause”, Germany took full and sole blame for the war and was thus 
accountable for all damage caused by the war. Part XIV of the Treaty of Versailles, which allowed for the 
Allies to take the resources of the Rhineland in compensation for several years severely hampered 
German efforts to rebuild her economy. Part V of the Treaty limited the size of the army to 100,000, 
reduced her Navy, and abolished her air force. France wanted a buffer area to impede future invasions; 
land was lost to new states Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc. Article 231 reparations that amounted to 226 
billion German Marks (almost $500 billion US dollars in 2012) to be paid to the Allies, along with giving the 
Allies a certain amount of their natural resources like iron and coal. 
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 The United States on the other hand was riding high after World War I, even with 
the effects of the Great Influenza Outbreak which killed millions of her citizens. Its 
economy was booming due to the business it had received during the war, and America 
was the wealthiest country in the world. While the French and British played down the 
role America played in the war, Americans knew they had won the war, for without them 
the Allies would have had best won a negotiated settlement instead of victory (Mosier 
2001). After the war, the US demobilized its forces, and went back to maintaining a small 
military, all while disengaging itself from the world outside of foreign trade, and enjoyed 
the good life of economic growth and stability throughout the 1920s. 
 Germany was wracked with problems in the years after the war. The German 
economy suffered hyperinflation from 1921 to 1924, causing great discontent with the 
Weimar Republic, and pushed prices to rise to unfathomable levels due to initial 
government inaction and later its poor choices. By 1923, a new German government had 
created a new currency system that helped stabilize the German economy.  
 German politics after the war was in an upheaval. There was fear amongst the 
center Liberal moderates and right wing Germans that the growing bands of armed 
communists would help bring about a Bolshevik revolution takeover. This fear forced the 
government to find support from somewhere to shore up its defenses and ensure stability 
and end the communist threat. (Keegan 1990, 27). The government in 1919 began to 
support the “Freikorps,” who were in reality made up of mostly center or right wing 
World War I veterans who helped the army fight major battles over Germany against the 
communists, and violence would continue between these groups until 1933 (Keegan 
1990, 27).   
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Many local Freikrops members in the Munich area, including one Adolf Hitler, 
joined a local nationalist party, which was then called the German Workers Party. In 
1923, the Nazi party, now headed by Hitler, attempted a coup. The now infamous ‘Beer 
Hall Putsch’ failed, and Hitler was forced into jail.30 With the collapse of the coup, the 
party suffered, and along with a stabilizing economy, forced the party in hiatus for the 
rest of the 1920s as stability returned. By the mid-1920s, “Germany had made a good 
recovery. The currency had been stabilized, credit restored, industry revitalized and 
unemployment successfully contained” (Keegan 1990, 34).  
 While things were looking up for Germany and her slowly recovering republic, 
world events would cause Germany to turn a different direction. The Great Depression 
that began in 1929 not only hit the United State particularly hard, but Germany as well. 
The depression was so vast that there was over 10% unemployment in Germany and the 
liberal government could find no means to address the problem (Keegan 1990, 34).  
 Because of this, “the parties of the extreme right and left benefited accordingly at 
the parliamentary elections called as one [social democrat] government after another 
collapsed under the pressure of events” (Keegan 1990, 34). The Nazi party stepped into 
the void of leadership left by the moderate parties, and steadily gained popularity with a 
platform of deficit budgeting to invest in public works, heavy industry, and rearmament 
of the military, of blaming Jews and other groups for the loss of WWI, and of ending the 
communist threat to Germany. It was a platform that would prove to be a winner, as the 
Nazi party won a majority of the seats in the Reichstag.31 Hitler and his party became a 
counter-weight to the growing threat of communism.  The party’s growth of power came 
                                                             
30 Where he wrote Mein Kampf- “My Struggle”- the book which helped re-launch the Nazi party and put 
forth his radical beliefs on paper and to the public. 
31 Ironically, Hitler came to power after the failed coup via freely held elections and not armed force. 
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not only by the ballot box but with its armed militias as well. This duel combination 
made it a force to be recognized with, a force that even moderate politicians were forced 
to accept and work with.32 With his growing power, Hitler was able to press his 
advantage and spread his influence to become Chancellor. But Hitler also had “luck,” due 
to the timely death of President Hindenburg in 1934, and along with an attack on the 
Reichstag, gave the Nazi party the pretext to pass the Enabling Bill which combined the 
office of the Presidency with that of the Chancellor (Keegan 1990, 35).  
 Hitler then moved to enact his party’s platform, and under the Enabling Act 
passed by the Nazi controlled Reichstag, gave Hitler dictatorial powers. Hitler began to 
replace local and state leaders of civil government and police forces with Nazi party 
members, giving Hitler complete control over the local and state governments. Hitler also 
moved to consolidate his hold over the party, and eliminated the potential threat from the 
SA, through the vicious use of the SS during the infamous “Night of the Long Knives” in 
late June and early July of 1934.33 This move effectively ended the SA as an independent 
force within the party and the rise of the SS into its position of prominence which it 
would hold until the end of the Reich. 
 Hitler furthered his control over the German state through making the military 
oath a personal oath to Adolf Hitler and not his office as Chancellor, through rearmament 
and the slow and careful rejection of elements of the Treaty of Versailles (which military 
commanders supported), and through removal of generals who did not agree with him.   
                                                             
32 Though until Hindenburg’s death, Hitler walked a fine line and avoided offending the only institution 
that could threaten his power, the Heer (Army).  
33 The Sturmabteilung (SA), known as the Storm Detachments or “Brownshirts”, and the Schutzstaffel (SS) 
known as the protection squadron. 
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 In 1936 Hitler reoccupied and militarized of the Rhineland, which received only a 
muted allied response. In 1938 an emboldened Hitler annexed Austria in the Anschluss, 
continuing his stated objective of reuniting the German people and their lands to the 
Reich. Later in the year, Hitler got the approval of Britain, France, and Italy to annex the 
Sudetenland.34 In March of 1939 Hitler would annex the rest of Czechoslovakia, which 
caused the Allies to respond by threatened Hitler not to act again, and sent France, 
Germany, and Poland rushing to rearm their militaries and signing mutual defense pacts 
out of fear of further Nazi aggression.35 The policies of appeasement that the Allies had 
pursued with Hitler in order to reduce the chances of war had backfired. Instead of 
placating Hitler, the actions of the Allied powers had served only to embolden Hitler’s 
demands for more territory.  
Hitler was not done with his demands for the return lands he deemed a part of the 
former Second Reich.36 He then sought out lands now owned by Poland along the ‘Polish 
Corridor.’ Hitler’s position was still rather complicated geo-politically in August 1939. 
Great Britain and France posed major threats to his ability to control Europe, as did the 
Soviet Union even though the Soviet Union was not allied with Great Britain or France. 
In order to secure his eastern flank in a war with Great Britain and France, Hitler sent 
envoys to the Soviet Union, which produced the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that secured 
                                                             
34 The Sudetenland was a predominately German speaking section of Czechoslovakia which geographically 
was heavily mountainous and contained most of the fortifications from which Czechoslovakia could 
defend itself from a potential German invasion. The agreement included the infamous phrase stated by 
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain that they had “peace for our time,” which was proven wrong a 
year later. 
35 Which did nothing for Czechoslovakia and it subsequently was annexed. 
36 Lands that was a part of Imperial Germany from 1871-1918. 
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Germany’s eastern border.37 On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland, which in 
turn brought France and the United Kingdom into the war.  
 In September 1939 the United States had no interest in fighting in the new 
“European War.” It had spent the last decade in the throes of the Great Depression, with 
high levels of unemployment and a collapsed national economy. The US was only slowly 
starting to get out of the depression, and in 1940 and 1941 the economy would grow, but 
only due to the supplies and armament the US was making not only for herself, but for 
other nations in the world. Ironically, it would not be Germany that would bring the US 
into the ever expanding global war, but Imperial Japan.  
II. Nazi Germany’s Core and Shield at the start of hostilities 
 Nazi Germany in 1941 was a state at war, though one not fully mobilized for total 
war.38 It was however a state built upon a composite of militant, socialist, and nationalist 
ideology, led by the Nazi Party who promoted theses virtues. German governance by the 
party was accepted by the majority of the population. In 1941, Germany was a major 
power economically, and through a large population was able to field a very large 
military. It was a state where the state controlled most aspects of society, via the Nazi 
party. The party ruled completely, having quashed internal dissent before the war. It was 
a racist regime, utilizing Jews as the scapegoats for Germany’s previous ills in war and 
peace. Using these scapegoats, Hitler was able to direct popular anger at these groups and 
strengthen his own position of power and that of the Nazi party. Germany’s core was 
strong and homogenous, which with a powerful economy and large population headed by 
                                                             
37 The Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union, which also secretly divided up 
Poland between them. 
38 That would not occur until 1943, and go into full swing in 1944 under Armaments Minister Albert Speer. 
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a dominating government was to prove to be one of the most dangerous and powerful 
regimes the world had ever seen.  
 Germany had a population that was willing to accept change under authoritative 
leadership in order to prevent the previous economic and military catastrophes from 
occurring again. Thus they were provided with some of the most generous social welfare 
programs in the world and a strong feeling of community that the Nazi party wished to 
instill in all citizens. It was a population that was willing to accept the Nazi party and its 
monopoly of political power for security, economic success, and stability. Thus the 
population pillar in Germany’s core had great potential and was strong, even if it was 
oppressed. 
 Germany’s economic pillar was in 1939 and in 1941 a very powerful force that 
had made a remarkable recovery from the Great Depression, but its success had come at a 
price and it was burdened with large amounts of government debt. Nazi Germany’s 
economic miracle of high production and low unemployment was based on two factors: 
redistribution of jobs and deficit spending by the state. Hitler wished Germany to be self-
sufficient, and cut most of its foreign trade in order to build up industries at home. The 
government went into a large amount of debt as it spent money it did not have on an arms 
buildup, on social programs, and on new industries. This all occurred because of the 
removal of the large Jewish population from the work force, allowing unemployed 
Germen men to take them. The Nazi party spent big on the economy, and by freezing 
Jewish assets and taking away their belongings, the Nazi party was able to offset some of 
the huge debt the government had accumulated.  
178 
 
Germany was also beginning to rely on slave labor to serve as a major component 
of its workforce. Its expansion in the East and West would open up new and vast amounts 
of resources that it did not have before the war. With the outbreak of war, the German 
economy was still largely geared for the civilian sector. Even though a large portion of 
the economy was already devoted to military-related production and expenditures, it was 
not on a wartime footing. It did not choose to increase taxes in order to pay for the war, 
and all policies in the newly conquered territories were based upon exploitation of them. 
Germany had an unbalanced economy, as its output was not fully devoted to ‘total war’, 
and instead was based upon exploitation of conquered states. The German economy was 
strong but with serious structural flaws.  
 Germany’s governmental pillar was the true heart of Germany in the 1930s and 
1940s, for it held the rest of the nation under its power and sway through propaganda, 
payouts, and violent means. In Nazi Germany, the party was the state, for the Nazi party 
had combined the state and the party into almost the same thing. In Germany the cult of 
personality for Hitler was fanatical. But Hitler was not naive, for he realized that power 
and authority should emanate not from his office, but from himself. To gain benefits in 
Nazi Germany, one had to be a member of the party. Only the military could claim (at 
least in the beginning) to be an outside neutral force, but between the oath to Hitler, and 
Hitler’s bribery of the generals, the military was a strong supporter of Hitler and his 
regime early on. The party was backed by a very large internal police and paramilitary 
force, the SS and its many different branches. In Nazi Germany the lines between 
domestic and foreign affairs blurred, and under Nazi ideology they became almost one, as 
seen in its rhetoric and actions for conquest (Kershaw 2000, 29-50). Germany’s 
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government was absolute and all powerful, as the party and government were one and the 
same; it was the key pillar of the German state in World War II. Surprising the party’s 
hold on power would be tested and proven during the crucible of war, where it would 
hold the state together even when the war was all but lost, and it would hold out till the 
very end.  
 Germany’s shield in 1941 was a very powerful and potent force, and from 1939 to 
1941 had broken some of the best armies in the world, to include France, and seemed to 
be doing so again in Russia. It had conquered most of Europe, and seemed to be on the 
verge of doing what it could not do in World War I, win a two front war.  While 
Germany’s shield was strong, it was engaged against too many states even before the US 
entered the war.  
 The Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces) by 1941 was in many ways a very 
modern force, but a force that was still in development and unprepared for the prolonged 
war that if found itself involved in. Germany had reintroduced conscription in October 
1935, and along with announcing the formal creation of the Wehrmacht, under the 
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), began to ignore the restrictions on military 
armaments and size from the Treaty of Versailles.39  
The German Heer (Army) was initially restricted to 100,000 personnel after the 
Treaty in 1919. After 1935, the Heer began to grow in size. By 1941 the German Heer 
was so vast that it was composed of several Army Groups (of almost 2.5 million in size, 
with 3,000+ tanks, and in over 160 infantry and 20 Panzer (tank) divisions) for its 
Russian campaign alone, along with several armies stationed in Africa, France, Italy, 
Poland, Norway, and the Balkans (Will 2006). The German Heer operationally preferred 
                                                             
39 OKW was the ‘Supreme Command of the Armed Forces’, which was headed by Adolf Hitler himself. 
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large sweeping movements that led to encirclement, utilizing panzers and tactical air 
attacks to breakthrough enemy lines, followed by infantry which would cut into the 
enemy rear and encircle the enemy and either capture or destroy them (Citino 2005, 293). 
While the German army seemed highly mechanized (with having some of the best tanks 
and infantry fighting vehicles of the war), they did not have the supplies and resources to 
enact it, and most divisions relied on horses and donkeys to move their supplies, and 
most soldiers moved on foot. The German army was very strong, and could rely on vast 
pools of manpower. Its coordination with the German Luftwaffe (Air Force) made for a 
combined operations force that was unbeatable in the early phases of World War II.  
The Luftwaffe in World War II was a service that was highly regarded, but still 
relatively new. Because of the treaty ending WWI, German was forced to abandon her 
large air force that she had created during the war. During the inter-war period German 
aviation centered on civilian aircraft (or warplanes masquerading as civilian aircraft) and 
working with foreign nations in order to train pilots. By 1941 the Luftwaffe was 
producing over 12,000 aircraft a year of all types. The Germans would create some of the 
best fighter planes in the world at the time, and some excellent dive and light/medium 
bombers. Luftwaffe doctrine for operational art and tactics was centered on gaining air 
superiority over the front which would allow for ground attack and interdiction of enemy 
ground forces in support of the Heer (Weigley 1973, 336). As such German air 
transportation was small, and German strategic bombing abilities were nonexistent. 
Germany’s strength lay in its fighters and its support of its ground forces.  
The Kriegsmarine (Navy) was the weakest of the three main branches of the 
Wehrmacht. A building plan had been created by the Wehrmacht for a fleet of massive 
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size to be ready by 1946 to take on the Royal Navy, but in 1939 this plan was nowhere 
near ready. She only had a handful of modern battleships, cruisers, destroyers, 
minesweepers/minelayers, and submarines (U-boats) to use against an enemy. Hitler’s 
admirals knew they could not compete at sea with the great naval powers (i.e. the US and 
UK) in a traditional sense, and relied on commerce raiding and unrestricted submarine 
warfare as their primary means of fighting. Additionally, Hitler’s fear of losing capital 
ships meant that they were used rarely and its surface fleet acted as a “fleet-in-being” 
(Gray 1999, 126-127). Thus the Kriegsmarine would enact a similar strategy at sea as it 
had in the First World War, unrestricted undersea warfare and commerce raiding. 
Operating outside of the Wehrmacht was the feared SS.40 The SS also had 
evolved from an armed wing of the party to the national police and counter-intelligence 
force, along with its own armed forces (the Waffen-SS) that consisted of several corps 
and divisions (to include armored ‘panzer’ divisions) sized formations that received the 
best equipment and training in Germany. The SS served several roles: as both an elite 
strike force in combat, as a guardian of the morale and discipline of the Wehrmacht, and 
as guardian of the party and state as a whole. For internal security, the SS was ruthless 
and highly efficient at quashing internal discontent.41 They were brutally efficient, 
violent, and feared.   
 Officer and enlisted training on a whole was rather quite good, with many 
historians viewing the German solider as one of the best trained and most efficient 
                                                             
40 The Waffen-SS served tactically and operationally under the Wehrmacht at times, but was outside the 
military’s control beyond battlefield use. 
41 The SS internal security forces included the Waffen-SS (armed wing- field army), Reich Main Security 
Office [which ran the Sicherheistdienst (SD), Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo), and Kriminalpolizei 
(Kripo)], and numerous other offices, corps, and groups (like the offices that ran education, race and 
settlement, and concentration camps) 
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fighters in history (Hastings 2004, 91-92). Enlisted personnel were excellent fighters. 
Officers were a mixed bunch, with many considered highly professional and brilliant on 
the battlefield, but many were indoctrinated under the Nazi spell, which turned a blind 
eye (if not active participation) to atrocities carried out against civilians and combatants 
alike, making them morally corrupted.  
Germany’s shield in 1941, despite setbacks on the Russian Front, was a 
formidable force, and if utilized properly could bring about victory in a war. Yet glaring 
weaknesses in production, strategy, doctrine, logistics, and a growing fear of the SS’s 
role security affairs were serious faults within the shield. The shield by 1941 had proven 
effective thus far. While it had failed to finish off the Soviets, it had inflicted 
unbelievable damage to the Red Army in the early months of the war to the point where 
Germans were convinced that victory would occur in the summer of 1942, and that 
ultimately the United States posed no threat to the Reich.  
III. United States’ Core and Shield at the start of hostilities 
 The United States in 1939 and in 1941, it was a functioning democratic republic. 
The population pillar was a diverse mixture of races, ethnicities, and nationalities that 
(more or less) accepted each other and interacted with each other at various different 
levels and in different ways. While not all citizens were treated fairly by others (or under 
the law), the population was loyal to the government and supported its rule if not its 
polices. 
The economic pillar, while damaged and under restructuring due to the effects of 
the Great Depression, was a viable open market capitalist-based economy. With slowly 
shrinking unemployment (from its high in the middle and late 1930s), a growing 
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manufacturing base, and large pool of workers, the US economy was still one of the most 
powerful in the world, and full of great potential despite the effects of the Great 
Depression (Herman 2012). Its economic model of restricted capitalism was still viewed 
as legitimate by both the population and government. 
The governmental pillar was backed by popular support for the people, who did 
not question its foundations, only the methods and ideologies that operated under that 
foundation. That foundation, the Constitution and its associated laws, saw a federal form 
of government operate with board popular support that utilized a separation of powers 
between not only the federal branches of government, but between the federal, state, and 
local governments as well. The government demanded from its population and economy 
resources which came in the form of participation, taxation, and physical service or goods 
(if and when required). In return for these services, the government provided services to 
the people in the form of direct goods and services, promotion of various interests at 
home and aboard, measures to promote economic growth, and most importantly for this 
study, protection via national defense. Citizens and corporations acquiesced to the 
demands of the government because the government in return responded to their demands 
as well. Because these effective trade-offs were acceptable to the citizens, the citizens 
continued to hold faith in the legitimacy of its institutions.  
In response to the events of 1939, the US had undertaken dramatic changes to all 
aspects of its shield. Utilizing the various elements of national power, the US began to 
diplomatically and economically pressure Germany and Japan to pursue different policies 
other than war, which eventually failed. United States blocked trade with Germany and 
Italy in 1940, all while finding ways to help supply Great Britain and the Soviet Union in 
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1941 (via Lend-Lease Act, etc.). Germany also was under military pressure through the 
creation of ‘Neutrality Patrols,’ where the US Navy and Coast Guard defended convoys 
transiting from the US to Iceland, and created a large zone in which belligerent powers 
could not operate (most of the north-western Atlantic Ocean area) without the threat of 
attack by the US. As such, the US mainly targeted Axis interests and naval assets while 
overlooking and actively supporting the interests of the Allies. 
 The United States had also begun to beef up its intelligence agencies. It created 
the “Coordinator of Information,” which was the early version of the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS), an agency that would perform both intelligence gathering and covert 
operations throughout the war in all theaters of war.42  
 The Armed Forces of the United States had seen a dramatic expansion since 1939. 
New designs of aircraft were beginning to be produced in greater and greater numbers. 
New warships from carriers, battleships, and cruisers all the way down to small landing 
craft of every type were in construction at naval dockyards in ever growing numbers.  
In spite of all of its preparations, the US was still woefully unprepared for the war 
ahead. While the Navy had a number of modern battleships being designed and under 
construction, its fleets still consisted of older WWI era battleships (Hone and Hone 2006, 
172). The US also had a large fleet of the new and improved Essex-class carriers under 
construction but few carriers in commission (Weigley 1973, 283). The US Navy and 
Merchant Marine were unprepared to maintain and operate the convoys required to 
transport the vast logistical requirement or personnel for the various fleets, air forces, and 
Army and Marine divisions required for the several campaigns all around the globe, nor 
supply its future allies. It did not have the capabilities or forces necessary to protect those 
                                                             
42 The OSS would eventually form the core of what became in 1947 the US Central Intelligence Agency. 
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convoys from a concerted submarine offensive against it. It had nowhere near the 
supplies and armor necessary to equip army sized formations, nor the landing craft 
necessary to put them ashore. Additionally its army air force was nowhere near equipped 
to launch sustained strategic bombing campaigns in any theater of war, nor the 
interceptors to protect those bombers. It also did not have the quantity of aircraft for 
conducting air superiority, ground support, interdiction, reconnaissance, etc. that ground 
commanders would demand for their campaigns. The public’s isolationist tendencies and 
philosophies were hard to change, and this was reflected in the dramatic, uneven, and 
slow buildup of its shield from 1939 to 1941. The US Army in 1939 ranked 17th in the 
size of its army behind Romania, and could barely field 5 divisions compared to the 136 
German divisions involved in the invasion of France (Atkinson 2002, 8).43 
In 1941 the United States was quite the “sleeping giant,” full of potential with 
vast manpower reserves (larger than Germany’s by over 40 million), a recovering 
economy that was re-tooling itself for war and a government that was highly regarded 
and effective. The shield of the US was in rapid (and somewhat haphazard) 
transformation. All of the armed services were expanding rapidly, testing new 
technologies, and creating the necessary supply lines and organizations necessary for war 
on a vast magnitude unseen in human history. It was however still woefully unprepared 
for war, and it would take great effort on the part of the US to take its vast potential and 
turn it into a fighting force that would fight globally while supporting its allies and defeat 
two major powers that were on opposite sides of the world from each other. 
 
                                                             
43 It should be noted that American divisions have traditionally been 2 to 3 times larger than most other 
states’ divisions were in size, and continue to be so to this day. 
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IV. Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the War before America Entered 
 While the Allies Powers of the United States are not the focus of this dyadic war, 
World War II would be incomplete without briefly mentioning the capabilities America’s 
allies. 
 The United Kingdom (along with its vast Commonwealth) was the ally of allies to 
the United States, and after war began, the US and Britain would combine their nations’ 
war efforts in a way unseen before in history. The British Imperial General Staff and US 
Joint Chiefs of Staff combined to create the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and coordinated 
the strategy of both states to the point where they were true partners (Weigley 1973, 318). 
When the US entered the war, the British were the senior partner, and this effected 
strategy early in the war, and in particular Churchill’s fascination with campaigns in the 
Mediterranean Theater.  
 Britain was an empire in decline. Its manpower and national confidence were 
damaged by the events of World War I, and in World War II it had been pushed to the 
brink of defeat numerous times. Furthermore, Britain was running out of manpower for a 
global war, and became highly cautious and conservative in its thinking and actions 
because of this. While it had very large armies in the field, and one of the finest navies 
and air forces (second only to the US by 1944), it was a force greatly supplied by the US. 
By 1944 and the launching of Overlord, and the predominance of US forces in not only 
the European Theater, but in the Pacific, the US would become the senior partner in the 
alliance, something Britain greatly resented.  
 The Soviet Union was the other major ally of the US in the fight against Nazi 
Germany, though as trusted by the US as Britain was to become. The Soviet Union was a 
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weakened stated because of the rule of Joseph Stalin and the Communist Party. In late 
1941, it appeared all was lost after the German invasion, but the Soviet Union, with its 
immense territorial size and enormous manpower reserves was able to hold on and 
eventually stop the German onslaught.  
 Throughout the war the Soviet Union would be engaged with the majority of 
formations within the German Heer, while the Western powers dealt with the rest of the 
German Heer, and the entirety of the German Kriegsmarine and majority of the 
Luftwaffe. The Soviets fought with a ferocity against the enemy (and that ferocity was 
reciprocated) unseen in any other fronts in World War II (except for some instances in 
the Chinese and Pacific Theaters). Losses were enormous, and the Soviets and Germans 
both fought till the death in many battles, and both fought in many ways stupidly.44 
Without US supplies and the destruction of the Luftwaffe by the US, the Soviet Red 
Army would never had been able to push back the Wehrmacht out of Russia as swiftly as 
it did. This should not detract from the fact that the majority of German Heer units were 
engaged against the Red Army, nor the bravery of Soviet service members. For without 
the Red Army the US would have had a much more difficult war. The same does holds 
true for the Soviet Union, for without the US, the Soviet Union would have lost the war. 
While not to downplay the incredible feats of the Wehrmacht during the first 
years of the war, it is not the major element of this case study. Suffice to say, the 
Wehrmacht again and again surprised the world by massing its forces in a critical 
location, launching massive attacks, and breaking through enemy lines which allowed 
them to drive deep into the rear of their enemies, which forced their enemies to either 
                                                             
44 Soviet Red Army tactics were not very advanced and dependent on mass of manpower and firepower 
which cost them a great many lives in failed assaults, but its operational art by 1944 was very impressive. 
188 
 
retreat or be surrounded and destroyed. This occurred time and time again in Poland, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, France, the Balkans, Crete, and at times in the see-saw 
battles of North Africa. Before June 1941, only one country stood in the way of Hitler: 
Great Britain. Britain had been able to extricate her Expeditionary Forces from the 
disaster in France, and fought on along at sea, and in the air, and in North Africa. While 
Britain expended itself halting Nazi aggression, it could hardly defeat Hitler on its own, 
and was in desperate need of America, who it began to court the United States in an effort 
to buy arms and eventually bring America in to the war.  
In June 1941 however, Germany would launch the largest operation in history, but 
would find that unlike other enemies, the Soviet Union would not fall easily. The first 
days of Operation Barbarossa were brilliant tactically and operationally for the Germans, 
who utilized deep penetration operations to encircle and destroy entire Soviet Fronts 
(Army Groups) and Armies, and advanced over a huge swath of the Soviet Union. By 
November of 1941 they were on the doorstep to Leningrad and Moscow. It appeared that 
the Soviet Union was on the verge of collapse. The arrival of winter however changed all 
that. The Germans were unprepared for winter operations, with its soldiers not having 
proper equipment for winter operations, nor their tanks and planes the right lubricants. 
The Germans made one last attempt to take Moscow in the middle of November when 
the ground froze, but failed. Germany was too weak now to take Moscow, Leningrad, or 
the Caucasus before the spring 1942.  
VI. The United States enters the war 
 A series of disputes between the US and Japan over Japan’s ongoing war with 
China and Japan’s militant policies in general had led the US to use political, economic, 
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and military pressure to end the conflict and its militant policies.  The strategy backfired, 
and it led the Japanese to go to war against the United States as it felt the American peace 
proposal was a worse outcome than risking defeat in war. On December 7, 1941 the 
Japanese launched a coordinated offensive against the US, Great Britain, the Netherlands, 
Australia, Burma, and the Philippines. The opening act of offensive operations was the 
Japanese Combined Fleet’s attack on the US Pacific Fleet and against military 
installations in and around Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 
 The shock of the attacks against the US overwhelmed the weakened defenses the 
US held in the Pacific. But initially the US was only at war with the Empire of Japan. 
Adolf Hitler however felt that the United States would eventually go to war with 
Germany. Thus far the policy of appeasement that Germany utilized towards the US had 
failed, as US Neutrality Patrols and arming of Britain and Soviet Union were harming the 
German war effort. Seeking to gain an advantage over the British and Soviets, Hitler 
decided to go to war with the US in the hope of helping his efforts against the Soviet 
Union. Thus, Hitler honored his alliance under the Axis Tripartite Pact with Japan and 
declared war on the United States on December 11, and began unrestricted submarine 
warfare against the US.  
 The US was woefully still unprepared for war, but as it was now at war could 
completely devote its significant resources to the effort. The US expanded its draft of 
men, expanded production orders to US companies, restricted elements of the economy to 
support the war effort, allowed women into the workforce to help offset the loss of men 
in the economy, created the Victory Program for managing War Department 
requirements, and raised taxes and bonds to pay for the war effort (Weigley 1973, 316-
190 
 
317). All of this would prove decisive down the road for the US, but for the first year of 
the war, the US had to utilize mainly what it had on hand in 1941.  
 American military leadership had a “simple” plan for winning the war against 
Germany. Build up the armed forces, land their troops in Europe, and drive their forces to 
take Berlin and occupy all of Germany (Weigley, 1973, 312-359). It was a direct strategy, 
meant to avoid the errors perceived after World War I, where partial occupation was seen 
as a failure, as was the failure to completely destroy the enemy’s will and ability to fight. 
Throughout 1942 the US Joint Chiefs continually pushed for an invasion in France in 
1942, but the British disagreed with the plan, and wanted instead to conduct future 
operations in the Mediterranean Theater of War, which US commanders felt would allow 
them after the war further British interests in the region. US strategy was based on the 
“strategic tradition often linked to Ulysses S. Grant in the Civil War. The surest route to 
victory was to obliterate the enemy’s army and destroy his capacity to make war. As the 
world’s greatest industrial power, with a military expanding to 12 million men, the 
United States could do that- particularly now that the nation belonged to the powerful 
alliance [of the Allies]” (Atkinson 2002, 11). However, FDR overruled his military 
advisors and sought unity with the British, and approved of operations to be conducted 
not in France for 1942 or 1943, but in the Mediterranean as the British desired (Weigley 
1973, 318-333).  
VII. Battle of the North Atlantic and the North African and Italian Campaigns 
 The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest campaign of the war. It started in 1939 
with the Royal Navy’s blockade of Germany, which prompted the Kriegsmarine to 
respond with its own blockade of Britain with the use of surface commerce raiders, 
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bombers, and mainly Unterseeboots (U-boats, or submarines). Thus the Battle of the 
Atlantic was a battle of the German U-boat versus the convoys and their escorts (both 
surface ships and aircraft) as the Germans attempted to cut off supplies to Britain and 
knock her out of the war (Keegan 1989, 105-106).  
 The campaign would last until the end of the war, and the threat of German U-
boat attack was a constant threat to Allied navies and their merchant marines. At the start 
of the war the US had neither their ships or aircraft to fully implement a proper convoy 
system for convoys along the US coast, in the Atlantic, and the rest of the world, and 
Germany took advantage of this. The lack of escorts, particularly along the American 
coastline (as most were directed for use in hunter-killer groups or defense of trans-
Atlantic convoys), and lead to heavy losses early on.  
 By August 1942, the US Navy finally began to have the resources to fully 
implement proper convoy protection schemes for most of its convoys. This prompted the 
Kreigsmarine to shift operations to the central Atlantic, where the Allies had limited air 
cover due lack of aircraft available at the time. Massive, weeks long battles occurred for 
the next several months where U-boat “wolf packs” (squadrons of five to twenty U-boats) 
would attack the convoys and their escorts, which lead to heavy losses in Allied shipping 
and much distress amongst the Allied high command. Thanks to technological advances 
in ASDIC (sonar), anti-submarine weaponry, the breaking of the German Enigma code, 
long range air patrols in bombers with radar, and a vast new fleet of escort ships (new 
escort carriers and destroyer escorts) and new merchant ships (the cheap Liberty ships), 
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the U-boat threat began to diminish after May 1943 (“Black May”) (Keegan 1989, 115-
120).45  
During March and April of 1943, large battles against several convoys seemed to 
threaten the lifelines to Britain and Africa, with the allies losing almost 100 merchant 
ships. But in May everything changed, as America’s mass production and technology 
finally caught up to the Kreigsmarine who lost 43 U-boats total, compared to 58 Allied 
vessels and forced the Kreigsmarine to suspend U-boat operations (Keegan 1989, 115-
120). After May 1944, the U-boat threat existed, but was greatly reduced. America and 
her allies now had command of the seas in the Atlantic Ocean and in the Mediterranean. 
The Battle of the Atlantic was effectively over, and Germany had lost. The war would 
now be decided on land. 
 As the British were finally pushing Rommel back from Egypt, a combined Anglo-
American force under General Dwight D. Eisenhower launched Operation Torch, which 
landed in three places along Vichy French North Africa on November 8, 1942. As the 
American proposed invasion of France was impractical in 1942, President Roosevelt had 
directed the US JCS to follow the wishes of British, as it would allow for US troops to 
actively engage German forces (Weigley 1973, 320-322). The operation’s goal was to 
bring Vichy French forces to the side of the Allies, bring up a force into the rear of 
Rommel and finish him and his Army Group off, and free North Africa of Axis influence 
and allow for further operations in the Mediterranean Theater.  
                                                             
45 Enigma was a electromechanical rotary cipher machine that Germany utilized to communicate with its 
units’, the Army used a three rotor machine, the Navy a 4 rotor. The Allies named the breaking of the 
code as Ultra through the diligent work of code breakers who use of capture machines and codes, brute 
force math, and new computers.  
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Operation Torch was a success despite several problems that occurred during and 
after the invasion, and eventually Vichy French forces either surrendered or joined the 
Allied forces.  
Measured by the proportions of the later war- of Normandy or the Bulge- the 
first engagements in North Africa were tiny, skirmishes between platoons and 
companies involving at most a few hundred men. Within six months, the 
campaign metastasized to battles between army groups comprising hundreds of 
thousands of soldiers; that scale persisted for the duration [of the war]. North 
Africa gave the European war its immense canvas and implied- through 70,000 
Allied killed, wounded, and missing, the casualties to come. No large operation 
in World War II surpassed the invasion of North Africa in complexity, daring, 
risk, or- as the official US Army Air Forces history concludes- “the degree of 
strategic surprise achieved.” Moreover, this was the first campaign undertaken 
by the Anglo-American alliance; North Africa defined the coalition and its 
strategic course, prescribing how and where the Allies would fight for the rest of 
the war (Atkinson 2002, 3). 
 In North Africa, the US Army, Army Air Forces, and amphibious Navy learned 
important lessons, and became a true fighting force. The war in North Africa, along with 
the defeat and capture of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad in January of 1943 by the 
Red Army had turned the tide against the Third Reich. Operation Torch and the war in 
North Africa had produced a great first victory of the US, and the capture of over 230,000 
Axis troops was a significant blow to the Axis, but the war was far from over.  
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After the securing of North Africa, the Allies lunched Operation Husky in July 
1943, the invasion of Sicily by the US Seventh and British Eighth Armies. The Allies 
feigned attacks against Corsica and Greece, but landed in Sicily as it was the closet 
option of the three. After a short campaign, Sicily was secured, though infighting 
between the American Seventh Army commander (General Patton) and British Eighth 
Army commander (General Montgomery) allowed for the elite German panzer units on 
the island to escape.  
Operation Husky was followed up by Operation Baytown, the British landings 
across from Sicily along the ‘toe’ of Italy, which produced the surrender of Axis Italy, 
and its subsequent occupation by Germany. Operations in Italy were the main show for 
the US and Britain in 1943, but already forces were being shifted to build up for 
Operation Overlord, the invasion of France. The US Fifth Army then landed along the 
Italian western coast near Salerno in Operation Avalanche (September 9, 1943). The 
operation was a close run event, and the Germans almost succeeded in pushing the 
Americans off the beachhead due to its swift armored counterattack. However, the US 
held on, and later met up with the British Eighth Army moving up the ‘toe’ to Salerno. 
Shortly after this, General Eisenhower was transferred from Supreme Command in the 
Mediterranean to Supreme Commander for Overlord in England.  
The terrain of Central Italy was heavily mountainous, making for an excellent 
defensive position. The ‘Winter Line’ or ‘Gustav Line’ stemmed the Allied advance up 
Italy short of Rome from October 1943 to June 1944. By this time however, Italy became 
a secondary front to Allied strategy, as the buildup for an invasion in Northern France 
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became the priority, along with the air war that was being conducted against Germany.46 
Germany on the other hand had only one strategic objective, survival from an 
overwhelming coalition of enemies bent on her destruction. 
VIII. The Air War, the Campaign in France, and Ending the Third Reich 
 The air war against Germany was full of promises of easy success by Allied air 
commanders, but in fact it was hardly easy and turned into a long, drawn out war of 
proportional attrition between the Allies (mainly Britain and the US) against Germans, 
where the Allies were able to eventually overwhelm the Germans in the air. US air 
theorists believed that strategic bombing could shorten the war and forsake the need for 
ground troops (Weigley 1973, 334-335). US strategic bombers would be able to bomb 
Germany’s war industries and supply lines into oblivion and if necessary cause terror 
attacks which would cause the government and population to give up hope and end the 
war.  
 The air war against Germany did not go as planned. The strategic bombing 
campaign of the US Eighth Air Force did not start of well, and the bombers of the Eighth 
Air Force were ravaged in their deep penetration missions into Germany as the Luftwaffe 
was able to attack the unprotected bombers.47 As such, bombers were restricted to 
attacking locations that were under the protection of US fighters, which severely limited 
their range of targets. At night British bombers conducted bombing runs which were even 
                                                             
46 Note: throughout 1943, the Soviets launched a series of offensives, and slowly pushed back the 
Germans. Germany attempted to regain the offensive with Operation Citadel: Battle of Kursk- which 
involved the largest tank battle in history- and failed. For the rest of the war, the Soviet Red Army would 
be on the offensive, and would slowly ground down the Heer via firepower and attrition. The Heer 
deployed over 60% of its strength at all times to the Eastern Front in order to combat the continual 
offensives of the Red Army. 
47 Unprotected bombers as in having limited to no fighter cover during deep penetration missions into 
Germany. 
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more inaccurate than US day-light bombing, whose sole intent was to terrorize and kill 
Germans (Weigley 1973, 338-340).   
 By early 1944 US strategic bombing served two purposes. First it was to support 
preparations for the Allied landings in northern France. Second was to destroy the 
Luftwaffe. US air commanders realized that until the Luftwaffe was neutralized as an 
effective fighting force, strategic bombing would not work, nor could the Allies invade 
France without air superiority. US commanders were forced to take a dramatic change in 
tactics and strategy in order to win air superiority before the upcoming invasion (Weigley 
1973, 34343). New planes and technologies (having new fighters such as the P-51 
Mustang and expendable fuel pods) gave US commanders a chance to complete their 
objectives (Weigley 1973, 342). US bomber formations were no longer the main weapon 
to be used against targets in Germany, but were now bait for Luftwaffe fighters, with the 
hope that new fighters would be able to destroy the Luftwaffe’s fighters. This cynical and 
coldly calculated plan worked and by May 1944 the Luftwaffe had been shattered, giving 
the Allies air superiority for the invasion. Further, US and British tactical air was of 
immense importance to helping ground units during the ground campaign by attacking 
enemy formations and interdicting their movement during daytime, allowing Allied 
ground forces to advance.  
 After the invasion US bombers resumed their attacks against German 
infrastructure and industrial production facilities. This offensive proved not to be as 
effective as hoped, and with fewer and fewer targets in the open as the Germans had 
shifted their industrial production to underground facilities or dispersed them, the US 
began to target Germany’s oil production and transportation network, which had 
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dramatically negative effects upon the German Wehrmacht’s ability to maneuver its 
forces. After the war, the US Strategic Bombing Survey would find that it was the 
combination of destruction of the Luftwaffe’s fighters in 1944 and the bombing of 
Germany’s oil production and supply lines that had the greatest effect upon the enemy, 
and that their methods were truly decisive in shortening the war because of its support of 
ground forces (Weigley 1973, 357-358).  
 While the bulk of the German Heer was getting chewed up on the Eastern Front, 
the Western Allies were preparing for a massive offensive of their own during the spring 
of 1944. The Italian front had become a side show, and resources there were just enough 
to keep down German forces in the area and drain them away from the Eastern and 
Western fronts. The Germans maintained a large force in Norway and in France, spread 
out along the coast and deep in the interior for counter-attacks. Germany’s hope was to 
repel the invaders on the beaches, but barring that, delay them until reinforcements could 
launch a counter-attack and push them back into the sea before their lodgment was too 
strong to push back. The Germans were strategically on the defensive until they could 
launch an operational offensive to defeat the upcoming Anglo-American invasion. This 
would all have to be done without air cover or naval support. 
 The Germans had several possible sites for an Allied invasion in mind, but they 
mainly revolved around two areas: the Pas-de-Calais and Normandy. The Pas-de-Calais 
was the most heavily defended piece of real estate in Europe, as it was the shortest 
distance between Britain and France. Normandy had beaches similar to Pas-de-Calais, 
but was less heavily defended. It was also further away for the ships and aircraft 
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supporting the invasion to travel than Calais, and because of this Germany believed that 
the Allies would land at Calais (Weigley 1973, 345).  
 The Allies worked hard to maintain the perception that Calais was the primary 
invasion location, and through Operation Bodyguard, the Allies enacted one of the most 
complex, comprehensive, and successful deception operations in history. The Germans 
were convinced that US Lieutenant General George S. Patton would lead the invasion at 
the Pas-de-Calais with his (fake) First US Army Group, while any landings at Normandy 
would be a diversion (McManus, 2004a). This, along with poor weather and other 
deception operations, helped the Allies deceive the Germans to where Operation 
Overlord would take place, thus confusing their ability to respond. 
 Operation Overlord was the overall name for the Allied invasion of Normandy. 
This operation was evidence of America’s primacy in strategy and as the senior partner in 
the war effort. While Britain would certainly be providing the majority of naval forces, 
the US Navy was heavily involved in the operation, for without it the invasion of this 
magnitude could not have occurred. Further, US airpower played the predominant role 
during the campaign, and while many of the main commanders were British, the Supreme 
Allied Commander was an American.  It was a massive undertaking, involving the 
landing of nine infantry and airborne divisions into the Normandy area during the assault 
phase of the invasion along five beaches codenamed Sword, Juno, Gold, Omaha, and 
Utah (McManus, 2004a). It would be followed up with many more divisions in the weeks 
and months afterwards. While the invasion did not meet its initial objectives, by the end 
of D-Day (the day of the landing), the Allies had a lodgment along the coast with over 
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150,000 troops ashore. Over the next few weeks more and more troops would and slowly 
expand the beachhead.  
 By mid to late July, the Allies had been slogging their way out of Normandy. The 
terrain of hedgerows and rivers along with the heavy concentration of German forces had 
slowed the allied advance to a crawl, and many feared that a stalemate would occur. The 
Allies were forced to fight over easily defended terrain in head on attacks. British 
offensive operations in and around the city of Caen (Perch, Epsom, Charnwood, 
Goodwood, and Spring) all had failed to breakthrough German lines and caused a great 
many Canadian and British casualties (McManus, 2004b). An unintended effect of the 
failed British offensives was the concentration of German forces around the British along 
the Allies left flank.48 This weakening of the German line on the right allowed the US 
First and Third Armies under Bradley and Patton an opening to exploit, which it did on 
25 July 1944 in Operation Cobra.  
 The Americans were able to mass their forces for break through the German lines, 
and elements of the US First and Third Armies drove hard (via maneuver) into the 
German rear areas. A German counter-attack at Mortain failed to contain the offensive, 
and the Germans were forced into a retreat. Eventually a major portion of the German 
forces in the West were trapped in the area near Falaise and Chambois. Known as the 
‘Falaise Pocket’ or ‘Falaise Gap’, German resistance crumbled (McManus, 2004b).49 
This, along with Patton’s Third Army advances across the Seine River and the Allied 
landings in Southern France via Operation Dragoon forced the Germans to retreat to the 
                                                             
48 Field Marshal Montgomery later claimed this was his plan all along, something that is not true, even if 
he adapted his plans throughout the campaign (Keegan 1989, 392-393). 
49 Although a major portion of the German Heer in the West were able to escape, they did so without 
their heavy weaponry or armor, and it was none-the-less a major Allied victory and an end to German 
control over France. 
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fortifications along the Franco-German border (Weigley 1973, 346-347). By the end of 
August 1944 most of France (including Paris) and small portions of Belgium had been 
liberated, and to many it seemed as if the war was going to be over soon. Thus far the 
campaign in Western Europe had turned from one of slow stalemate in the Normandy 
area to a massive breakout of a vast scale. Allied (and mainly American) preponderance 
of material and forces was critical, as it allowed them to maneuver and exploit holes in 
German lines. Further, while the inferior Sherman tank could not always defeat a German 
panzer head on, the Americans had so many tanks compared to Germany that the US 
simply out massed and out maneuvered the Germans at every turn. They had air 
superiority over the battlefield, forcing the Germans to maneuver at night to avoid air 
attack.  
American artillery was the outstanding branch of the war for the American army, 
with the ability to coordinate firepower in such a fast and effective manner that the 
Germans feared it. American units were not only well supplied, but over supplied in 
necessary material. American divisions were completely mechanized and all contained 
some armor for infantry support. Even if the Germans were truly better man for man 
compared to the Americans, in the larger picture it did not matter, for the Americans use 
of everything to include manpower simply was overwhelming the Germans and their use 
of firepower and maneuver over manpower was something the Germans could not stop. 
 For Germany, the summer of 1944 had been a disaster. At sea they could no 
longer pose a credible threat to the Allied navies. In the air their fighter force had been 
decimated, and Allied strategic bombing was taking its toll on war production and 
morale. In the Mediterranean Theater, Rome and all of Italy below Florence had fallen to 
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the Anglo-American armies. On the Eastern Front, Germany was forced to weaken its 
forces to support the effort in the West, which the Soviets exploited in Operation 
Bagration and destroyed the bulk of German Army Group Center. It cost Germany over 
400,000 casualties and the Soviets were now advancing into Poland, the Baltic states, and 
the Balkans. In the West, France had fallen, and the Anglo-American armies were along 
the German border following Eisenhower’s ‘Broad Front’ offensive strategy.50 
Germany’s units were simply running out of trained (and untrained) manpower. Losses 
had been so great that the average size of a division shrank throughout the war. 
Production was slowly increasing but it was not enough to stem the tide of the Allies 
preponderance of weaponry and supplies. 
 Ending the war by Christmas 1944 would not to happen. Both in the east and in 
the west the Allies were plagued with supply problems, for the Allies had advanced 
beyond their supply forces’ abilities to resupply them at the time. US General 
Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Western France, 
was presented with two planned offensives in September 1944, but only enough supplies 
to enact one of them which temporarily ended his use of the ‘Broad Front’ offensive 
strategy for a ‘Narrow Front’ offensive strategy. One was for the US Third Army 
(supported by the First Army) under General Patton to race for the Upper Rhine River in 
the south of Germany and gain a foothold over the river and into Germany. The second 
was presented by Field Marshal Montgomery, which was to land paratroopers along a 
corridor, and for them to capture bridges in Holland while the British XXX Corps would 
race up the highway and secure the bridges, creating a bridgehead over the Lower Rhine 
                                                             
50 The Broad Front strategy meant that all allied armies were advancing along the front simultaneously, as 
compared to a narrow front where only one army would attack at a time. 
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River in North-Western Germany.51  Under political pressure, Eisenhower sided with the 
British Montgomery over Patton’s plan, and Operation Market Garden commenced on 17 
September.52 
 Operation Market-Garden was a major failure, as it failed to take the bridge over 
the Lower Rhine at Arnhem and saw the British 1st Airborne Division destroyed in battle 
against German SS Panzer divisions in Arnhem. After Market-Garden, the Allies settled 
down into small offensives along the border, slowly gaining ground but taking losses, all 
while building up supplies for an offensive in late winter or early spring, which in turn 
allowed the Germans to fortify their defenses. The failure of Market-Garden, along with 
the slow opening of the Scheldt estuary meant that the war would not end before 
Christmas. 
 Germany took full advantage of this, and bled the Allies in battles to take the 
Scheldt estuary, Hurtgen Forrest, cities of Aachen, Metz, in Roer River Valley, and other 
places along the defensive Siegfried Line.53 Germany however felt that by the winter of 
1944 the war was lost without some momentous change.54 German commanders knew 
they could not defeat the Allies without knocking them out of the war, or persuading the 
Western Allies to join them against the Soviets. Out of this desire to concentrate all 
forces against the Soviet menace was a plan to push back the Western Allies with an 
offensive that would retake the vital port of Antwerp and cut off the British and Canadian 
                                                             
51 Liberal use of the word highway, it was a one lane road for much of the highway. 
52 Field Marshal Montgomery had failed to capture the Scheldt estuary and thus his failure to open the 
major port of Antwerp was a costly mistake, forcing supplies to come from Normandy until November 
1944. The Allies should have taken Antwerp first before going off on Market-Garden (Hastings 2004, 19-
20). 
53 In the Roer River Valley the Germans blew up dams to slow the US Ninth Army’s advance in that area. 
54 This is not to say that Germans discussed defeat. They did not, as Hitler forbad “defeatist talk” and the 
SS enforced it ruthlessly. 
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Armies from the Americans. Thus the plan Hitler envisioned was with the new strategic 
situation, the Allies would sue for peace, and then the Wehrmacht would be able to 
redeploy its forces to combat the Soviets, and if lucky be joined by the West against 
Stalin. 
 Operation ‘Wacht am Rhein’ (Watch on the Rhine) was the German offensive that 
attempted to force the Allies into a settlement. The operation, now known as the ‘Battle 
of the Bulge,’ was initially a success for Germany as it utilized bad weather to negate 
American air superiority and attacked along a weakly defended line of the Western Front 
at the Ardennes Forrest. But the offensive, due to stiffening American resistance (such as 
the 101st Airborne’s brilliant defense at Bastogne) and a lack of German supplies, got 
bogged down.55 The ‘Bulge’ in allied lines was pushed back through the aggressive 
counter-attack by Patton’s Third Army and the clearing of the weather to allow for the 
massive use of American air power.56 For the US, it was the largest ground battle it had 
ever fought, and what seemed to be a monumental failure for the Americans turned into a 
decisive victory. For Germany, it was a disaster. Germany had used up the last of its 
strategic armor and infantry reserves for this offensive, and it was for nothing. Instead of 
a slow and steady war of attrition in the German heartland, Germany was severely 
weakened and its defeat now inevitable.  
 After the Bulge in Allied lines had been defeated, the US and Britain launched 
offensives that centered around securing the ground west of the Rhine River, and crossing 
the river itself. By the middle of March, the American First Army had a full bridgehead 
                                                             
55 To include the 101st Airborne Division’s General McAuliffe’s famous response to a German surrender 
demand, “Nuts!” and when pressed by the Germans for what it meant, replied it was plain English for “Go 
to hell”. 
56 Third Army’s advance to relieve Bastogne was perhaps Patton’s finest hour as a military commander.  
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over the Rhine River thanks to the damaged but captured at Remagen and subsequent US 
built bridges nearby. This was followed up by Patton’s Third Army crossing the Rhine at 
Oppenheim, and the British Operation Plunder/Varsity crossing at Rees and Wesel by the 
British Twenty-First Army Group. By the start of April, US (along with British, 
Canadian, Polish, French, etc.) divisions from three Allied Army Groups of almost 100 
divisions (mostly American) were swarming deep into Germany, overwhelming, out 
maneuvering, and out flanking the Germans. Germany Army Group B was surrounded in 
the Ruhr pocked on 01 April which surrendered by the 18 April (taking 325,000 German 
captives). US Twelfth Army Group under Omar Bradley then became the main thrust of 
the war, although all Allied Army Groups in the west were on the offensive, and by the 
9th of April had reached the Elbe River, the demarcation line for US/Soviet forces. The 
US and Western Allies would overrun all of Germany west of the Elbe, and were also 
into Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia by V-E Day.57  
 In the East, the Soviet Union relentless pushed the Germans back, culminating in 
the capture of the capital of Berlin on May 2, 1945. After January 1945 however, 
Germany was a dying state. That it refused to die even when all was lost and there was no 
hope of victory was due to the extraordinary powers that the Nazi Party maintained until 
the very end of the war (Kershaw 2012). Even though the Allies had air superiority, and 
were destroying production centers, transportation networks, oil storage and production 
sites, and devastating entire cities (killing hundreds of thousands of civilians), the 
Germans fought on. The Nazi party had complete control over the governance of the 
state, and management of its economy, and even the hearts and minds (perhaps better 
                                                             
57 Victory in Europe is May 8, 1945, although the Soviets use May 9, Victory Day, as the date for the end of 
the war. 
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described as their minds and ‘balls’) of the people. The citizens lived in greater fear of 
the Nazi SS police and Nazi party than it did the Allies, and same was true of the 
military. Hitler and the Nazi leadership would not surrender, it was to them ‘victory or 
death’, and that was their view not only for themselves, but the entire German Reich 
(Kershaw 2012).  
 It would take the Allies killing millions of Germans, both on and off the 
battlefield (unless one considers strategic bombing of a city a battlefield) and the 
armaments of war, along with the total occupation of the state (to include the capture of 
its capital) and the almost complete destruction of its ability to resist (armed forces, 
security forces… i.e. its shield) before Germany would surrender. Even in the final days, 
the SS continued to keep the people in line, and only until overrun, arrested, and 
disbanded did the SS no longer cause fear over the population and armed forces. By this 
time the German economy had collapsed, its armed forces were either completely 
captured or destroyed, and their governments in ruins and under Allied occupation were 
most members of the population able to look elsewhere for governance and protection 
(the Allied Occupation Governments). This breaking of national willpower and morale 
was due not only due to the high losses of population, but the collapse of the economy as 
well. With its collapse, the population became dependent on the good will of the Allied 
Powers in order to survive. No state has been so thoroughly conquered and destroyed 
since Hannibal’s own Carthage.  
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IX. Hypothesis Outcomes 
H𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒  = States with stronger Core’s and Shields, who are able to defend them while 
defeating the enemy’s Shield and/or damaging the enemy’s Core will be more likely to 
win wars. 
 Evidence for Hypothesis (Core): At the start of the war, Germany had a very 
strong core due to the Nazi party’s hold over the population and economy, even though 
the economy had some major structural problems. The Americans also had a strong core, 
even if it was even more unprepared than the Germans for a prolonged war.  
 Throughout the war Germany was unable to attack the US’s core directly, but it 
was able to directly attack the Core of the Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The only 
way to attack the American core would be by causing heavy casualties and force the US 
to accept a negotiated peace. The United States, in conjunction with other allies, was able 
to both directly and indirectly attack the German core.  
 The attacks by the US and her allies upon the German core were total in its 
methods and in its outcome. The United States conducted strategic bombing of German 
cities and production, killing hundreds of thousands if not millions by aerial strategic 
bombing and causing severe harm to the German economy and infrastructure. The US 
also maintained a blockade, but this had already been accomplished by the British. The 
US and here allies were however, able to launch direct attacks upon the German core, and 
in the process captured the entirety of German national territory, while completing the 
complete capture and destruction Wehrmacht as a fighting force. Germany’s economy 
was in ruin, its government collapsed and under Allied occupation and military 
government, and its population completely dependent on the Allies for survival.  
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 Because of the lack of attacks by Germany on the American core, and America’s 
overwhelming victory over the German Wehrmacht, and the complete conquest of 
Germany’s core, there is strong support for this hypothesis.  
H𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠  = The greater the state’s casualties (damage to the population pillar), 
the less the likelihood of victory. 
 Evidence for and against Hypothesis (Population Losses): If one conducts an 
analysis of losses of the US and Germany in World War II, the Germans have far greater 
losses. If you take into account the other allies, the Soviet Union alone has more losses 
than the Germans and Italians combined. Thus in a dyadic analysis between the US and 
Germany, it holds true. In Allies vs. Axis, it does not. Therefore, the evidence is 
contradictory. If one takes into account that the Soviet Union could afford such losses 
and still fight on, it explains a lot. However, by 1944, German losses had been so great 
that is was unable to fully man its armed forces with trained (and even untrained) recruits, 
and with this knowledge, casualties played a major and attritional role in Germany’s 
defeat.  
H𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 = The greater the state’s economic losses (damage to the economic 
pillar), the less the likelihood of victory. 
 Evidence for Hypothesis (Economic Losses): America’s economy grew 
throughout the war in terms of GDP and production. Germany’s economy suffered 
immensely throughout the war due to strategic bombing, and later on due to the loss of 
resources and territory. By the last few months of the war the German economy collapsed 
and was dependent on the Allies for their good will. Therefore as Germany’s GDP 
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declined throughout the war, and America’s rose, there is strong support for this 
hypothesis in this case study. 
H𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  = The greater the state’s government cohesion, the greater chance of victory 
(as it is more resilient to stress placed upon it). 
Evidence for and against Hypothesis (Governance): Both the US and Germany 
had great cohesion within their governments and in their society. For the US it was 
because of its inclusive (if imperfect) government and imperfect cultural values (i.e. civil 
rights issues), but for the time it was one of the most cohesive and popular governments 
in the world. For German, cohesion came at the expense of minorities (Jews, etc.), and a 
very radical authoritarian police state under the Nazi Party and SS. For the US, its 
governance was never truly stressed, and thus never under the threat of collapse like 
Germany. Therefore, it being very strong was able to weather heavy casualties and self-
imposed limitations at home. Germany on the other hand, was also very strong, due to its 
strong armed tactics. And it would take the complete overrunning of the country, and the 
complete destruction of its armed forces to bring about the end of Nazi governance in 
Germany. Therefore, this war had two states with very strong governance, and has 
evidence both for and against this hypothesis.  
H𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  = States who maintain offensive initiative will have a greater chance 
of victory. 
Evidence for Hypothesis (Offensive Initiative): While Germany early in the war 
had offensive initiative, it overextended itself with having too many campaigns on too 
many fronts, and the allies were able to take advantage of it. After the defeat in North 
Africa (along with the failure at Kursk), the Germans were on the strategic defensive for 
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the rest of the war. Its efforts to regain the offensive on the Western Front through the 
attacks at Mortain and in the Ardennes were merely operational offensives that failed to 
gain the strategic initiative. Consequently the Germans were pushed back and defeated, 
having spent the last years of the war on the defensive and being beaten by the offensives 
of the Allies and in particular the United States and Soviet Union. Therefore there is 
strong support for this hypothesis in this case study.  
H𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑  = States that utilize ‘unrestricted war’ means of both conventional and 
unconventional warfare will have a greater chance at victory than those who solely utilize 
purely unconventional or purely conventional methods.  
Evidence for Hypothesis (Warfare Methods): Both sides utilized conventional and 
unconventional forces during the war. However the Germans primarily relied on 
conventional forces, while the Allies, and the US and Britain in particular strongly 
augmented their conventional forces with capable unconventional forces such as the OSS, 
SOE, SAS, and other organizations and utilized partisans behind the lines to disrupt 
conventional forces. As the Allies, and the US in particular utilized both methods heavily 
and won the war, there is some evidence for this hypothesis. 
H𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑣𝑒𝑟  𝐷𝑜𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠  = States that utilize maneuver doctrines will have a greater chance of 
victory. 
 Evidence for and against Hypothesis (Maneuver Doctrines): Both Germany and 
the US heavily utilized maneuver doctrines for most of the war. By 1944 however, 
Germany began to move away from this doctrine to fixed defensive positions, as 
Germany did not have the resources in which to fully enact a maneuver doctrine, nor 
elastic defense doctrine due to heavy losses in Germany’s armored formations (and 
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Hitler’s insistence on holding all territory to the last man). The Americans, who had the 
resources to enact the doctrine, excelled and continually outflanked, overwhelmed, and 
bypassed the enemy in great sweeps of encirclements and flanking attacks. Therefore 
there is evidence for and against this hypothesis as it worked for the Americans, but not 
for the Germans. 
H𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑠 = States that utilize mass at the point of attack on offensives will have a greater 
chance of victory (i.e. the “schwerpunkt”). 
 Evidence for and against Hypothesis (Mass Doctrines): The Germans excelled at 
massing their troops at the point of attack strategically, operationally, and tactically at the 
early stages of the war, and tactically throughout the war. However, after receiving such 
heavy losses throughout the war, Germany was unable to mass forces effectively at the 
strategic and operational levels after 1943 except during the Ardennes Offensive. The 
Allies, and in particular the US was able to mass its forces at critical points tactically (the 
“schwerpunkt”) throughout the war, and repeatedly turn those tactical offensives into 
operational and strategic success in Italy, in France, and throughout Northern Europe. 
Germany could not compete with the American’s vast mass production, which while 
providing inferior tanks, still overwhelmed German lines and lead to breakouts and the 
defeat of Germany. Therefore there is strong support for this hypothesis.  
H𝐵𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠  = The greater the losses to a state’s battlefleet, the greater the chances of 
defeat 
Evidence for Hypothesis (Battlefleet Losses): Germany was unable to sink an 
American capital ship throughout the war (though it did sink several British and Soviet 
capital ships). The Americans were able to help the British hole up and sink several 
Vichy French and German capital ships, and Germany lost the majority of capital ships in 
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the war compared to the US and Britain, who also had control of the sea and won the war. 
Therefore there is strong support for this hypothesis, as the Germans were unable to fully 
contest command of the sea with such few capital ships and its U-boat fleet.  
H𝑆𝑒𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 = States that utilize sea control doctrines will be more likely to win wars 
Evidence for Hypothesis (Sea Control): Only the Anglo-Americans sought control 
over the sea. The German Kriegsmarine was much smaller than the Royal Navy and US 
Navy, and as such could not compete with them in head on naval battles for control over 
the sea lanes. As such they sought to utilize a sea denial strategy against the Anglo-
Americans, and at times performed well. However they never truly contested the seas for 
control over them, and the Anglo-American navies were able, especially after ‘Black 
May’ in 1943, to have control over the seas and secure sea lines of communication. 
Therefore there is strong support for this hypothesis in this case study.  
H𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠 = States that utilize conservation of force strategies and operational 
art will have a greater chance of a prolonged war and defeat 
 Evidence for and against Hypothesis (Conservation Forces): While Britain 
certainly used a conservation of force strategy, both the US and Germany did not. Both 
believed in aggressive maneuvers to win the war as quickly as possible. Due to the size of 
forces involved, the war turned on into a very prolonged war. As both the US and 
Germany did not utilize conservation of force strategies, this hypothesis requires further 
testing.  
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X. Conclusion 
 America’s victory in the war can be broken up into two categories, what the US 
did to win the war, and what Germany did to lose it. While the US had sheer numbers on 
its side, in terms of manpower and manufactured weaponry, numbers in themselves do 
not win wars, but how they those advantages are employed and how disadvantages and 
vulnerabilities are minimized. The US won by protecting her core and shield all while 
destroying the shield and heavily damaging and capturing the core of Germany.  
 By December 1941, Germany was embroiled in a war that already expanded 
beyond the continent of Europe to the entire world. It failed to destroy the British 
Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk, and win air superiority over Britain in 1940. It failed to 
build strategic bombers to bomb Soviet production sites in the Ural Mountains, and failed 
to knock the Soviet Union out of the war in 1941 before the Soviets could regroup. It also 
failed it its blockade of Britain, or capture the Suez Canal. German victory was within the 
realm of possibility until December 11, 1941. After December 11, 1941, this realm of 
possibility began to fade; as Germany’s greatest strategic error was going to war with the 
United States.  
 The United States for her part was not destined to win merely because of her 
manpower and material production strength. It would require overcoming her own errors 
and exploiting the enemy’s. The United States early on was forced to rely upon the 
sacrifices of the Soviet Union, and the leadership of Great Britain before she herself 
would assume the mantle of leadership. 
 The United States pressed its advantages to the maximum, and in particular that of 
industrial production of war material, so much so that she could more than supply not 
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only her own forces, but also provide vast stockpiles of resources to all the other allied 
powers. 
 Germany was overwhelmed, first at sea, next in the air, then in material, in 
manpower, and finally on the ground. The importance of D-Day cannot be overstated. It 
allowed the Soviets to fight far fewer troops. The preparations for D-Day saw the 
Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe devastated as fighting forces, and D-Day and subsequent 
offensive operations brought an end to the Heer. American material, manpower, tactics, 
and operational art, in concert with her Allies outmaneuvered, overwhelmed, and 
destroyed Germany. It was war like no other since the three Punic Wars and the eventual 
destruction of Carthage perhaps. 
 Germany could not harm America’s core until she defeated the British and 
Soviets, and consequently was unable to do so thanks to American support. Germany’s 
core however was devastated by the American war machine and by supplying its allies. 
Germany had bit off more than she could chew and in doing so, was stretched to the 
limit, unable to protect her core and shield, and lost the war. 
Chapter Conclusion 
 What is to be made of these two case studies? They show that there is overall 
support for the Informal Theory, along with many of the hypotheses, but not all of them 
(see Table below). Furthermore, the case studies show that the strategies and many other 
aspects of waging war change over time, and are not static or only a one choice final 
option. They instead evolve and change over time, as domestic and military factors (of 
both states) are taken into account by leaders and the population of the state.  
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 These two case studies show several important things. First, in both wars, the 
economies and populations suffered as all states involved were forced to shift resources 
from their cores to their shields. The United States was able to handle it quite well. Japan 
did so ably, but there were problems with its balancing act. Russia could not handle it, 
and because of the losses on the battlefield and failing economy, caused the population to 
rise up in revolution. Germany as a state was completely crushed, and its population and 
economy suffered terribly for its aggression, which eventually led to total occupation of 
their state and an ending to the Third Reich.  
 The case studies also show that for at least some periods of time, each state would 
attempt to utilize similar if not the same strategies, operations, and use of principles of 
war as their enemy would. More often than not, victory was achieved by the state that 
was better able to utilize certain principles to the point where the enemy could no longer 
fight in a similar manner and was forced to change how it fought. In the Russo-Japanese 
War, both attempted to fight a war of maneuver. At Port Arthur, both were forced into 
fighting a siege. However in the battles fought in Manchuria, the Russians were 
constantly beaten back, on the defensive, and unable to go on the offensive and turn the 
tide of the war. In World War II, both utilized similar maneuver and firepower doctrines, 
but as the war dragged on for Germany, she was unable to man and equip forces to enact 
it, and was forced to rely on static defenses while the Allies relied on defense-in-depth 
while on the defense and when on the offensive they utilized firepower and maneuver 
with overwhelming forces at the schwerpunkt, which Germany could not stop.  
 
 
215 
 
Table 5.1: Case Study Hypotheses Outcomes Compared 
  Russo-Japanese War World War II 
Hypothesis:    (Germany vs. US) 
H (Core) Support For  Support For  
H (Population Losses) Support For and Against Support For and Against 
H (Economy Losses) More Information Required Support For  
H (Governance) Support For  Support For and Against 
H (Offensive Initiative) Support For  Support For  
H (Warfare Methods) More Information Required Support For  
H (Maneuver Doctrines) Support For  Support For and Against 
H (Mass) Support For and Against Support For and Against 
H (Battlefleets) Support For  Support For  
H (Sea Control) Support For  Support For  
H (Conservation Forces) Support For  Support For and Against 
 
 While it is easy to state certain principles of warfare, certain strategies and 
operational arts, and doctrines are timeless or hold true and should be utilized by 
commanders all the time based on what we have learned in this chapter, we must 
remember one thing. These are only two wars out of hundreds of wars in the past two 
hundred years, and do not provide much detail beyond these two wars. Therefore, further 
research requires either with many more case studies, or quantitative analysis.  
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Quantitative Analysis 
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Thus far I have reviewed the literature of military theory and political science. I 
have also reviewed the problems within the field of study and offered up a new Informal 
Theory of Interstate Warfare, which seeks to fill in missing data within the field and 
correct some of the problems within the field. Next I tested the general theory and 
specific hypotheses with two case studies. In this chapter I will explain how the 
hypotheses will be tested quantitatively, along with the variables that were 
operationalized in order to test the various hypotheses. I will then present the statistical 
models that tested the hypotheses, and explore the results found. I will conclude with a 
final combined model, and some concluding thoughts to the results.  
While wars and won or lost based upon the ability of a state to defend its core and 
shield while simultaneously stressing and damaging the enemy’s core and shield, 
execution of that general plan is more difficult. In the previous chapter two case studies 
were presented. They described those wars through the important lens of the strategic and 
operational levels of warfare, how the states involved fought those wars, and why their 
cores and shields helped produce victory or defeat. However, those two case studies were 
merely two wars, between four belligerents. The question then becomes, can the Informal 
Theory of Inter-state Warfare be applied to most of it not all wars? This could be done 
via case studies as well, but that would require more time, effort, and hundreds if not 
thousands of pages.  
 However, one can approximate this effort by use of quantitative (statistical) 
analysis. The approach has both strengths and weaknesses. It can simply boil down the 
very important issues in a way that case studies cannot simplify. But it has the potential 
of losing perspective as well as true understanding of events. Because of the data and 
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information problems stated in the previous chapter, along with the requirement for vast 
mathematical problems which require that information, statistical analysis can only gain 
us an incomplete clarity, but some level of clarity none-the-less. Until such a time that 
more information becomes available to researchers, only the combination of qualitative 
and quantitative analysis can provide the level of clarity in this imperfect and incomplete 
area of study.  
 What this study can provide through quantitative analysis is some of the many 
determinants of war outcomes, with an emphasis on areas related to the overall theory 
presented in chapter 4. As seen in the study of the evolution of warfare and strategy, 
along with the two case studies, is that not every war ends the same, or for the same 
reason beyond a rather “big picture concept” of the core and shield of the state. But what 
leads a war to end when it does, and what strategies and operational art were utilized is of 
prime importance. One must be wary of the value of statistics. Like in football, the same 
plays will not always work when utilized. However, certain plays played over a time 
frame do tend to succeed or fail more often, and as in football with various plays, certain 
strategies and operational art should be utilized more often than others. This can perhaps 
give one an idea as to what military theories and political actions are successful, and 
which ones are failures, and create a train of thought for how one should expect states to 
act and respond to enemy actions when engaged in war.  
 I will now expand upon the dependent, independent, and control variables utilized 
in the data set created to test the general theory, explain the coding involved, and show 
how these variables relate to certain hypotheses. The models utilized rely primarily on 
Logit and Multinomial Logit forms of probability theory within statistics, which should 
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“allow us to predict, with reasonable confidence, the outcome of wars” (Stam 1996, 111).  
Then I will analyze the results of the various models run, the value of certain variables 
utilized in the coding, and whether or not the hypotheses were upheld through this study. 
Finally the chapter will conclude with some final thoughts on the Theory and the 
quantitative analysis conducted.  
Research Design 
 In order to examine the validity of the Informal Theory of Interstate Warfare, and 
the several hypotheses created to test it, the quantitative analysis utilizes directed war 
dyads (i.e. war between two states). The wars utilized for the data set were based upon 
the Correlates of War (COW) data set (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010), which covers 
interstate wars after 1815 with the beginning of the new order in international politics. 
My analysis therefore utilizes all interstate wars within the timeframe from 1816 to 2007.  
The COW Project first makes the determination of what is a state, which was written 
extensively about in chapter 4. In order for a war to meet the criteria to be decaled an 
interstate war under the COW Project, states involved in the war must be members of the 
interstate system, be between the regular conventional forces of two or more states, with 
political leadership of each state directing the war in some manner (i.e. excluding 
rebellious forces, etc.), and have had at least 1,000 battle deaths during the course of the 
war. It is perhaps this 1,000 battle related deaths threshold that will cause some scholars 
some heartache (to include myself), but as it is the accepted baseline within political 
science, and as the standard baseline, it will be utilized in this study. Further the two wars 
utilized in the previous chapter’s qualitative analysis were coded as interstate wars in the 
COW Project.  
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 The unit of analysis in this thesis is the interstate dyad, which is defined as a pair 
(or more) of states that are members of the interstate system, where system status is 
defined by various codings and rules within the COW Project (Sarkees and Wayman, 
2010). 
 The COW list was modified from its current state in several ways. First several 
wars were broken up into multiple wars, and in some cases by theaters of war (World 
War I, World War II, etc). The Vietnam War was broken up into two wars, one from 
1965-1973, and the other which did not include the United States in 1975. Other wars 
were edited as minor allies were removed from the Seven Weeks War, Franco-Prussian 
War, Korean War, Vietnam, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the two Persian Gulf Wars. Two 
wars were also deleted, the War of the Communist Coalition (which was viewed as a 
subset of the Vietnam War), and the Bosnian War for Independence, which I viewed as a 
civil or intrastate war (i.e. internal or civil war). 
 The data set utilized in the analysis differs greatly from those used in most 
previous studies of war outcomes, such as Stam (1996). Stam and those who have used 
Stam’s data in their own research rely on a single observation per war dyad. While 
Stam’s work revolutionized the way we think about politics and war, and in particular the 
use of strategies, the limitations of a single observation per war has several limitations, 
which is one problem with previous data sets. Further, most data sets, including the COW 
Interstate war data set does not include any variables about military strength, strategy, 
doctrine, operational art, or anything else military related beyond pure troop strength and 
national indicators of production (CINC scores). 
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  Because of these problems and limitations, I take a different view for my data set: 
that wars should be broken up into distinct timeframes that take into account the changes 
for strategy, operational art, principles and doctrinal changes made during the war.58 My 
data set is broken up into timeframes instead of just a view of the war as a onetime, 
whole event. These timeframes, however, are not time dependent (as in broken up by 
every week, month, or quarter) but instead are completely dependent on the changes of 
variables within the strategic and operational levels of warfare that occurred during the 
war. Therefore, any time a strategic or operational variable changed during the war by 
either dyadic side, the timeframe ends and a new one begins. Because of the emphasis on 
strategic and operational levels of war, along with the principles and doctrines of war, the 
tactical level of warfare was skipped all together in this data set. 
Dependent Variable(s) 
 Utilizing a similar method utilized by Stam (1996) and Bennett and Stam (1998), 
two different dependent variables were utilized. Since we are looking for what variables 
led to certain war outcomes, war outcomes are the dependent variable utilized. The first 
dependent variable is that of a binary coding: of win or lose. Because there are just two 
outcomes (instead of three), all draws are coded as a loss, as it is my belief (as stated in 
Chapters 4 and 5) that only victory can guarantee survival of the regime, but a draw or 
loss significantly raises the specter of regime collapse, and thus a draw is deemed to be 
just as bad as a loss, instead of just dropping draws from the analysis.  
                                                             
58 All codings in this data set for military variables come from primary and secondary historical sources, 
but mainly secondary sources of Dupuy and Dupuy (1993), Clodfeiter (2008), Sarkees and Wayman (2010). 
However, for the coding, further research was required beyond these sources, and they can be found in 
the Bibliography.  
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  The second dependent variable is an expansion of the first dependent variable, 
similar to that of Bennett and Stam (1998). Thus there are four possible outcomes in war, 
coded as a win, loss, or draw (negotiated peace or stalemate), along with a forth 
possibility, continuance of the war. Because of the need to break up timeframes, this 
additional variable of continuance of the war allows for changes in the independent 
variables instead of a single observation throughout the war.  
The reasons for two different, and yet similar models and different dependent 
variables is to first simplify war and its final timeframes down to its most basic form, 
under a binary win-loss dependent variable utilizing logistical regression. Yet this 
however only shows the final timeframe of a war, and not the entire war as a whole. As 
such, the second dependent variable of Win, Lose, Draw, or Continue was used (under 
multinomial logistical regression) in order to better clarify the events in a war, with 
continue serving as the baseline for the regression in the second type of model run. 
Further analysis is conducted through cross tabulation in order to examine the coding of 
variables, with an emphasis on the continue dependent variable for purposes of clarifying 
the use strategies during those continue timeframes.  
Independent (Explanatory) Variables 
 Under the coding of Stam and others, war strategies, doctrines, etc. are one time 
variables that do not take into account the changes of war. Furthermore, the coding of 
military variables tend to be very broad (such as maneuver-attrition-punishment), and 
strictly rely on strategic level variables. In order to provide greatly clarity into the 
determinants of war outcomes and test the overall validity of the Informal Theory and its 
various hypotheses, the data set coded variables not only at the strategic level of war, but 
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also that of the operational level of war, along with doctrine and use of several principles 
of war. For the population and economic variables, both binary variables (“dummy 
variables”) and quantitative continuous variables were utilized. For most military related 
variables, the use of binary variables (for use or non-use) was utilized.  
 At the strategic level of war, several variables were tested. Three variables were 
tested at the political-strategic level, all of which were binary variables. The first, War 
Aims, was coded by how decided its war aims, with a 1 coded for complete takeover and 
removal of the enemy government (or annexation of that state), and a 0 for anything less 
(or “limited”) than the complete occupation and overthrow of the enemy state. The 
second, Wartime Economy Production was coded a 2 for complete mobilization of the 
economy for wartime use, a 1 for partial mobilization for wartime use, but with a strong 
civilian sector, and a 0 for use of what industries were on hand at the start of the war. The 
third political-strategic variable was Manpower Policy, coded 2for introduction of a draft, 
1 for calling up of reserve formations, and 0 for use of only regular active forces during 
the war.  
 Below the political-strategic level are military-strategic variables, four of which 
were tested. The first was Force Utilization. Force utilization centered around how states 
fought during a war, relying on three main modes of fighting: terrorism, unconventional, 
or conventional warfare. A 4 was coded for use of conventional warfare only, a 3 for use 
of both conventional and unconventional warfare (with the primary means being 
conventional), a 2 for use of unconventional warfare only, a 1 for the use of 
unconventional warfare and terrorism (and the primary effort being unconventional), and 
a 0 for the use of terrorism only.  
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 The second military-strategic variable is the state’s Targeting Policy. A 3 was 
coded for targeting not only military targets, but infrastructure and industry, and the 
specific targeting of civilians. A 2 was coded for the targeting of military targets and 
infrastructure and industry, and a 0 for only military targets. The third variable is a state’s 
Engagement Policy, which is in effect the Sun-Tzu vs. Clausewitz debate at the strategic 
level. States could either seek out the enemy through direct attacks upon its shield and 
core with destruction of the enemy’s armed forces in open battle (coded as a 1), or seek 
indirect attacks upon the shield and core via blockades, mainly disrupting and destroying 
the enemy’s lines of communication at the expense of direct action, hit-and-run 
operations, guerrilla warfare, etc. (coded as a 0). The fourth variable tested is a binary 
variable, for Strategic Offensive Initiative.  
This variable ties in, and was coded for the operational level of warfare as well. 
Offensive initiative is an important variable for this study, and a thoroughly military one 
with political and military implications. It is also a complex variable even though it is 
coded as a binary variable as 1 or 0. In the coding it is broken up into two distinct 
variables of Strategic Offensive Initiative, and Operational Offensive Initiative. Offensive 
initiative is not a strategy, or a doctrine, but an action taken by armed forces. This action 
is to attack, and to follow up the initial attack with still further attacks, thus giving one 
state the initiative as it puts the enemy on the defensive as they respond to the attacks. At 
the operational level of war, offensive initiative is a series of offensive tactical battles in a 
theater of war in which some territory is taken and the enemy is on the defensive. At the 
strategic level of war, it is forcing the enemy to respond to actions in a theater or several 
theaters. In war, an armed force may prefer to be offensive strategically, as in securing 
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vital terrain but defensive operationally and tactically, as in forcing the enemy to attack 
them in their defensive position. Therefore there are 4 major combinations that are coded 
in two different variables for the strategic and operational levels of war.  
 Strategically offensive and operational offensive is where one state’s shield is 
attacking the enemy and pushing them back, and dictating where the enemy will fight, or 
forcing them to retreat. Strategically offensive and operationally defensive is where one 
state’s shield has secured some vital territory or conducted some action which places 
them operationally and tactically on the defensive, but because of their action, forces the 
enemy to attack them not both at a time and on ground not of their choosing. Strategically 
defensive and operational offensive is when a state’s shield is trying to end the strategic 
offensive of the enemy by attacking them operationally and turning the operational 
offensive into a strategic one. Finally there is the strategically defensive and operational 
defensive, where the state on the defensive is just reacting to enemy attacks. This variable 
is important as offensive operations allow for the securing of territory and either capture 
or destruction of elements of the shield and core of the enemy’s state. 
 After the strategic level, the operational level of warfare is tested (as seen in the 
operational offensive initiative variable). Two binary were utilized, one was National 
Territory Lost during the time frame (1 for loss, 0 for no loss), and the other was 
Territory Gained during timeframe, of any type of territory- be it a state’s own territory, 
enemy territory, or an allied occupied territory (1 for gain, 0 for no gain). Another binary 
variable was created, similar to the strategic level engagement policy, but more so at the 
operational level of war, reliant on theater making decision.  
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 After the operational level of war, military doctrine and principles were tested, 
mainly for land warfare. All were binary variables, with a 1 for use and 0 for not used 
during the time frame (with the exception of three variables explained further below). 
The doctrinal principles of firepower, maneuver, mass, attrition, static defense, 
withdrawal, encirclement, and conducting sieges were all coded to be tested within the 
data set.  
 Of foremost importance of these doctrinal principles were firepower, maneuver, 
and mass. Maneuver doctrines hold a place of prominence not only within Allan Stam’s 
coding, but also within much of military theory. Maneuver doctrines imply offensive 
operations, flanking movements, and deep penetration operations. This doctrine is of key 
importance to the US Army today in conventional warfare, and as so with most militaries 
of the world. This coding differs as it is a doctrine, not its enactment (though doctrine 
may change as the ability to enact it may diminish, forcing a change in doctrine).  
 The concept of mass has taken on different forms in military theory. Most 
prominent is the concept of massing one’s troops at a critical point of attack upon an 
enemy line, which von Clausewitz called the ‘Schwerpunkt”, which today has been 
misidentified as “Center of Gravity”. This coding using Clausewitz’s original concept, 
did one state enact the massing of forces at a critical point in a battle at the enemy line in 
order to break it (or hold off a breakthrough) in the manner von Clausewitz describes. 
This hypothesis seeks to see if the “Schwerpunkt” is only a tactical variable, or an 
operational level variable that von Clausewitz described, and a key to victory in 
campaigns. This is done by coding for concentration of offensive operations in operations 
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at the operational level (i.e. theaters) with one or more corps (i.e. two or more divisions) 
or above conducting an attack or defense. 
 The third concept, that of firepower, is based upon the doctrine that places high 
value and use of artillery, air strikes, naval gunfire support, and armor upon enemy 
concentrations of forces to break up attacks or defensive positions in place of doctrines 
that require heavy amounts of manpower.  
 Three other land warfare doctrinal principles were tested as well. These doctrines 
were more complex and nuanced than the previous ones, all of which were binary 
variables as well. Instead of being coded as use or non-use, they were coded as either or 
statement during the timeframe. The first is Land Offensive Doctrine, which combines 
firepower and maneuver doctrines (coded as 1) or attrition and mass doctrines (coded as 
0). The second is Land Defensive Doctrine, which is either elastic (coded as 1) or static 
(coded as 0). Finally there is Manpower Doctrine, which is how troops are utilized in 
combat and how they are seen; either as expendable, coded as a 0 or to be conserved, 
coded as a 1 (like the British in their doctrine in WW2).  
 Naval warfare was also coded in the data set, something very few data sets have 
done. A battlefleet is viewed in the traditional sense: the size of a state’s capital ship fleet. 
The size of battlefleet’s losses is purely a quantitative number, reflecting no qualitative 
information on those capital ships included in the count. To do so would require a vast 
amount of data and mathematical formulas, not to mention simulations and war games to 
go along with those formulas to test.  Utilizing the data from George Modelski and 
William Thompson’s (1989) work in Seapower In Global Politics: 1494-1993, with some 
minor additions to include states that were not deemed as major powers by Modelski and 
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Thompson, yet still had capital ships. I calculated the losses of capital ships based upon 
the changes in the Modelski and Thompson data set. I ignored Modelski and Thompson’s 
use of attack and ballistic missile submarines as capital ships, and retained the aircraft 
carrier as the main capital ship long after Modelski and Thompson do in their data set, 
but with an emphasis on a medium sized carrier or larger as the main capital ship from 
1960 to 2007. For example a US Nimitz class carrier was counted as a capital ship, but 
the British Invincible class used in the Falklands War was not as it was viewed as a light 
carrier. This data was also utilized in the data set for other variables, such as number of 
capital ships at the start of the war, size of battlefleet at the end of the war. Another 
variable was a binary variable reflecting which state had the larger battlefleet at the start 
of the war, and with the final variable again being a binary variable with the state had the 
larger battlefleet at the end of the war, coded as 1 for larger, 0 for smaller, or both as 0 if 
neither had a battefleet. 
However, states do not necessarily need capital ships in order to exert control over 
an area of the ocean, nor does the presence of capital ships mean that a fleet and move 
unhindered in an area without the threat of the other. Some navies choose not to engage a 
larger foe, others contest them bitterly. Navies either choose to control the sea for their 
own use, or deny its use to the enemy. In this hypothesis, naval warfare doctrine was 
coded in two different variables. The first variable was based upon an ordinal scale coded 
from 0 to 4, starting with Sea Denial doctrines with the emphasis on attacking the 
enemy’s sea line of communications. The second was a Sea Denial doctrine with an 
emphasis on the enemy’s battlefleet. The third was a Sea Control doctrine, where the 
emphasis was protecting one’s sea lines of communication while attacking the enemy’s 
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sea lines of communication. The forth was a Sea Control doctrine where protection of the 
battlefleet and attacking and destroying the enemy’s battelfleet was of primary 
importance. The final variable on the ordinal scale, coded as a 4 was a Sea Control 
doctrine that sought to both protect one’s sea lines of communication and battlefleet 
while destroying the enemy’s battlefleet and sea lines of communication. The second 
variable is binary variable, for use of a sea control doctrine with an emphasis on total sea 
dominance (coded as a 1) or a sea denial doctrine or partial sea control doctrine (coded as 
a 0).  A third and fourth binary variable were based upon whether or not a state utilized 
Commerce Raiding and a Traditional Blockade in their wars, coded 1 for use, and 0 for 
non-use.  
 Finally two variables for air warfare were tested. Any states engaged in war 
before the Wright Brothers flight was dropped from the coding in these two variables. 
The first was a state’s Bomber Doctrine. If a state utilized strategic bombing, along with 
interdiction and tactical bombers, it was coded with a 3. If a state’s bombers only were 
utilized in an interdiction and tactical bombing role, it was coded as a 2. If a state’s 
bombers were only utilized in a tactical bombing role, it was coded as a 1, and if it had no 
bombers, it was coded as a 0. Fighter-bombers were not considered bombers for this 
coding.  
 The second air variable and last military variable in the data set was a state’s 
Fighter Doctrine. IF a state utilized its fighters in an air superiority role and for forward 
air support, it was coded as a 3. If it only was used in a forward air support and air 
defense role, it was coded as a 2, and if only in an air defense role, it was coded as a 1. If 
the state had no fighter aircraft, it was coded as a 0. 
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 In addition to military variables, the population and economies of states before, 
during, and after the war were added to the data set to help test the greater Informal 
Theory. In order to test the population hypothesis, a series of quantitative and continuous 
variables for the size of a state’s population at various times before and during the war 
were utilized. This data mainly came from the population data that the Angus Maddison 
data set (2008) had compiled, most prominent variables utilized in my data set being 
population at the beginning of the war, and population at the end of the war. This basic 
data was further refined to include averages of pre-war and wartime population growth, 
pre-war and wartime population growth percentage, and nominal dummy variables to 
denote if a state’s population had decreased during the war timeframe.  
 Other population variables were taken from the Correlates of War (CoW) data set 
(Sarkees and Wayman 2010), with in particular emphasis on military personnel at the 
start of the war, maximum military personnel, and personnel mobilized (which was the 
difference between the start war and maximum wartime military personnel variables). 
Casualty variables (battle deaths) also came from the CoW data set, but some casualty 
figures, such the Mexican-American War were modified to reflect information from 
Michael Clodfeiter’s Warfare and Armed Conflict (2008), as I believe it to be the 
definitive source on wartime casualties. 
 Economic variables were also gathered in the data set. The data set includes a 
state’s economy at various times before, during, and at the end of a war. This data mainly 
came from the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data that the Angus Maddison data set 
(2008), most prominent being GDP at the beginning of the war, and GDP at the end of 
the war. This basic data was further refined to include averages of pre-war and wartime 
231 
 
GDP growth, pre-war and wartime GDP growth percentage, and binary variable to denote 
if a state’s GDP had decreased during the war timeframe. Other economic variables were 
taken from the Correlates of War (CoW) data set (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), with in 
particular emphasis on military expenditures at the start of the war, maximum military 
expenditures, and end war military expenditures.  
Control Variables 
  In order to control for the variables utilized above, three important control 
variables were utilized in most combined models in order to bring stability and balance to 
all models. These three variables are quite commonly seen in most models and within the 
political science literature: Initiator of the war (binary variable coded 1 for initiator, 0 for 
non-initiator), battle related deaths (total number), and the Polity IV Score (which codes 
states from -10 to 10 in an ordinal scale, with -10 meaning most autocratic, and 10 
meaning most democratic, with the US coded as a 10 through the entirety of the Polity 
data set). 
Tested Binary Win-Lose Models and Results 
 Several models were run, based upon testing the most prominent hypothesis 
specific variables along with the control variables to ascertain the most important 
variables for each hypothesis. For the following tests, only the binary win-lose dependent 
variable was utilized for these models. The most prominent variables were then brought 
together into a unified model for the final results.  
 
 
 
232 
 
DV: Win-Lose Models using Logit Regression 
Population Only Models 
Table 6.1: WL Population Models 
 
The initial model, Population Model #1 (Table 6.1), ran every single population 
variable available with the three standard control variables stated earlier. The significant 
variables from the first model were run a second time in Population Model #2 (Table 
6.1), a simplified model. From the simplified model, we see that wartime population 
growth has a negative effect on the state’s ability to win a war the larger it is, and that a 
Pop Model 1: Pop Model 2:
Binary W == All Other Outcomes Combined Pop Simplified Model
Outcome --> Win War Win War
Pre War Pop Avg -0.5894 (.22)*** -0.0012 (1.58e-03)
Pre War Pop Growth Pct 4.003684 (32.2087)
Pre War Larger Pop Growth -1.022241 (.4936)** -0.6066114 (.3961)
Start War Pop Larger 0.0006095 (.00025)**
Start War Population 72.0063 (439.8)
War Pop Growth Pct -23.10375 (11.90)* -22.68366 (8.1367)***
End War Pop -0.0259 (.09)
War Pop Decrease -1.763115 (.8409)** -2.29804 (.7664)***
Start War Mil Personnel -0.0246721 (.0373)
Max War Mil Personnel 0.0243177 (.0373)
Personnel Mobilized -0.024529 (.0373)
Casualty Ratio 0.0018845 (.0168)
Initiator -0.0176223 (.4537) 0.7827974 (.3888)**
Battle Deaths -0.000984 (6.57e-04) -0.00166 (5.78e-04)***
Polity IV Score 0.005424 (.0297) 0.0023234 (.0243)
Coefficients (Std Error) Log Likelihood: Log Likelihood:
*p < 0.10 -112.14623 -124.37375
**p < 0.05 LR Chi² (15): LR Chi² (15):
***p < 0.001 62.29 38.7
Pseudo R²: Pseudo R²:
Note: All actual populations, 0.2173 0.1346
averages, and deaths are rounded No of Observ: No of Observ:
to the nearest thousandth 626 633
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decrease of the population on the wartime will have a negative impact on the ability of a 
state to win a war. This result is significant as it holds in line with H(Population Losses), 
when a state’s population pillar is damaged, it will hamper the ability of the state to win a 
war, and therefore find strong support for this hypothesis when measured alone without 
other wartime variables outside the control variables.  
Economic Only Models 
Table 6.2: WL Economic Models 
 
Model 1: Model 2:
Binary W == All  Other Outcomes Combined Econ Model Simplified Econ Model
Outcome --> Win War Win War
Pre War GDP Avg -0.0165 (.00117)
Pre War GDP Growth Pct 2.699246 (3.8571)
Start War GDP 0.000147 (.22) .000276 (1.11e-04)**
Wartime High GDP -0.0234 (.01)*
Wartime GDP Avg 0.0406 (.03)
Wartime GDP Growth Pct -0.1335451 (3.0562)
End War GDP -0.00169 (.00148)
Start War Mil Expenditure 0.0000915 (5.82e-05)
Max War Mil Expenditure -0.0000605 (6.77e-05)
End War Mil Expenditure -0.0000122 (5.54e-05)
Initiator 0.4406896 (.3586) .3577 (.2323)
Battle Deaths -0.00107 (5.57e-04)* -.000233 (5.05e-04)***
Polity IV Score 0.0369308 (.0275) -.0247 (.0166)
Coefficients (Stand Error) Log Likelihood: Log Likelihood:
*p < 0.10 -149.59153 -284.25613
**p < 0.05 LR Chi² (15): LR Chi² (4):
***p < 0.001 55.7 59.39
Pseudo R²: Pseudo R²:
Note: All actual money amts, 0.157 0.0946
averages, deaths are rounded No of Observ: No of Observ:
to the nearest thousandth 736 957
               Note: High Correlation between Start War GDP, Wartime High GDP, 
                                      End War GDP variables in Economic Model #1
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 The initial model, Economic Model #1 (Table 6.2), ran every single economic 
variable available with the three standard control variables. The significant variables from 
the first model were run a second time in Economic Model #2 (Table 6.2), a simplified 
model. It should be noted that a high level of correlation between the start of the war 
GDP, wartime high GDP, and end of the war GDP variables. As such, two variables were 
dropped, and for the rest of the models utilized in the win-lose dependent variable 
models, only Start War GDP or End War GDP was utilized. From the simplified model, 
we find that the higher the GDP a state starts off with, the greater the chance it has for 
victory in war. Thus we find some support for H(Economic Losses), however, further 
testing in a combined model is required. 
Military Strategy, Doctrine, and Operational Art Models 
 Several models were run for the very large amount of military strategy, doctrine, 
and operational art variables in the data set. The first model (Table 6.3) purely looked at 
strategic level variables. The second model (Table 6.3) utilized only operational level 
variables, along with military doctrine and land warfare. The third model (Table 6.4) was 
a look at the naval and air warfare variables in the data set, with the forth model (Table 
6.4) being a composite of all the variables within the data set.  
 The fourth model (Table 6.4) served as the basis for two simplified models. The 
first simplified model (Table 6.5) found highly significant the targeting policy of states, 
along with offensive initiative as being highly significant. Both were strongly positive, 
showing that wars are won by offensive initiative and through the targeting policy. What 
was also found highly significant, though in the negative was the use of commerce 
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raiding and full traditional blockade strategies. On their own, they harm the state that 
employs it more so than if had not, which is a very intriguing finding. 
 The final simplified model (Table 6.5) was again a simplified model. This time it 
found that not only is offensive initiative important, but so is that of actually gaining 
territory from the enemy. Furthermore, a land offensive doctrine that emphasized 
firepower and maneuver was also significant in helping to attain victory, as was use of 
naval warfare doctrines that emphasized not only the blockade of enemy port, but power 
projection against the enemy as well.  
 These military-only models give strong support to several hypotheses to include 
H(Offensive Initiative) and H(Maneuver Doctrines), but not H(Warfare Methods), 
H(Mass), H(Battlefleets), and H(Conservation Forces). This could perhaps be due to the 
coding utilized in the data set, or just the binary nature of the dependent variable
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Table 6.3: WL Military Variables Models Part 1 
Model 1: Model 2:
Binary W == All  Other Outcomes Strategic Lvl Operational Lvl
Outcome --> Win War Win War
Pol Strategy- War Aims 0.3720359 (.2130)*
Pol Strategy- Eco Production -0.1284706 (.1799)
Pol Strategy- Manpower -0.1414619 (.2126)
Mil Strategy- Force Utilization 0.2505924 (.2270)
Mil Strategy- Targeting Policy -0.0803452 (.1446)
Mil Strategy- Engagement Policy 0.4197851 (.4498)
Strategic Offensive Initiative 2.47174 (.2837)***
National Territory Lost 0.4247342 (.3350)
Op Lvl War- Engagement Policy 1.182145 (.6525)*
Op Lvl Offensive Initiative 2.0637 (.3698)***
Op Lvl War- Continuous Front -0.1451305 (.2301)
Territory Lost During Timeframe -0.609043 (.3495)*
Territory Gained during Timeframe 0.807734 (.2705)***
Mil Principle Doct- Firepower 0.5140044 (.3017)*
Mil Principle Doct- Maneuver -0.4005403 (.3234)
Mil Principle Doct- Mass 0.6049953 (.2765)**
Mil Principle Doct- Attrition -0.2759916 (.2704)
Mil Principle Doct- Static Defense 0.2562625 (.3236)
Mil Principle Doct- Withdrawal 0.5722277 (.5265)
Mil Principle Doct- Encirclement 0.9292987 (.2716)***
Mil Principle Doct- Siege -0.1879529 (.2264)
Land Warfare- Manpower Doct -0.5544486 (.2754)**
Land Warfare- Defensive Doct 0.4067809 (.3908)
Land Warfare- Offensive Doct 0.4472762 (.3927)
Naval Warfare Doctrine
Simplified Nav War Doct
Commerce Raiding Strategy
Traditional Full Blockade Strategy
Target Enemy Battlefleet
Battlefleet Strength in Size
Larger Star War Battlefleet
Larger End War Battlefleet
Wartime Battlefleet Losses
Air Warfare- Fighter Doctrine
Air Warfare- Bomber Doctrine
Initiator -0.0572009 (.2007) -0.2308693 (.2149)
Battle Deaths -0.00000233 (5.91e-07)*** -0.00000245 (6.14e-07)***
Polity IV Score 0.0134536 (.0141) -0.0090483 (.0149)
Coefficients (Stand Error) Log Likelihood: Log Likelihood:
*p < 0.10 -391.47958 -344.86752
**p < 0.05 Pseudo R²: Pseudo R²:
***p < 0.001 0.2048 0.2914
No of Observ: No of Observ:
1503 1491
Table 6.4: WL Military Variables Models Part 2 
 
Model 3: Model 4:
Binary W == All  Other Outcomes Naval and Air War Combined w/o Op Lvl
Outcome --> Win War Win War
Pol Strategy- War Aims -2.567217 (3.9651)
Pol Strategy- Eco Production 33.25893 (23.5018)
Pol Strategy- Manpower -22.81579 (15.4377)
Mil Strategy- Force Utilization 23.04431 (12.2892)*
Mil Strategy- Targeting Policy 42.31738 (19.6319)**
Mil Strategy- Engagement Policy -13.21483 (5343.808)
Strategic Offensive Initiative 29.87286 (17.7327)*
National Territory Lost 86.1076 (49.3382)*
Op Lvl War- Engagement Policy
Op Lvl Offensive Initiative
Op Lvl War- Continuous Front
Territory Lost During Timeframe
Territory Gained during Timeframe 42.2191 (23.2889)*
Mil Principle Doct- Firepower -5.201647 (5.1034)
Mil Principle Doct- Maneuver -1.64057 (2.7757)
Mil Principle Doct- Mass 1.617526 (2.3464)
Mil Principle Doct- Attrition 2.447223 (2.1347)
Mil Principle Doct- Static Defense 1.892803 (3.2339)
Mil Principle Doct- Withdrawal -35.20091 (1840.821)
Mil Principle Doct- Encirclement 18.73142 (8.7360)**
Mil Principle Doct- Siege -14.5498 (8.5897)*
Land Warfare- Manpower Doct -1.772704 (2.2929)
Land Warfare- Defensive Doct 3.198019 (3.8877)
Land Warfare- Offensive Doct 32.55144 (18.0585)*
Naval Warfare Doctrine -0.0019147 (.3606) 6.598209 (2.7119)**
Simplified Nav War Doct -0.3046711 (1.3222) -7.453645 (4.2370)*
Commerce Raiding Strategy -2.755188 (1.4325)** -47.85061 (25.3549)*
Traditional Full Blockade Strategy 1.888715 (.9286)** 61.05218 (37.9863) *
Target Enemy Battlefleet -0.6566708 (.8248) -37.54562 (20.5112)*
Battlefleet Strength in Size 0.0308142 (.0343) -0.1345789 (.1215)
Larger Star War Battlefleet -0.2638944 (1.1119) 11.59148 (8.2445)
Larger End War Battlefleet -0.700542 (1.3930) -53.48954 (31.2413)*
Wartime Battlefleet Losses -1.894527 (1.1694)* -53.23123 (33.9293)
Air Warfare- Fighter Doctrine 0.5536317 (.5389) -19.75757 (8.5473)**
Air Warfare- Bomber Doctrine -0.2035345 (.6394) 3.820976 (6.1616)
Initiator 0.606427 (.9139) -8.771849 (8.6346)
Battle Deaths -0.00000135 (6.16e-07)** -0.0000105 (6.73e-06)
Polity IV Score -0.1110506 (.0704) -1.189094 (1.0700)
Coefficients (Stand Error) Log Likelihood: Log Likelihood:
*p < 0.10 -80.155562 -27.974218
**p < 0.05 Pseudo R²: Pseudo R²:
***p < 0.001 0.2029 0.7218
No of Observ: No of Observ:
526 526
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Table 6.5: WL Simplified Military Variables Models  
 
Model 5 Model 6
Binary W == All  Other Outcomes Simplified Model 1 Simplified Model 2
Pol Strategy- War Aims
Pol Strategy- Eco Production
Pol Strategy- Manpower
Mil Strategy- Force Utilization
Mil Strategy- Targeting Policy .5178 (.2453)**
Mil Strategy- Engagement Policy
Strategic Offensive Initiative
National Territory Lost
Op Lvl War- Engagement Policy
Op Lvl Offensive Initiative 3.16 (.6138)*** 2.071 (.3469)***
Op Lvl War- Continuous Front
Territory Lost During Timeframe
Territory Gained during Timeframe .9804 (.2501)***
Mil Principle Doct- Firepower 
Mil Principle Doct- Maneuver
Mil Principle Doct- Mass
Mil Principle Doct- Attrition
Mil Principle Doct- Static Defense
Mil Principle Doct- Withdrawal
Mil Principle Doct- Encirclement
Mil Principle Doct- Siege
Land Warfare- Manpower Doct
Land Warfare- Defensive Doct
Land Warfare- Offensive Doct .5423 (.2674)**
Naval Warfare Doctrine .1028 (.0647)^
Simplified Nav War Doct
Commerce Raiding Strategy -1.8862 (.6395)***
Traditional Full Blockade Strategy -.7638 (.3658)**
Target Enemy Battlefleet
Battlefleet Strength in Size
Larger Star War Battlefleet
Larger End War Battlefleet
Wartime Battlefleet Losses
Air Warfare- Fighter Doctrine
Air Warfare- Bomber Doctrine
Initiator .2341 (.417) -.0065 (.2144)
Battle Deaths -1.85e-06 (5.62e-07)*** -2.46e-06 (5.73e-07)***
Polity IV Score -.01 (.0258) -.0141 (.0159)
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 Finally, three composite models (Table 6.6) were run, utilizing economic, 
population, and military factors, while still retaining the three control variables in them. 
The first model (Table 6.6) was a model that was without naval warfare variables, whiles 
the second and third models (Table 6.6) utilized naval warfare variables at the expense of 
a small group of observations. 
Table 6.6: Composite Win-Lose Models 
 
 As seen by the results, GDP, population, and military variables all combine 
together to have highly significant results together, which gives some measure of validity 
to the overall Informal Theory of Interstate War.  
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Binary W == All  Other Outcomes Key w/o naval Key Var w/ naval Final Composite
Outcome --> Win War Win War Win War
War Pop Growth Pct -37.54869 (8.4857)*** -34.12321 (8.503)***
War Pop Decrease -0.8864484 (.4128)**
Start War GDP 0.000314 (1.88e-04)*
End War GDP 0.000542 (2.22e-04)** 0.000537 (2.2e-04)***
Mil Strategy- Force Utilization 0.6657112 (.3226)** -1.271988 (.605)** -1.075888 (.584)*
Op Lvl Offensive Initiative 2.122421 (.458)*** 2.414697 (.7029)*** 2.337522 (.7121)***
Land Warfare- Manpower Doct -1.218297 (.5862)**
Mil Principle Doct- Mass 1.731938 (.4297)*** 2.764623 (.9235)*** 2.478943 (.9246)***
Mil Principle Doct- Attrition 1.34907 (.5387)**
Commerce Raiding Strategy -2.023026 (1.1077)* -2.354286 (1.0819)**
Wartime Battlefleet Losses -2.259775 (1.028)** -2.484051 (1.065)**
Initiator -0.0475935 (.315) 1.056667 (.5838)* 1.550807 (.6318)**
Battle Deaths -0.00161 (5.38e-04) -0.0028 (8.18e-04)*** -0.00238 (7.38e-04)***
Polity IV Score -0.0024616 (.023) -0.0577466 (.0467) -0.0540952 (.0476)
Coefficients (Stand Error) Log Likelihood: Log Likelihood: Log Likelihood:
*p < 0.10 -163.11716 -74.643798 -73.457703 
**p < 0.05 LR Chi² (8): LR Chi² (11): LR Chi² (11):
***p < 0.001 102.91 104.35 107.16
Pseudo R²: Pseudo R²: Pseudo R²:
Note: All actual populations, .2398 .4114 .4218
averages, GDPs, and deaths are  No of Observ: No of Observ: No of Observ:
roundedto the nearest thousandth 787 500 503
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 These strong results uphold many of the hypotheses put forth in the theory, but 
not all of them. Population decrease because of the war has a strong negative impact upon 
victory, as does a large growing population, which would place greater stress upon the 
Core in the middle of a war. GDP plays an important role, and the higher the End War 
GDP is, the greater the chance a state has of victory, as its economic pillar has been 
spared or has limited the damages of war.  
 Further, states that utilize a mixture of military force employment methods are 
more likely to win, where reliance on less conventional means as a primary method of 
fighting increased the odds of defeat. On the ground, operational offensive initiative 
continues to remain robust and a necessary part of victory. Surprisingly, attritional 
warfare can prove to be an strategy to victory for many states. But what is more 
important is how those forces are used, and when forces are massed properly for 
offensive and defensive operations at the “schwerpunkt”, then the chances for a state to 
achieve victory increases (and holding von Clausewitz to be correct in his assertion). 
Maneuver however was not significantly statistically relevant in the combined model, nor 
was control of the sea, while battlefleet losses were.  
 While these results go a long way to helping provide empirical support for the 
Informal Theory of Interstate war, its reliance of a binary win-lose dependent variable 
weakens its overall assessment. Therefore, further testing, and in particular the use of 
multinomial logit for multiple war outcomes is required.  
Tested Win-Lose-Draw-Continue Models and Results 
 As stated earlier, more than just winning or losing can occur in war. In fact, the 
Bargaining Model believes that wars can continue until an accommodation occurs 
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(Werner 1998, Stam and Smith 2002), while Stam’s (1996) war outcome analysis 
believes that wars can (and do) end in draws or some type of negotiated peace. As such, 
the use of multinomial logit is required to test a dependent variable with four different 
outcomes. In this case here, it is assumed that to continue the war is the base outcome for 
these models.  
DV: Win-Lose-Draw-Continue Models using Multinomial Logit Regression 
Table 6.7: WLDC Endings Best Fit Model #1 
 
Outcome --> Lose (0) Draw (2) Win (3)
War Pop Growth Pct 4.307248 (5.7622) 12.17956 (8.6838) -63.83916 (14.1335)***
War Pop Decrease 0.9381582 (.822) 0.2274205 (1.7359) -4.971128 (1.2268)***
End War GDP -0.00186 (.00157) -0.000239 (7.49e-04) 0.00112 (3.73e-04)***
Mil Strategy- Force Utilization
Op Lvl Offensive Initiative -1.453602 (.7049)** 0.8391827 (.7637) 3.06118 (.8179)***
Mil Principle Doct- Firepower 0.3274682 (.6378) -1.184405 (1.2588) -0.8111755 (.8488)
Mil Principle Doct- Maneuver
Mil Principle Doct- Mass 1.147857 (.6316)* 0.0214197 (1.063) 1.633741 (.8176)**
Mil Principle Doct- Attrition -0.7451999 (.7734) 0.6825896 (1.2058) 1.178044 (.6883)*
Mil Principle Doct- Static Defense 0.497544 (.6061) 2.48129 (1.0012)** 0.3418711 (.5972)
Mil Principle Doct- Withdrawal 1.970034 (.5440)*** 0.4704624 (1.3645) -16.12557 (4814.25)
Land Warfare- Manpower Doct -0.4684729 (.7846) -0.5683137 (1.1501) -1.485896 (.7034)**
Land Warfare- Offensive Doct 0.0551371 (.8496) 1.877249 (1.1232)* 1.884947 (.8556)**
Naval Warfare Doctrine -0.0821105 (.1921) -0.3730737 (.4941) 0.1381031 (.2456)
Commerce Raiding Strategy
Wartime Battlefleet Losses
Air Warfare- Fighter Doctrine -0.0145685 (.3496) -0.3707846 (.5662) 0.9210962 (.5383)*
Air Warfare- Bomber Doctrine -1.050935 (.4025)*** 17.06095 (1645.58) -1.85464 (.5940)***
Initiator 1.823928 (.6949)*** 1.282806 (1.4671) -0.6804356 (.8964)
Battle Deaths -0.00239 (7.59e-04)*** -0.00402 (.00203)** -0.00157 (6.97e-04)**
Polity IV Score -0.004322 (.0565) 0.0356837 (.1231) -0.1228456 (.0631)*
Coefficients (Stand Error) Log Likelihood: Pseudo R²: Note: GDP and Battle-
*p < 0.10 -178.54692 .4011 deaths rounded to 
**p < 0.05 LR Chi² (51): No of Observ: nearest 1000th 
***p < 0.001 239.15 610
Multinomial Logit
Combined Best Fit Model #1
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 In this model (Table 6.7), the population and GDP results are similar to the binary 
dependent variable model, where having a population decrease by the end of the war, 
along with having a large growing population (i.e. birth rate) during wartime harms your 
chances for victory, but does not necessarily mean you will lose. Having a high GDP at 
the end of a war will boost a state’s chances at victory.  
 With the military variables, offensive initiative again gave robust findings, and 
important factor for victory, and conversely a major factor of defeat if not held. The 
principle of mass (the “schwerpunkt”), proved less robust, but robust none the less, and 
while it is an important principle for victory, its use also can foretell defeat as well. 
Therefore, while it is an important principle to follow in war, it in itself does not 
guarantee victory.  
 Static defense utilization was a surprising find, as military theory would have one 
believe that static defenses will ultimately lead to defeat. However, static defenses lead to 
stalemate, and this can be seen in such wars as World War I and Korea. Withdrawal of 
ones forces from a battle, even if involved in a strategic maneuver to stronger positions 
gives the enemy offensive initiative and territory, and the model robustly found that it 
will lead to defeat in war.  
 In agreement with general military theory and the hypothesis of manpower 
conservation, it was found that states that utilize doctrines that seek to conserve their 
manpower harm their chances at victory, though that is not to say that non-conservational 
use of manpower will lead to victory necessarily. Furthermore, in agreement with Allan 
Stam’s general concept of maneuver (with my own firepower emphasis as well), 
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offensive doctrines that utilize maneuver and firepower over attrition and static defenses 
will improve their chances for victory in war, or at least that of a draw. 
 Of somewhat of a surprise, naval warfare variables had little influence when 
utilized a combined command of the sea variable. In the air however, states that utilize air 
superiority with their fighters will improve their chance of success in war, while 
surprisingly and in contradiction to the Informal Theory of Interstate Warfare, strategic 
bombing does not help win wars on its own, which suggests that tactical bombing may be 
of greater support to the war effort than strategic bombing. 
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Table 6.8: WLDC Endings Best Fit Model #2 
 
 A second model (Table 6.8) was run, this time without the control variables, and 
switching up some of the military principles and naval warfare variables with other 
variables. Maneuver alone was not a war winning principle until applied with firepower 
under offensive doctrine. Otherwise the variables of GDP, population, force utilization, 
and offensive initiative were significant as was expected. However in the case of force 
utilization, we had the opposite result as found in the binary dependent variable coding, 
Outcome --> Lose (0) Draw (2) Win (3)
War Pop Growth Pct
War Pop Decrease 1.760682 (1.2791) -101.6711 (2738133) -1.603064 (.6977)**
End War GDP -0.0131 (.00499) 0.5554 (.0000414) 0.000402 (2.50e-04)*
Mil Strategy- Force Utilization -3.362503 (1.1945)*** 5.016378 (40283) 1.838308 (.7547)**
Op Lvl Offensive Initiative -1.03441 (.8107) -37.26196 (64410) 3.058963 (.8382)***
Mil Principle Doct- Firepower 
Mil Principle Doct- Maneuver 1.825687 (.8994)** -956.9345 (2741626) -0.2740777 (.5235)
Mil Principle Doct- Mass 0.1272003 (.8775) -1354.866 (2756035) 3.458481 (1.1557)***
Mil Principle Doct- Attrition
Mil Principle Doct- Static Defense
Mil Principle Doct- Withdrawal
Land Warfare- Manpower Doct -0.5140996 (.7623) -690.4869 (611787) 0.0080138 (.7689)
Land Warfare- Offensive Doct -0.9348081 (1.054) 2.916981 (67942) 2.007589 (.9866)**
Naval Warfare Doctrine
Commerce Raiding Strategy 2.055338 (.9309)** -0.847743 (40283) -3.229116 (1.312)**
Wartime Battlefleet Losses 0.4650706 (.8706) 150.1524 (2803368) -2.539747 (1.1569)**
Air Warfare- Fighter Doctrine 0.592333 (.601) -2.473164 (67942) -0.5352594 (.5232)
Air Warfare- Bomber Doctrine -1.021725 (.8664) -0.7752979 (21962) -1.122651 (.8334)
Initiator
Battle Deaths
Polity IV Score
Coefficients (Stand Error) Log Likelihood: Pseudo R²: Note: GDP and Battle-
*p < 0.10 -95.491207  .3923 deaths rounded to 
**p < 0.05 LR Chi² (36): No of Observ: nearest 1000th 
***p < 0.001 123.31 447
Combined Best Fit Model #2 w/o Control Variables
Multinomial Logit
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where states that utilized conventional warfare only have a better chance of winning a 
war then unconventional warfare only or a mix of the two types of war.  
 What was also surprising were the results in the losses accrued to a battlefleet and 
the use of commerce raiding strategies. Conducting a commerce raiding strategies have a 
decidedly negative impact on s state’s chances for winning a war. Further, the loss of 
capital ships harmed a chance for a state to win, but did not significantly impact their 
chances for losing.   
 It should be interesting to note however that battle deaths were consistently found 
to be significant in most of it not all of the models utilized in this chapter. This suggests 
that greater casualties have a negative impact on winning a war, which is of no surprise. 
However it also shows something else: constant and steady attrition in war. Casualties 
will continue to rise the longer the war is waged, which gives some credence to why 
states attempt to use strategies and principles that seek to end wars quickly, if only to 
save their manpower in the long run through a sustained level of attrition throughout the 
war.  
Cross Tabulation 
 Cross tabulation isn’t necessarily the most complicated or important statistical 
models. It is merely the tabulation of results of two variables against each other. It is 
useful for the purposes of this thesis in order to determine how each side utilized certain 
strategies, doctrines, principles, and operational art during the war. Significantly, it will 
provide a snapshot for what occurs during the continue timeframe coded into these wars.  
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Table 6.9: Offensive Land Doctrine Cross Tabulation 
 
 As seen in this cross-tab, (Table 6.9) the use of the maneuver-firepower land 
doctrine combination was much more significant than the attrition-mass combination. 
What this tells us is that states and their military often prefer the use of maneuver-
firepower doctrines, and will often use them at the same time as the opponent. Therefore, 
the use of the doctrine itself does not mean victory on the battlefield or in the war. Its 
employment, at the operational and tactical levels, along with terrain, training, 
technology, etc. are crucial. Therefore, wars are won not by the doctrine itself, but its use, 
and over time, the one state is worn down to such an extent that they can no longer follow 
the doctrine, and are forced to give up using it.  
Table 6.10: Maneuver Doctrine Cross Tabulation 
 
Offensive Land Doctrine
Attrition- Maneuver- Total
Mass Firepower
Lose 93 68 161
Continue 369 772 1,141
Draw 14 36 50
Win 23 127 150
Total 499 1,003 1,502
Maneuver Doctrine Utilized?
No Yes Total
Lose 104 59 163
Continue 417 731 1,149
Draw 21 31 52
Win 23 129 152
Total 565 950 1,516
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 In cross-tab (Table 6.10), the use of just purely a maneuver doctrine, while not 
significant in the logit models run above, shows like the previous cross-tab (Table 6.8), 
that both states will often at some time utilize the same doctrine against each other. 
Therefore, we can come to the same conclusion as the previous cross-tab that states like 
to utilize similar strategies, operational arts, doctrines, and principles.  
VI. Hypothesis Results 
 H (Population Losses): In both case studies, the results were mixed, due in part to 
lack of data, and US vs. Germany and Allies vs. Germany. However, casualties played a 
major factor in the defeat of Russia (leading to revolution) and Germany (inability to man 
depleted units) in both case studies. In the statistical analysis, the decrease of a state’s 
population throughout the war significantly hampers its ability to win the war. Thus, 
damage to one’s population will impact the war effort, both in its ability to produce arms 
and troops, as seen in the robust results above. Furthermore, they affect how the 
population and government leaders perceive how the war is going. Losses on the 
battlefield may be near, or far away. Yet for those not actively serving in the shield, the 
pain of war can be felt with the loss of family members, friends, and in the pocketbooks, 
etc. 
What is intriguing is the idea of growth rate of a population during the war. At 
first, this may seem counter-intuitive. How does a growing population hamper the war 
effort when manpower is required for the shield and the core to function? At first it would 
be easy to write of the finding by stating that they can simply replace the losses accrued 
in war. However, few wars span more than 5 years. New births however require 17+ 
years in order to physically equip and train a new human to operate in the core or shield. 
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Thus they become a drain on the war effort because resources that could have been 
utilized for the shield has to remain for use in the core.  
Therefore, we find strong evidence for this hypothesis, that damage to the 
population pillar of a state’s core will lessen the likelihood of victory. 
H(Economic Losses): In the two case studies, there was strong support for this 
hypothesis. Damage to an economy, either through direct or indirect means, will affect 
the ability of the state to arm itself while providing for its citizens. In the statistical 
analysis there was support for the state having the highest GDP at the end of the war 
winning the war, as they were able to out produce their enemy while still being able to 
support their own core. Therefore, we find evidence for this hypothesis, that damage to 
the economic pillar of a state’s core will lessen the likelihood of victory. 
H(Offensive Initiative): In both case studies, the state that won the war had the 
offensive initiative at both the strategic and operational levels of war, as they were 
consistently dictating events to the enemy, and continually gaining ground while 
damaging or destroying the enemy’s armed forces. In empirical testing, it was found that 
both states in the majority of wars will trade offensive initiative, or attempt to gain it at 
the same time. However, with very robust quantitative findings in the models, offensive 
initiative is an important factor in attaining victory in war (and conversely and indicator 
of defeat when it is not held), in particular at the operational level of war. Further, 
offensive operations are the only sure way to win a war. While how a state goes about it 
operationally and tactically may differ, the building up of defensive barriers and 
armament must serve to buy time for offensive operations to occur, least another state 
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decide to follow the fate of France with its Maginot Line. There is very strong support for 
this hypothesis, and for offensive operations in general.  
H(Warfare Methods): In the two case studies, both states primarily relied on 
conventional means while still utilizing unconventional warfare to support their 
conventional forces. Because both states utilized the same methods, the case studies were 
inconclusive in their results. Quantitatively however, things were different. In the binary 
dependent variable coding, the results were significant, but depending on the model, there 
was evidence for use of combined methods, while other models were for use of pure 
conventional warfare methods. In the mlogit model, the results were against the 
hypothesis.  
 While an emphasis on the building and use of conventional forces to win 
interstate wars should not be underestimated, the question remains if states should still 
have the capability to defend against unconventional attacks and launched 
unconventional attacks against the enemy, all while conducting major conventional 
operations. To this, military theory would state that it is best to rely on one (conventional 
war), but be prepared to defend against and utilized the other (unconventional warfare) 
against the enemy to gain an advantage. Until this question is further resolved, it seems 
that military theory continues to remain the safe bet on this issue. Thus, with conflicting 
results, though none were correlated with other variables in the modified models, this 
hypothesis cannot be verified under current tests here, and requires further testing. 
H(Maneuver Doctrines): In the case studies, there was strong support for it in the 
Russo-Japanese War, but less so for World War II. In all of the models however, 
maneuver alone was not statistically relevant. Only when combined with firepower 
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doctrines did maneuver doctrines become significantly relevant. As such, this puts into 
question the differences of coding between the Stam data set and my own, though the 
Stam data set has a much more board definition then I utilize. Without its melding with 
firepower doctrines, there is little support for this hypothesis.  
H(Mass): There was strong support for this hypothesis in the case studies, and in 
the various quantitative models. We can therefore uphold von Clausewitz concept of the 
‘schwerpunkt” at not just the tactical level as many historians and theorists state, but at 
the operational level of warfare as well, just as von Clausewitz predicted.  
H(Battlefleets): There was strong support for this hypothesis in the case studies, 
and in the majority of the models from which the variable was tested. The greater the 
losses of capital ships from a state’s battlefleet, the less likely a state will win a war. This 
does not mean that state’s should not use their battlefleets in action, but perhaps a 
cautious naval commander, who is daring when required, but not overly ambitious and 
wasteful with their ships, serves the interests of their state and the war effort the best. 
This kind of thinking can justify Admiral Jellicoe’s actions better so than Admiral Beatty 
in World War I, or the caution showed by Admirals Fletcher and Spruance in the Pacific 
in World War II. Jellicoe, Fletcher, and Spruance all won battles however. Beatty almost 
lost it twice without support from Jellicoe.59 But daring does have its use, as Admiral 
Nelson showed time and time again, however he did create disproportionate losses upon 
the enemy in battle, which would support the assertions of this hypothesis, even if he was 
rather bolder than most naval officers before or after him.  
                                                             
59 I am bias on the Jellicoe-Beatty debate. I am a firm supporter of Jellicoe, and believe Beatty to have 
been reckless in every command he held while connected with the Grand Fleet in World War I.  
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H(Sea Control): Both case studies showed strong support for this hypothesis. 
However the statistical analysis was less compelling. Not all models held it as significant, 
and only found that enacting certain sea denial (commerce raiding) strategies actually led 
to defeat. However, this statistical analysis may be skewed due to the nature of naval 
warfare. Wars are won on land, but naval forces to serve as a force multiplier for land 
operations and allowing for greater freedom of movement in land operations and in the 
keeping of supply lines open for ground forces when deployed overseas. Most wars had 
very few naval battles, and some had not navies involved at all. Further, naval supremacy 
at sea does not equate to victory on land (such as the US in Vietnam). While there is little 
support for this hypothesis based upon the quantitative tests here, this hypothesis does 
deserve more research and analysis.  
 H(Conservation Force): The case studies had a decided divided view on this, with 
support for this in the Russo-Japanese War, and mixed evidence for this in World War II. 
Statistically the results were robust; enacting strategies that seek to conserve forces did 
not help achieve victory in war, and in fact hurt the chance for victory. As such, there is 
support for this hypothesis, but it is in greater need for further testing. 
 H(Core): Can we support the overall hypothesis that states that protects their own 
core and shield while damaging the enemy core and shield will be victorious? While the 
determinants are just that, determinants, they do point for support for the hypothesis, 
though more rigorous mathematical models are required to answer this hypothesis. The 
analysis above showed that the population and economy needed protection in order to 
support the war effort for the shield. Further, offensive operation and damage to the 
enemy shield and core significantly helped a state win the war they were involved in. 
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What is missing is more data on governance, decision making, and other elements of the 
shield outside of the armed forces to further validate or refute this hypothesis, but thus 
far, the hypothesis and overall Informal Theory of Interstate Warfare seems to be an 
excellent organization and analysis of the state at war. 
VI. Implications and Conclusion 
 So what have we learned in this chapter? Thus far we have strong evidence that 
states tend to use similar means when fighting, or until the point where they can no 
longer utilize that strategy, principle, doctrine, or operational art. Furthermore, there is a 
constant attrition of casualties in war, which may be why military theorists and politicians 
want quicker ends to wars even when evidence may suggest this may harm their long 
range war aims, and why military commanders tailor their strategies, etc. for quick, 
decisive wars when possible. They are not only cheaper in manpower, but in money as 
well.  
 A state’s economy and population also play a major role in helping or hurting a 
state’s ability achieve victory in war, but conversely is impacted by the events that occur 
during war. Combined with offensive military action, they are decisive in state’s winning 
wars.  
 Yet there is a glaring weakness in this type of analysis. It does nothing to show 
how and why the wars end the way they do when they do. It has only given the 
determinants of war outcomes. Nothing in this data shows that leaders, the population, or 
another state determines when the war ends.  
 Because of this, further testing of old and new determinates of war outcomes must 
continue, and then compared to see how they fit within the overall Informal Theory of 
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Chapter 4. Wars are won or lost by offensive action. Primarily the state that utilizes 
offensive action, and has offensive initiative is dictating events on the battlefield, and 
forcing the enemy to respond to actions made against it. Offensive action and initiative 
also provides the promise of gaining territory and destruction of the enemy’s forces 
(though this is not to say that it is without cost, because it is). However, offensive 
initiative is necessary for winning wars, especially in interstate wars.  
 Yet what does this mean for civilian leaders, military leaders, and populations? 
Most interstate wars involve the direct or indirect targeting of not only the shields of their 
state, but also attacks upon their cores. Further, there is a fine line between too much 
restraint (i.e. conservation of forces strategies) and too little restraint (unrestricted 
strategic bombing). Wars are costly, not only in manpower, but in lost GDP as well, and 
will always have a cost, no matter the spin placed upon them. Wars are not fought by just 
the armed forces of a state, but by states in its entirety. States may choose how large or 
small they wish to participate in the war, but states, with their economies, populations, 
governments, and armed forces (and all other elements of the shield) fight wars and will 
be targeted. It would be wise for political scientists, military theorists, politicians, and 
military professions to remember this when they study and actively engage in war, 
instead of studying and engaging by proxy variables and results. 
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With the results of the case studies and quantitative analysis already presented, 
what are the implications for this theory, researchers in the fields of political science and 
military science, policy makers, and military commanders based upon the results of the 
theory and hypotheses?   
First, there is strong support for viewing war in through the structural lens as done 
in the theory presented. However, it is merely a framework and not a true mathematical 
model in its current form, though it has the potential to become one in the future. The 
findings found in the thesis further expand the work already done in war outcome 
determinants, and help illuminate weaknesses in offense-defense theory and the 
bargaining model of war, which in the case of the latter should be addressed in order to 
strengthen the bargaining model, while the former should simply be disregarded as it is 
beyond its usefulness in the field of study.  
 I have shown that when states go to war, their populations and economies play an 
important factor in determining the outcome of a war. Combined with military operations 
at the strategic and operational level of war, we begin to see the more accurate picture of 
the (entire) state at war. Damage to both the Shield and the Core can have the direst of 
consequences on the outcome of a war.  
 This theory is not a mutually exclusive theory, but is designed to complement the 
work already crafted, as it could significantly help the bargaining model become a more 
specific and accurate model. It also expands upon the determinants of war outcomes, 
refining the work of such authors as Allan Stam (1996), while not directly conflicting 
with their overall results. The theory is where all theories in both fields of study should 
be heading: the combination of smaller theories into larger, more complex, and accurate 
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theories and models. But is what has been presented really new? Many of the concepts 
certainly are not. And much of what has been stated is considered common sense, or well 
known. However, not much of it has been tested in political science or military science. If 
it could be compared to physics, it is as if we know the atom exists, but hold little 
knowledge beyond that it exists. Why these concepts have yet to be tested, and in such 
detail, is unknown. Further, why a theory has yet to be created to encompass the state at 
war in such detail before this is also unknown.  
 In the case of my Informal Theory, I have utilized many well-known concepts of 
both how a state operates and is organized with well-known principles and concepts of 
warfare into one, something that has yet to be done on this scale in political science, and 
is only done so in military science in war games and simulations of potential conflicts or 
historical lessons, but nothing systematic. As such, it is merely the first step in continuing 
research. Thus the “so what” question asked is while these concepts and ideas are 
obvious to many, they have yet to be tested on such a scale and in such a manner.  
 For researchers, continued work on wartime variables, in particular military 
related variables needs to continue. It should not only continue beyond single 
observations per war dyad to changes made throughout the war, and beyond that of the 
strategic level of war to incorporate the operational and (eventually) the tactical levels of 
war. Such attempts by Biddle (2004) at the tactical (and very low operational level) can 
be expanded upon up into the operational level and beyond. The military and many 
national security think tanks routinely simulate and war game combat operations at all 
levels of warfare. However, simulations and war games, just like case studies and 
empirical analysis suffer from an information problem. 
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To further our knowledge, there must be an accepted call to arms, which seeks 
two things: closer cooperation with other areas of study, and attempts to lessen the 
information problem. This task will not be easy, as both researchers in both political 
science and military science do not fully embrace each other, nor other relevant areas of 
study that are related to waging war. The majority of political scientists tend to leave out 
detail in military variable (though there are some notable exceptions to this), while the 
majority of military scientists and practitioners tend to do the same in their research in 
regards to political variables. Therefore, political scientists and military scientists and 
practitioners should look beyond their specific areas of study and work hand-in-hand 
together, and do so more often. Their fields of study are too interrelated to not do so, even 
if the tendency is not to work together.  
In order to correct and limit the information problem, there should be a concerted 
effort, not unlike that of the Correlates of War data set, but far more expansive, specific, 
and detailed in wartime information. This new data set should strive to expand our 
current data, specifically data within the areas of population, economics, production, 
political governance, military organization, military doctrine, principles of warfare, the 
operational and tactical levels of war, military decision making, training, technology etc. 
with the eventual goal of connecting these  vast and under researched areas together. This 
endeavor would be far beyond anything the COW data set has accomplished thus far.  
This would be no easy task, as it would require modeling and simulation of 
weaponry, production information, detailed analysis of doctrine and training, and much 
of that data is not available in English, if at all. For example, information in English on 
the Austro-Hungarian army during World War I has a great many gaps in it due to the 
258 
 
collapse of the empire in 1918, with much of that information lost. What is there is 
mostly in German, Hungarian, and several other languages. Yet no one can doubt that 
massive effect the Austro-Hungarian army had upon the Russians and Italians in the First 
World War.  
 Research at this level of detail is impossible for one person. For this endeavor to 
succeed, historians, military professionals, think tanks, academia (both professors and 
students) will have to endeavor upon this great and noble undertaking. It will be long and 
tedious work, but it will help solve the information problems that currently plague the 
study of warfare in both fields. 
But in order to advance our cause, it must be done. The atomic bomb, nor knowledge of 
black holes and the expansion of the universe were hardly found by one person, but the 
by combined efforts of many scholars, theorists, and researchers, along with technicians, 
engineers, mathematicians, etc. It none the less can be done with sustained will power 
and energy for it to succeed. 
 The field should also conduct research not only into more operational and tactical 
variables, but that of training, doctrine, methods of war, technology, etc.  Perhaps the 
most important thing missing in not only my own thesis and analysis, but in all of 
political science, is how leaders, commanders, war fighters, and personnel respond under 
the stress of combat and warfare (Rosen 2005). It is easy to test people in a controlled 
environment, to see whether or not they will act this way or that. It is however something 
completely different (and impossible) to put true fear, the fear of death, defeat, and loss 
of life and true stress into a testable controlled environment. And how people will 
respond not when only money is at stake or based off of some survey, but when their own 
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very existence and the existence of their way of life is at stake, is difficult to quantify. 
How does one react when forced to make decisions that could have major ramifications 
not only for them, but for the personnel under them or the future of their state? As Evan 
Thomas describes in his book on the Battle of Leyte Gulf (1944), “who can know what is 
it really like to stand, bone-weary, on the bridge of a ship in action, responsible for 
hundreds if not thousands of lives, unsure of the enemy’s strength and where-abouts, and 
yet forced to make fatal decisions” (Thomas 2006, 354). Only a very few can truly know 
what that stressful burden feels like. For some, their time responsible for their personnel 
was only a few chaotic minutes or hours, others months, and for some, years.60 And yet, 
how they respond to that stress, and the decisions they make will have a very large 
impact on the outcome of battles, campaigns, and wars. The coding of training, and 
intangibles such as leadership, courage, morale, etc. will be a difficult, but necessary 
undertaking if we are to further the field of study.  
 And finally, researchers should look beyond their potential prejudices of war. War 
is evil, but at times a necessary one, at times one of choice. In autocracies, the people are 
less to blame, but in a democracy, everyone has a say and not only culpability in their 
state’s war outcomes, but a responsibility in helping achieve victory (or defeat) in war. 
War must not be romanticized, nor despised, but seen as a human endeavor, though a 
very destructive one.  
Perhaps researchers should keep in mind the comments of Evan Thomas ended 
his book on the Battle of Leyte Gulf, where he stated that this battle, and we should 
                                                             
60 Run-ins with the Iranians in the Persian/Arabian Gulf as Officer of the Deck on my DDG were not fun, 
and at the time I thought little about it, I was just doing my job as I was trained to and how I wanted to. In 
retrospect, I have an appreciative understanding of the pressures and stresses commanders may be 
under, even if my stress lasted mere minutes and not days, weeks, months, or years. However, some of 
those minutes felt like a lifetime to me then and now.  
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extrapolate that to war in general should be “remember[ed] for its individual acts of 
heroism and defiance, but more so for the blunders and misunderstandings that are 
inherent in war” (Thomas 2006, 356).  
Those blunders and misunderstandings inherent in war should also be 
remembered by policy makers and military commanders as well. Policy makers and 
commander should remember that not only are their armed forces at war with another 
state’s armed forces, but that their state is at war with another state. Since World War II 
there has been a push to limit war and its effects upon everything outside of the armed 
forces. In the past thirty years in the United States, it has become fashionable to believe 
that new weaponry (“smart weaponry”) will somehow allow for no civilian casualties in 
war. Yet there is a paradox in that assessment. That same population that many wish to 
avoid harming at all is an element of the enemy state, and whether freely or through 
force, support that state as it wages war against the United States.  
Because of this, modern thoughts of bloodless wars should be tempered with 
reality. War involves killing. And when one state goes to war against another state, 
choices must be made, and the repercussions of which accepted in how one will 
prosecute the war. While attacks should always be made against the armed forces of an 
enemy state, the defeat and destruction of an enemy’s armed forces is difficult. Unless the 
state wishes to embark upon a military buildup of massive proportions that can ensure 
overwhelming their opponent’s armed forces completely, states should consider both 
direct and especially indirect attacks upon the enemy’s core.  
While in the US (and many other states) the concept of and practice of the 
destruction of the enemy’s armed forces is constant, it is none the less a very difficult 
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task. Politicians and military commanders should think as Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, 
Pershing, Marshall, Eisenhower, King and Nimitz thought of war: war requires attacks 
upon both the enemy’s shield and core. Furthermore, leaders should recognize that their 
own core needs protection and guidance to support its own shield. This kind of 
coordination is time consuming and difficult, and may be unpopular. No matter the 
difficulty, it is a leader’s responsibility to do so.  
If war was truly about just armed forces fighting each other, and ideas of 
proportionality, then they conflict with some specific results of this thesis. How else can 
there be an account for a decrease in a state’s population and GDP if attacks (both direct 
and indirect) were not made upon it? How else can one account for the results that state 
that taking the enemy’s national territory? This thesis and line of thinking are backed by 
findings made by Quackenbush (2012) with regards to the capture of an enemy capital, 
and with Martinez (2012) and the effects of various aerial strategies have upon war 
outcomes.   
Besides lifting the restrictions upon attacks upon the enemy core, leaders should 
ignore the concept of proportionality when responding to the enemy and instead seek to 
use overwhelming force. This is backed by the empirical results of the mass and 
offensive doctrine variables and hypotheses. Not only should that force be an 
overwhelming mass of force at the schwerpunkt, but a force that, as seen like 
overwhelming mass in the previous chapter, a force that is willing to take risks and seeks 
swift victory over conservation of forces. Leaders would be wise to remember that there 
is a natural attrition of casualties in war, and that the longer a war lasts, the more 
casualties that will occur, and only swift action that seeks victory regardless of casualties 
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will avoid prolonged losses over the long term, as seen in the constant losses over time in 
the casualty variable tested in Chapter 6.  
Finally, offensive action (coded as offensive initiative in the data set and 
hypothesis) is what wins wars. Sitting on the defensive hardly takes territory, nor deters 
an enemy from attacking. Only offensive action can stop an enemy from attacking 
because it places them on the defensive. No matter the current technological level, 
successful states overcome barriers to offensive operations to win wars. Offensive 
operations however are more expensive in the manning and equipping of forces designed 
to move vast distances into the enemy’s territory and kept well supplied. However, the 
price of victory in war is worth the expenses to maintain such a force in peacetime, so if 
deterrence fails, victory will be won on the battlefield. This would lend credence to the 
ancient Roman saying attributed to Vegetius: Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum (If you wish 
peace, prepare for war).  
This should only be viewed as the first steps. Any errors made are my own, and 
are unintentional and not out of malice. To me, this will always be an unfinished work, 
though I hope to come back to this and refine and expand upon the theory and lessons 
learned sometime after my service in the US Navy. I hope other researchers will expand 
upon the findings here, make this theory and other theories within political science and 
military science stronger, and take up the call to arms for a combined effort at data 
collection for the greater good of our understanding of the state at war. It is the least that 
those who do not serve actively or who have already served can do to ensure better 
analysis for the fields of study and perhaps ensure practically that fewer wars occur, and 
if not for the sake of ourselves, then for our children and our children’s children future.  
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